The Controversy Between the United States and the Allied Governements Respecting Neutral Rights and Commerce During the Period of American Neutrality, 1914-1917 by University of Texas at Austin
University of Texas Bulletin 
No. 2344: November 22, 1923 
The Controversy Between the United States and the 
Allied Governments Respecting Neutral Rights 
and Commerce During the Period of 
American Neutrality, 1914-1917 
By 
MALBONE WATSON GRAHAM, Jr. 
Adjunct Professor of Government 
PUBLISHED BY 
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS 
AUSTIN 
Publications of the University of Texas 
Publications Committee: 
FREDERIC DUNCALF 
KILLIS CAMPBELL 
F. W. GRAFF 
C. G. HAINES 
J. L. HENDERSON 
E. J. MATHEWS 
H.J. MULLER 
HAL C. WEAVER 
The University publishes bulletins four times a month, 
so numbered that the first two digits of the number show 
the year of issue, the last two the position in the yearly 
series. (For example, No. 2201 is the first bulletin of the 
year 1922.) These comprise the official publications of the 
University, publications on humanistic and scientific sub-
jects, bulletins prepared by the Bureau of Extension, by the 
Bureau of Economic Geology, and other bulletins of general 
educational interest. With the exception of special num-
bers, any bulletin will be sent to a citizen of Texas free on 
request. All communications about University publications 
should be addressed to University Publications, University 
of Texas, Austin. 
UNIYEISITY OP TEXAS PRESS, AWSTIK 
University of Texas Bulletin 
No. 2344: November 22, 1923 
The Controversy Between the United States and the 
Allied Governments Respecting Neutral Rights 
and Commerce During the Period of 
American Neutrality, 1914-1917 
By 
MALBONE WATSON GRAHAM, Jr. 
Adjunct Professor of Government 
PUBLISHBD BY THE UNIVERSITY FOUR TIMES A MONTH, AND ENTERED AS 
SECOND-CLASS MATTER AT THE POSTOFFICB AT AUSTIN. TEXAS, 
UNDER THE ACT OP AUGUST 2'4, 1912 
The benefit& of education and of 
useful knowledge, generally diffused 
through a . community, are essential 
to the preservation of a free govern-
ment. 
Sam Houston 
Cultivated mind is the guardian 
genius of democracy. . It is the 
only dictator that freemen acknowl-
edge and the only security that free-
men desire. 
Mirabeau B. Lamar 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Introductory Note ---------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
Chapter I. The Outbreak of War: Initial Contro-
versies 13 
Chapter II. The Controversy over Mail Seizures________ 25 
Chapter III. The Controversy over the Declaration 
of London ___ __ ________ ------------------------------------------------------- 36 
Chapter IV. Unneutral Acts and Unneutral Service 51 
Chapter V. The Controversy over Armed Merchant 
Ships _ ____ _ __ ____ _ _ _ _ __________________ __ __________ _____ _______ _ ___ ________ ______ 61 
Chapter VI. The Controversy over Contraband and 
the Right of Search______ __ ___ ______________________________ ___________ 86 
Chapter VII. Transfer of Registry and Enemy Char-
acter ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 138 
Chapter VIII. The Controversy over Blockade _______ _____ 147 
Chapter IX. Conclusion ------------------------------------------------ 167 
Appendices -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 169 
Bibliography ________________ _________ ---------------------------------------------- 183 
Index ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -_..... . 189 
The intercourse of this country with foreign nations, and its pol-
icy in regard to them, are placed by the Constitution of the United 
States in the hands of the Government, and its decisions upon these 
subjects are obligatory upon every citizen of the Union. He is bound 
to be at war with the nation against which the war-making power 
has declared war, and equally bound to commit no act of hostility 
against a nation with which the Government is in amity and friend-
ship. 
This principle is universally acknowledged by the laws of the na-
tions. It lies at the foundation of all governments, as there could 
be no social order or peaceful relations between the citizens of dif-
ferent countries without it. It is, however, more emphatically true 
in relation · to citizens of the United States. For as the sovereignty 
resides in the people, every citizen is a portion of it, and is himself 
personally bound by the laws which the representatives of the sov-
ereignty may pass, or the treaties into which they may enter, within 
the scope of their delegated authority. And when that authority has 
plighted its faith to another nation that there shall be peace and 
friendship between the citizens of the two countries, every citizen of 
the United States is equally and personally pledged. The compact 
is made by the department of the Government upon which he himself 
has agreed to confer the power. It is his own personal compact as 
a portion of the sovereignty in whose behalf it is made. And he can 
do no act, nor enter into any agreement to promote or encourage re-
volt or hostilities against the territory of a country with which our 
Government is pledged by treaty to be at peace, without a breach of 
his duty as a citizen, and the breach of the faith pledged to the for-
eign nation. 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. 
INTRODUCTORY NOTE ON THE GENERAL NEU-
TRALITY POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES 
In the study of the policy of the Government of the 
United States since the inception of its national life one 
cannot fail to be impressed with the remarkable character 
of its positive contributions to thhe law of nations in its 
pursuit of the ideal of neutrality amid circumstances too 
often all but intolerable. It matters little that the policy 
of neutrality inaugurated by President Washington was 
guided in part by the considerations of internal policy, the 
uncertain financial conditions-of the newly established Fed-
eral Government, and a distinct division of counsels in the 
cabinet, for the essential fact back of the adoption of the 
policy in the famous proclamation of neutrality was the 
resolve of the President "to adopt general rules, which 
should conform to the treaties, and assert the privileges, of 
the United States." These were, accordingly, laid down in 
systematic rules, as "there was reason to apprehend that 
our intercourse with those powers with whom the United 
States have the most extensive relations might be inter-
rupted, and our disposition for peace drawn into question 
by the suspicions too often entertained by belligerent na-
tions."1 
Throughout, one thing stands out quite clearly-the firm 
desire of Washington to establish along clearly defined lines 
a policy which should embrace in its scope the recognition, 
as this nation understood them, of the principles of the 
law of nations as regards neutral powers. It is true that 
we had not illcorporated in our treaty of peace with Great 
Britain the principles of the Armed Neutrality of 1780, 
although we had later committed ourselves in the treaties 
with the countries which composed iF to the acceptance of 
the doctrines promulgated by the Empress Catherine, and 
it was only in the articles of the Jay Treaty with England 
that we assented to the right of a belligerent to seize enemy 
1American State Papers, Foreign R elations I, 21. 
2Moore, Digest of Int ernational Law, VII, 560. 
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property aboard a neutral ship. Under such circumstances, 
on the outbreak of war in Europe, it was an epochal step 
for Washington to take in seeking independently to de-
termine, as far as our municipal jurisprudence was con-
cerned, the exact stand that the United States would take 
in the interpretation of its rights and duties as a neutral 
power. 
It was on this basis, therefore, that the first Neutrality 
Act of June 5, 1794, was passed, prohibiting the acceptance 
by citizens of the United States of commissions to serve a 
foreign state or prince; the enlistment or hiring of per-
sons to enlist in the service ~f any other state; the fitting 
out and arming of vessels to be used against countries with 
which the United States was at peace; the commissioning 
of a vessel for such purpose; the augmenting of its forces; 
the setting on foot of military expeditions against foreign 
states within the territory or jurisdiction of the United 
States, and empowering the President to use such part of 
the land and naval forces of the United States as should 
be judged necessary to enforce the act. The courts of the 
United States were likewise given jurisdiction over cases 
of captures within the territorial waters of the United 
States, though the act was not to be so construed as to pre-
vent the prosecution of treason or piracy as defined by 
treaty or by law of the United States.3 This act, renewed 
in 1797, was made permanent by the Act of April 24, 1800. 
As a starting point for the enactment by other countries 
of neutrality laws, the Act of 1794 has been claimed as one 
of the most model acts that could have been contemplated 
for the true enforcement of neutrality, and has received 
unstinted praise from many eminent writers and states-
men.• 
It is not the part of this endeavor to discuss in any de-
tail the numerous occasions when the United States has 
found itself in a difficult position due to the violation of its 
31 U. S. Statutes at Large, 381. 
•Cf. Fenwick, C. G., The Neutrality Laws of the United States, p. 
27, and Hall, W. E., International Law, 4th Ed., p. 587. 
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neutral rights by belligerents in foreign wars, or due to 
the enterprises undertaken by its own citizens in aid of in-
surrections or revolutions in American countries. Suffice 
it to say that such notorious cases of filibustering as the 
Miranda expedition in 1806 brought from the pen of Jef-
ferson on November 27, 1806, a neutrality proclamation as 
regards the wars of the Spanish American colonies and the 
attempt of American citizens to organize military expedi-
tions in the United States with a view to furthering their 
insurrection against Spain.5 Other proclamations and 
diplomatic notes between the United States and Spain fol-
lowed in the course of the next decade, and the manifest 
deficiencies in the neutrality laws, as revealed both by the 
exigencies of the Napoleonic wars and by the revolt of the 
Spanish colonies, were brought to the attention of Congress 
by Madison in his message to Congress on December 26, 
1816: 
It is found that the existing laws have not the efficacy ne-
cessary to prevent violations of the obligations of the United 
States as a nation at peace towards belligerent parties, and 
other unlawful acts on the high seas, by armed vessels 
equipped within the waters of the United States. 
With a view to maintain more effectually the respect due 
to the laws, to the character, and to the neutral and pacific 
relations of the United States, I recommend to the consid-
eration of Congress the expediency of such further legisla-
tive provisions as may be requisite for detaining vessels ac-
tually equipped, or in a course of equipment, with a warlike 
force, within the jurisdiction of the United States; or, as the 
case may be, for obtaining from the owners or commanders 
of such vessels adequate securities against the abuse of their 
armaments, with the exceptions in such provisions proper 
for the cases of merchant vessels furnished with the defen-
sive armaments usual on distant and dangerous expeditions, 
and of a private commerce in military stores permitted by 
our laws, and which the law of nations does not require the 
United States to prohibit.G 
The fruit of Madison's recommendations and the advice 
offered by Monroe, then Secretary of State, was the "Act 
5Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Presidents, I, 404. 
6 Fenwick, citing Am. State Papers, For. Rel., IV, 103, op. cit., p. 35. 
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more effectually to preserve the neutral relations of the 
United States" effective March 3, 1817.7 This served to 
take away the burden of preventing expeditions against a 
friendly nation by insurgents, by the designation of "for-
eign prince, state, colony, district, or people" as the all-
embracing group of those in whose behalf the laws were 
to be enforced, in lieu of the narrower designation "for-
eign state or prince" which had operated too one-sidedly 
against all insurgents hitherto.1a Finally, as a com-
pleting measure, Congress, by an Act of April 20, 1818, 
passed a law codifying all previous neutrality laws into one 
act, now embodied in the Revised Statutes of the United 
States, Sections 5284-5291.8 
The next enactment dealing with the neutrality of the 
United States came as the result of President Van Buren's 
proclamation of January 5, 18389 warning American citi-
zens against compromising the neutrality of the United 
States by interfering in the current insurrection in Canada 
against the British authorities, and a message urging Con-
gress to make adequate provision for the case. Conse-
quently, on March 10, 1838, Congress passed an act author-
izing the detention of shipments of ammunition or other 
war material "which may be provided or prepared for any 
military expedition or enterprise against the territory or 
dominions of any foreign prince or state or of any colony 
district or people coterminous with the United States and 
with whom they are at peace."10 This has been regarded 
in some quarters as the chief precedent for the action of 
the Congress of the United States, when, by joint resolu-
tion of March 14, 1912, it authorized the President to pro~ 
7 3 Statutes at Large, 370. 
7aThis marks, from a juridical standpoint at least, the turning 
point in the policy of the United States as regards the revolting col-
onies of Spain, by the assertion of its neutrality laws so as to protect 
them from being the victims of expeditions of repression supported 
by the United States through grants of aid to the mother country. 
s3 Statutes at Large, 447. 
9Richardson's Messages, III, 481. 
105 Statutes at Large, 212. 
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claim the illegality of export of munitions to any American 
country where, in his opinion, there existed "conditions of 
domestic violence which are promoted by the use of arms or 
munitions of war procured from the United States,'' until 
otherwise ordered by him or by Congress.11 
More menacing to our neutrality were the mid-century 
filibustering expeditions of Lopez to Cuba in 1849, and of 
Walker to Nicaragua in the early fifties, the numerous at-
tempts on the 'part of over-zealous Americans to aid Cuba 
in her protracted struggle for freedom against Spain, and 
sundry expeditions that have from time to time been made 
against Mexico. In each instance these served to call forth 
from the President a proclamation against the citizens who 
should so conspire to set at naught the laws of the United 
States maintaining her neutrality. As regards Cuba, so 
open were American sympathies in favor of the insurgents 
that Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State, was "forced to 
admit with regret" that the United States had failed to ex-
ercise the "due diligence" in preventing the escape of an 
expedition• bent on reaching Cuba, due to the extreme se-
crecy with which the insurgents had carried out their plans; 
furthermore, there were constitutional limitations as to the 
right of search and seizure, as well as to the suppression 
of free expression of opinion, which the United States Gov-
ernment could not itself trespass.12 
The lessons taught the United States by the depredations 
of the Alabama in the Civil War, and by the neglect of 
Great Britain to take due diligence to prevent the departure 
of the Laird commerce destroyers from Liverpool, gave 
President Grant ample warrant for making the regulations 
as to the stay of belligerent war-vessels in the harbors of 
the United States as stringent as possible. Consequently, 
by means of a second proclamation of neutrality in the 
Franco-Prussian War, issued October 8, 1870, supplement-
ing the very detailed proclamation which he had already 
nFenwick, op. cit., p. 58. 
i2House Executive Document No. 160, 41st Congress, 2nd Session. 
p. 133. 
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issued on August 22, 1870, President Grant declared that, 
as information subsequent to the original proclamation 
gave him "reason to apprehend an abuse of the hospitality 
of the ports of the United States by belligerent cruisers," 
he proclaimed and declared that "any use of the territorial 
waters of the United States by vessels of either belligerent 
for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations or as 
posts of observation must be regarded as in violation of the 
neutrality of the United States." 13 Further than this, the . 
proclamation fixed the rule of a twenty-four hour stay in 
neutral ports for belligerent warships, in the wake of the 
practice adopted by Great Britain in her Neutrality Regu-
lations of 1862, which also provided that the supplies to 
be taken aboard a belligerent vessel must be limited to pro-
visions for her crew and as much coal as should be suffi-
cient to carry the vessel, if without sail power, to the nearest 
European port of her own country, and that supplies of coal 
could not be furnished more than once in three months.14 
These regulations finally found their way into Convention 
XIII, adopted by the Second Hague Conference•in 1907, re-
lating to the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Mari-
time War, thereby acquiring the sanctions of the law of 
nations for this hitherto purely municipal enactment. 
The last important development of the position of the 
United States previous to the outbreak of the European 
· war, with the exception of the proclamation as to Mexico 
already noted, is to be found in a proclamation issued by 
President Roosevelt on October 14, 1905, who declared 
"for good and sufficient reasons to me appearing, and by 
virtue of the authority conferred upon me by a joint reso-
lution approved April 22, 1898, to prohibit the export of 
coal or other material used in war from any sea-port of the 
United States" that "the export of arms, ammunition, and 
munitions of war of every kind from any port in the United 
States or in Porto Rico to any port in the Dominican Re-
public, is prohibited, without limitation or exception, from 
t3Richardson, Messages, VIII, 87-89. 
HFenwick, op. ci t., 53. 
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and after the date of this my proclamation until otherwise 
ordered by the President or the Congress."15 
These various steps are sufficient, for the purposes of this 
study, to show how .the United States, by mere municipal 
enactments, has striven to fulfil ; as best it knew, the strict 
obligations of neutrality. 
Judged by the standards of other nations, as may be 
noted in reading the neutrality proclamations of all the 
neutral countries at the beginning of the Great War.16 the 
standard of neutral conduct maintained by the United 
States is relatively high, consistent with the previous in-
ternational practice of the most enlightened nations, and 
free from any regulations that have not as yet taken effect 
internationally-such as Latin American states have been 
wont to embody in their neutrality codes. Yet notwith-
standing this high standard of neutrality laws and policy, 
the United States found, in the course of the Great War, 
that her municipal enactments must be broadened. To 
that end, the 63rd Congress, in its closing hours, passed a 
joint resolution to empower the President to better en-
force and maintain the neutrality of the United States.17 
This authorized the President to issue orders to the col-
lectors of customs under the jurisdiction of the United 
States to withhold clearance from any vessel, American or 
foreign, which he had reasonable cause to believe to be 
about to carry fuel, arms, ammunition, men or supplies to 
any warship, or tender, or supply ship of a belligerent na-
tion, in violation of the obligations of the United States as 
a neutral nation. The rush at the eleventh hour to pass 
some such blanket clause of authority when the eventful 
summer of 1915 was at hano is the only discreditable fea-
ture in regard to the conduct of our policy at the time, yet 
the powers entrusted to the President as the result of its 
passage were found sufficiently ample, for all the emer-
gencies of the international situation, up till the time of 
1534 Statutes at Large, 383. 
16107 British and Foreign State Papers, II, 795-865. 
11Ew No. 2, p. 20. (4.III.15). 
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the crisis over the armed neutrality bill two years later. 
The ignominous failure of the latter measure left the 
United States without any proper means to safeguard its 
neutrality towards other countries with which it remained 
at peace during the period of the war, consequently it be-
came necessary to enact new measures fitted to safeguard 
the neutrality of the United States during time of war. Jn 
the Espionage Bill, passed during the first session of the 
65th Congress, a special title was introduced to cover the 
situation, and embodied in it the gist of the best proposals 
for the better safeguarding of the neutral .rights of the 
United States that had been made during the years of her 
neutrality. As their import does not bear on the issues 
under our consideration, it is sufficient here merely to refer 
to them, with the comment that it took the test of war itself 
to prove to the United States the flaws and weaknesses in 
its previous code of neutrality. At last, under the pressure 
of war-time enactments,1 3 _the United States has obtained 
a thoroughgoing code of neutrality laws sufficiently drastic 
and systematic in their operation to render amenable to 
law almost all the possible situations that might arise in 
time of either peace or war.18• 
18Title V, Chapter 30, U. S. Statutes at Large, 1917, p. 221. 
18aFor a review of the effects of the law of 1917 upon the older 
statutes, cf. Hyde, Charles Cheney, International Law, Chiefly as 
Interpreted and Applied by the United States, II, 703-708 passfim 
(hereafter cited as Hyde, International Law). 
CHAPTER I. THE OUTBREAK OF WAR: 
INITIAL CONTROVERSIES 
In the course of this conflict, let it be our endeavor, as 1t 1s our 
interest and desire, to cultivate the friendship of the belligerent na-
tions by every act of justice and of innocent kindness; to receive 
their armed vessels with hospitality from the distresses of the sea, 
but to administer the means of annoyance to none; to establish in 
our harbors such a police as may maintain law and order; to re-
strain our citizens from embarking individually in a war in which 
their country takes no part; to punish severely those persons, citi-
zen and alien, who shall usurp the cover of our flag for vessels not 
entitled to it, infecting thereby with suspicion those of real Ameri-
cans and committing us into controversies for the redress of wrongs 
not our own; to exact from every nation the observance towards our 
vessels and citizens of those principles and practices which all civi-
lized people acknowledge; to merit the character of a just nation and 
maintain that of an independent one, preferring every consequence 
to insult and habitual wrong. Congress will consider whether the ex-
isting laws enable us efficaciously to maintain this course with our 
citizens in all places and with others while within the limits of our 
jurisdiction, and will give them the new modifications necessary for 
these objects. 
THOMAS JEFFERSON. 
The outbreak of the European War found the United 
States suddenly encumbered with the heavy load of diplo-
matic relations of the various belligerent powers, who, 
feeling secure in entrusting their addled affairs to our 
care, had turned instinctively to the embassies or legations 
of the United States, feeling that, as we had always "stood 
apart, studiously neutral," in all previous European con-
flicts, we would now be the first to proffer our aid to those 
distressed civilians and exasperated statesmen whose feel-
ings on the outbreak of war had left many a difficult situa-
tion for neutral diplomats to handle. America became the 
medium of exchange of thought and correspondence be-
tween the two great groups of belligerents, and her en-
deavors to straighten many tangled and thwarted affairs 
out of the impasses into which war had brought them was 
such as to make the work of our diplomats abroad and of 
our State Department at home signal in its achievements. 
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The most pressing situation abroad was, of course, the 
plight of American citizens marooned in the war area, de-
void of means of identification-such had been the general 
neglect of passports in antebellum days. They were now 
seized or detained or left stranded in the most precarious 
situations, and our embassies were taxed to the limit in an 
endeavor to provide them safe means for return to the 
United' States, both by the issuance of passports and by 
provision of money for them. To that end Mr. Bryan, then 
Secretary of State, sent a circular telegram to the embas-
sies and legations in Europe on August 1, 1914, directing 
the issuance of emergency passports to American citizens 
requesting them, and advising all consular officials to reg-
ister Americans at the consulates and to give them dupli-
cate certificates of registration in case they did · not have 
passports. Americans were urged to keep in touch and 
within reach of consular officials, and were to be given all 
possible protection under all circumstances.19 Ten days 
later consuls were given authority to issue emergency pass-
ports, and to get blanks printed, while remitting all fees 
for passports.2 0 
The subsequent misuse of passports by persons claiming 
to have been naturalized and therefore to be exempt from 
the jurisdiction of the country of their birth led Mr. 
Lansing, then Counsellor of the Department of State, to is-
sue strict orders against the issuance of any passports to 
persons not duly authenticated, while doubtful cases were 
to be referred to the State Department. 21 On December 21, 
the passport regulations were supplanted by an entirely 
rigid set of rules devised from experience and aiming to 
make extremely difficult any false use of passports.22 Simi-
lar care was to be used in regard to persons domiciled 
in European countries but desiring to have their pass-
ports renewed. 23 Special regard was paid to the case of 
19EW No. 2, p. 155. (1.VIII.14). 
20Jbid., p. 155. (10.VIIl.14). 
211bid., p . 155. (12.IX.14). 
22Jbid., p. 156. (21.XII.14). 
23Jbid., p. 158 ff. ( 8.II.15). 
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Americans going to Europe, and the Department of State 
issued several circulars urging our citizens to avoid actions 
or measures which might lead to suspicion: 
As belligerent countries are accustomed , for self-protec-
tion, to scrutinize $!arefully aliens who enter their territories, 
American citizens who find it necessary to visit such coun-
tries should, as a matter of precaution, and in order to avoid 
detention, provide themselves with letters and other docu-
ments in addition to their passports, showing definitely the 
objects of their visits ... American citizens sojourning in 
countries which are at war are warned to refrain from any 
conduct or utterances which might be considered offensive 
or contrary to the principles of strict neutrality. 24 
Such were the measures taken abroad for the interests 
of our own citizenry, and their effectiveness soon put an 
end to all rumors of whatever nature to the effect that the 
United States had been helping belligerent governments 
to recruit their reservists, etc., by means of the surrepti-
tious issue of false passports. Such charges were made spo-
radically but never actually proven. At home the efforts 
were different, and, if anything, even more impartially neu-
tral. President Wilson issued the first proclamation of 
neutrality on August 4, and this was followed by an identic 
proclamation in every instance of a new declaration or 
state of war until our entry into the conffict.25 But more 
than this, the President, in a message directed towards the 
maintenance of neutrality, urged every thoughtful man in 
America to be "impartial in thought as well as in action" 
for the sake of the enviable distinction that it would bring 
to the United States: 
The effect of war upon the United States will depend upon 
what American citizens say and do. Every man who really 
loves America will act and speak in the true spirit of neu-
trality and fairness and friendliness to all concerned. The 
spirit of the Na ti on in this critical matter will be determ-
ined largely by what individuals and society and those gath-
ered in public meetings do and say, upon what newspapers 
and magazines contain, upon what ministers utter in their 
24Jbid., pp. 162-3. (l 7.IV.15) . 
2sEW No.2, pp. 15-17 (24.V.15). 
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pulpits, and men proclaim as their opm10ns on the street . 
. , . Divisions among us would be fatal to our peace of mind 
and might seriously stand in the way of the proper per-
formance of our duty as the one great nation at peace, the 
one people holding itself ready to play the part of impartial 
mediation and speak the counsels of peace and accommoda-
tion, not as a partisan, but as a friend .... The United 
States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during 
these days that are to try men's souls. We must be impar-
tial in thought as well as in action, must put a curb ... on 
every transaction that might be construed as a preference 
of one party to the struggle before another. 
My thought is of America ... this great country ofours; 
(that) she should show herself in this time of peculiar 
trial a nation fit beyond others to exhibit the fine poise 
of undisturbed judgment, the dignity of self control, the ef-
ficiency of dispassionate action; a nation that neither sits in 
judgment upon others nor is disturbed in her own counsels 
and which keeps herself fit and free to do what is honest and 
disinterested and truly serviceable for the peace of the 
world. Shall we not resolve to put upon ourselves the re-
straints which will bring to our people the happiness and 
the great and lasting influence for peace we covet for 
them?26 
It was the human values in the midst of a world of war 
that were sensed as the spirit of this proclamation on the 
part of the President, for it was but a keynote to the policy 
which has been habitually American, to pay a high regard 
for the human element in all things. In the controversies 
to follow the outbreak of the war our commercial and very 
material interests were threatened, on the one hand, by the 
Allied Governments, whose position of maritime supremacy 
was such as to menace any neutral that thwarted their 
plans or crossed their path at. an inopportune moment, and, 
on the other hand, by the more immediately menacing con-
trol of the lives of human beings which the Imperial Ger-
man Government capriciously exercised in an endeavor to 
wrest for itself that maritime supremacy which it soughj: 
to dispute in a new fashion by unexampled means. Whether 
the whole of our country thus grasped the theme of our 
2eJbid., pp. 17-18 (19.VIII.14) 
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neutrality, whether the countries abroad were sufficiently 
· dispassionate to interpret its meaning, it is impossible to 
estimate, but that our policy throughout the period of neu-
trality consistently upheld this view it is impossible to deny. 
It was a magnificent concept, but the responsibilities in-
volved in it were many. 
As regards Panama, and the interoceanic canal over 
which the United States exercises control, it imme-
diately devolved upon the President and the Department of 
State to take measures to safeguard the neutrality of the 
Canal Zone and its adjacent waters. This was accom-
plished by the joint effort of the United States and Panama. 
On October 10, 1914, Mr. Lansing and Sefior Morales, the 
minister of the Republic of Panama at Washington, en-
tered into a formal protocol to arrange that belligerent 
war vessels and their tenders should be allowed to coal in 
Panamanian waters only once in three months.21 Further-
more, President Wilson issued a proclamation on Novem-
ber 13, 1914, putting into effect a series of regulations gov-
erning use of the Panama Canal by vessels and belligerents 
and the maintenance of neutrality by the United States in 
the Canal Zone. These defined the -..·e8sels to which the 
rules were applicable and forbade the furnishing of fuel, 
lubricants or supplies for either vessel or crew except un-
der the most rigid supervision and in the smallest quanti-
ties possible. No troops of any belligerent were to be dis-
embarked unleis absolutely necessary, and the twenty-four 
hour rule, in addition to the time taken in passing through 
the canal or necessitated by storms, etc., was to be rigidly 
adhered to. However, no war-vessel of one belligerent was 
to be allowed to depart within twenty-four hours after the 
departure of a war-vessel of the opposite belligerent.28 Use 
of repair facilities was to be strictly limited to cases of 
urgent necessity. Radio installations were to be used only 
in canal business, and all air craft of a belligerent power, 
public or private, were forbidden to descend or arise within 
21Ew No. 2, p. 18. 
isEw No. 2, pp. 18-20. 
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the jurisdiction of the United States at the Canal Zone, or 
to pass through the air spaces above it. 
Despite these careful precautions, a slight controversy 
with Great Britain arose over the cases of the Mallina, Tre-
meadow and Protesilaus, all British vessels which had gone 
through the Canal Zone, and who$e alleged violation of 
American neutrality was brought to the · attention of the 
Department of State by the German Ambassador at Wash-
ington.29 Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, in a note of December 18, 
1914, to Mr. Bryan cleared up the matter by a presentation 
of the facts which showed that the Mallina had put to sea 
without clearance papers, in violation of the canal regula-
tions, because otherwise she would have been in the zone 
more than twenty-four hours, due to the delay in getting 
her papers through from the Canal Zone ·authorities, who 
were to send them to her along with some supplies. Fear-
ing the possibilities of internment if she overstayed her 
time, she put to sea, preferring to violate the customs regu-
lations of the Canal Zone rather than be interned, because 
she was particularly valuable to the Admiralty as a collier 
at this time. Concerning the Tremeadow, not even this al-
legation could be made, hence. nothing was done in her case. 
In the case of the Protesilaus, accused of improper use of 
wireless in Panamanian waters, it was substantially proved 
that the Protesilaus had come into port without dismantling 
her wireless apparatus, as provided for by the Canal Zone 
regulations. While in port she received an Admiralty code 
message by wireless to be transmitted to the British Consul 
at Panama. She asked the land station to transmit the 
message in plain language, but was refused, whereupon her 
wireless was dismantled and not used again. These mat-
ters having been communicated to Mr. Lansing, he replied 
on January 2, 1915, ·acknowledging receipt of the British 
note to that effect, and the matter was dropped. The Brit-
ish allegation that the incidents were caused by tardiness 
of the United States in establishing neutrality rules for the 
29/bid., pp. 23-25. 
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Canal Zone seems to be sustained in point of fact, and the 
fact that no such incidents recurred after the Canal Zone 
Rule_s had been published by the Admiralty shows the in-
tentions of the colliers concerned to have been substantially 
sincere in desiring to avoid any breaches of American neu-
trality. 
The question of the use of wireless installations on land 
or in the territorial waters of the United States was a mat-
ter of no little concern to the United States, and the gen-
eral attitude of the State Department is given in an ap-
pendix. 30 Much earlier, however, the President had issued 
executive orders preventing radio stations within the juris-
diction of the United States of America from transmitting 
or receiving for delivery messages of an unneutral nature, 
and from in any way rendering to any one of the belliger-
ents any unneutral service during the continuance of hos-
tilities. The enforcement of this order was left to the Navy 
Deparlment.31 By a later order, the United States, under 
the Radio Act of August 13, 1912, took over the high-pow-
ered radio stations for exclusive use and control over trans-
Atlantic communication with Europe in code and cipher 
messages. This was in pursuance of the third, fifth and 
eighth articles of the Fifth Convention of 1907 signed at 
the Hague, whereby belligerents were forbidden · (a) to 
erect on the territory of a neutral state a wireless te-
legraphy station or any other apparatus for the purpose of 
communicating with the belligerent forces on land or sea; 
(b) to use any installation of this kind established by them 
before the war on the territory of a neutral state for pure-
ly military purposes, and which had not been opened for 
the service of public messages, and neutrals were called 
upon to suppress such acts in violation of their neutrality 
if occurring on their territory, but were not called upon 
to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents 
of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy 
apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private indi-
30Bryan to Stone (20.I.15), EW N o. 2, p. 58 (p. 181 , i nfra). 
31EW No. 2, p. 71 . (5.VIIl.14). 
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viduals. This point can best be illustrated by the resolution 
of the British delegation at the Hague in 1907 that it be 
specified that "the liberty of a neutral state to transmit 
massages, by means of its telegraph lines on land, its sub-
marine cables or its wireless apparatus, does not imply 
that it has any right to use them or permit their use in or-
der to render manifest assistance to one of the belliger-
ents."32 
Almost concurrently arose a controversy, more dilettante 
than juridical, over the British and French censorship of 
messages transmitted by cable or wireless. The demands 
of the British censor that telegraph companies write out in 
full all addresses, the charging of expense to the sender for 
decoding and recoding, for translation and retranslation 
all led to protests from the State Department, but the chief 
complaint was made when the British censors started sup-
pressing cable communications to and from neutral coun-
tries. This considerably curtailed American trade with 
neutral countries and the State Department was peculiarly 
insistent in stressing the hardships caused by suppressions 
when the senders were informed of nothing concerning the 
non-delivery of the massages-a claim which the British 
Government refuted by saying that to notify the sender of 
non-delivery of his telegrams would be to defeat the object 
of censorship. The legal grounds taken by Great Britain 
were that under Article 8 of the International Telegraphic 
Convention the contracting states reserved the right to sus-
pend the telegraphic service for an indefinite period. 
Such a notice was issued by the British Government when 
the present emergency arose, but in order to avoid the in-
convenience which would have arisen from a total stoppage 
of communication, it was decided as an act of grace to ac-
cept telegrams for transmission on the understanding that 
they were to be accepted at the sender's risk and subject 
to censorship by the British authorities; that is, that they 
might be stopped, delayed or otherwise dealt with by the 
a2 scott, R eports, pp. 539-543, pa ;•:im. 
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censors, and that no claim for reimbursement could be en-
terained. aa 
21 
In other cases, the British Government asked particular 
instances to be furnished where redress was sought by neu-
tral countries or merchants. As the only effective evidence 
was in the hands of the British censor, it was manifestly 
impossible for neutrals to fulfil the conditions laid down by 
the British Government as precedents to redress. 
By December, 1914, the French Government began to 
relax its vigilance in the censorship of cablegrams and ac-
cepted code messages for France, Algiers, and Tunis, speci-
fying the codes to be used. This lack of concerted measures 
between the British and French Governments led to repre-
sentations made by the State Department to Great Britain 
on December 3, 1914, in regard to discriminations "against 
American cablers who desire to use American cables instead 
of those of the French company, which is a foreign con-
carn."~~ In reply, the British Government authorized sev-
eral codes to be used for cotton transactions, which were 
still held to be transactions in non-contraband goods, and 
suggested the omission of technical words in ordinary un-
coded telegrams, as these were likely to be regarded as sus-
picious or as endeavors to use a concealed cipher or code. 
Further protests were made to the British Government con-
cerning the censorship of cables being forwarded to France, 
as this was a double consorship. Finally, on December 18, 
1914, the British Government issued a memorandum per-
mitting the resumption of code service between the United 
Kingdom and certain foreign countries, with, however, very 
considerable exceptions. 35 In reply to the request made by 
Ambassador Page at Loru:Ion that the Embassy be informed 
of telegrams stopped, with the reason for their being 
stopped, the British Embassy at Washington stated that 
"whenever the date of the despatch and addresses of sender 
33The British Post Master General to the Political Department of 
the Swiss Confederation, EW No. 2, p. 77 (2.Xl.14) . 
a•EW No. 2, p. 81. (3.Xll.14) . 
as[f>id, pp. 84-5. (18.XII.14). 
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and destined receiver were given, the censor would inform 
the United States Ambassador in London whether the cable 
had been stopped and the reasons for stopping it."36 
The censoring of messages passing from the United 
States to South America through British-owned cables out-
side of the European system was another source of griev-
ance to the United States and formed the subject of several 
representations on the part of the State Department to the 
British Government. 37 In this respect at least, the Foreign 
Office heeded the protests of the United States and replied 
that the attention of the censors· had been called to the ex-
isting regulations on the subject and that the British 
Government would pass all messages between North and 
South American countries sent by way of the United King-
dom, but Mr. Page was constrained to suggest, in his trans-
mission of the memorandum, that Americans wishing to 
send messages to South American countries should be ad:.. 
vised if possible to use non-British cables to escape annoy-
ances. 
A point in the controversy which is not altogether credit-
able to the United States is the charge brought by the Brit-
ish Government against the Department of State for hav-
ing transmitted as official business commercial telegrams 
from American firms to British or neutral countries. The 
matter was brought to the attention of Mr. Page by Sir 
Edward Grey in a note verbale of November 17, 1914, which 
is not obtainable, to the effect that "certain telegrams from 
private individuals and commercial firms, detrimental to 
British interests were being sent through the State De-
partment," and that "the censorship authorities had 
brought to Sir Edward Grey's nolice the fact that this prac-
tice still continued." The Foreign Secretary went on to 
point out that as the State Department messages were given 
priority over ordinary messages of a commercial nature, 
this practice was unfair to British traders, besides afford-
3UJbid., pp. 85. (21.XIl.14). 
31EW No. 2, pp. 93-4. (13,27.V; 3 .VI.15) . 
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ing means of intercourse with the enemy which the British 
Government could not brook. 38 
On March 16, 1915, Mr. Bryan replied in a carefully pre-
pared dispatch to Mr. Page, stating that the Department of 
State had sent instructions to all consular and diplomatic 
officers to discontinue, until they were further instructed, 
the forwarding of private commercial messages on the 
ground that the British Government had raised objections 
to such a practice. The United States understood, however, 
that the objections raised by the British Government were 
not ba2ed upon the suspicion that the messages were in pri-
vate code or conveyed a double meaning, but that they were 
destined to enemy territory. While ignoring the charge 
that this practice was unfair to other traders, Mr. Bryan 
added that it was understood that the British Government 
recognized the importance, as a matter of policy and good 
relationship at least, of not exercising the right of censor-
ship in a way to interfere with legitimate American com-
mercial transactions with neutral countries. 39 
The last topic connected with the use of telegraphs was 
raised by the regulation of the British censors providing 
that only messages passing between diplomatic missions 
and their home government might go in 'cipher, and that 
all others must be open.40 This of course dep.rived the Am-
bassador at Berlin of the privilege of communicating with 
Paris or London by cipher messages, and made it necessary 
to handle all the business entrusted to them in plain lan-
guage. The commanding officer of the United States troops 
at Tientsin sent a code message on August 21, and one on 
August 22, to the commanding general in the Philippines: 
via Hong Kong, so they were held up by the British 
censor and not allowed to go through. This was made the 
subject of a note from Sir Edward Grey to Ambassador 
Page, who forwarded theni, under date of October 23, 1914, 
to the Department of State.41 The seeming negligence of 
3Sfbid., p. 91. (5.III.15). 
39EW No. 2, pp. 91-2. (16.III.15) .• 
4ofbid., p . 72 (27.VIII.14). 
41Jbid., p. 75. (23.X.14). 
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the Department of State in making these regulations known 
to all the diplomatic missions of the United States led to 
an informal request of the British Government that this be 
done, as Minister Reinsch at Peking had violated this pro-
priety by sending a coded message to the American Con-
sul General at Hong Kong.42 This was brought to Minister 
Reinsch's attention with an injunction to remember the 
regulations.4 3 
Akin to the question of telegrams and wireless messages 
is the subject of the transmission of mail of American 
diplomatic and consular officers. This formed the subject 
of correspondence between all the belligerent governments 
and the United States, as a result of which the various gov-
ernments consented to regard the mail-pouches of the dip-
lomatic missions of the United States as inviolable if they 
were under the seal of the office; if no correspondence of 
private individuals other than diplomatic or consular offi-
cers or employees of American missions or consulates ad-
dressed to private individuals in the United States were 
sent in the pouches; if all official correspondence of diplo-
matic and consular officers to individuals outside of the De-
partment were marked "Official Business" and left un-
sealed; and. it communications from either private indi-
viduals, American or alien, in belligerent countries to pri-
vate individuals or agents in the United States were ex-
cluded from the pouches. These regulations were the re-
sult of agreements arrived at by diplomatic discussion and 
embodied in two circulars issued by the State Department, 
on December 18, 1914, and April 23, 1915, respectively. 
These regulations lasted throughout the period of Ameri-
can neutrality, after which the mail-pouches of missions in 
Allied countries were thrown <?Pen to use by all Americans.44 • 
42EW No. 2, p. 86. (29XIl.14). 
43Jbid., p. 86. (2.I.15). 
44fbid., pp. 67-8. 
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CHAPTER Il 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER MAIL SEIZURES 
Concerning the seizures of mails bound for neutral 
countries by the British customs authorities, as a result of 
the ill-starred expedition of Henry Ford and the Oscar II 
and Frederich VIII, the United States opened a rather pro-
tracted correspondence with the Allied Governments, re-
garding this procedure as a very high-handed act on the 
part of the British authorities. In a dispatch dated Janu-
ary 4, 1916, Mr .. Lansing brought the whole subject matter 
under discussion, instructing Ambassador Page to pre-
sent these views to the British Foreign Office.45 
This note dealt with the question of ordinary mail and 
of parcel post, the Department being "inclined to regard 
parcel post articles as subject to the same treatment as ar-
ticles sent as express or freight in respect to belligerent 
search, seizure, and condemnation." This laid down a clear 
line of demarcation between ordinary drop-letter corres-
pondence and "correspondence" capable of being made a 
vehicle for freight. But, "on the other hand, parcel post 
articles are entitled to the usual exemptions of neutral 
trade, and the protests of the Government of the United 
States in regard to what constitutes the unlawful bringing 
in of ships for search in port, the illegality of the so-called 
blockade by Great Britain, and the improper assumption 
of jurisdiction of vessels and cargoes apply to commerce 
using parcel post service for the transmiss.ion of commod-
ities." 
On April 3, 1916, the Allied Governments submitted, 
through the French Ambassador at Washington, a mem-
orandum on the subject of these seizures, stating that the 
Allied Governments had been compelled to resort to this 
procedure with respect to mail matter, "on account of the 
fraud and violence exercised along that line by their ene-
mies." 
45EW No. s, p. 145. (4.I.16.) 
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The viewpoint laid down with respect to the treatment 
of parcel post will first be examined, because of the policy 
enunciated by the United States to treat it as ordinary com-
merce. 
"The shipment of merchandise by parcel post," stated 
the Allied note, "is a mode of shipment and transportation 
analogous to shipment and transportation on way bills or 
bills of lading, with this difference, that the transportation 
is undertaken by the mail service, which moreover some-
times turns it over to common carriers, as is the case in 
France. In no wise do such 'parcels' constitute 'letters' or 
'correspondence' or 'despatches,' and they clearly are not 
withdrawn in any way from the exercise 'of the rights of 
police, supervision, visitation, and eventual seizure which be-
long to all belligerents as to all cargoes on the high seas." 
The note goes on to cite the destruction of parcel post 
on board the French liner Floride, sunk by the Prinz Eitel 
Friedrich, in which case the commander had declared that 
the post parcels on board the steamship Floride had been 
regarded as merchandise and not as correspondence; that 
that was the reason why he did not have them taken out 
of the Floride, but allowed them to sink with the vessel, 
basing his action on the Declaration of London, according 
to which parcels are merchandise and not correspondence.46 
It should be stated that this distinction alleged by the com-
mander of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich does no.t appear either 
in the text or the Drafting Committee's Report annexed to 
the Declaration of London. In this instance, therefore, it 
may be assumed that the statement of the Second Assistant 
Postmaster General is inaccurate.46• 
The Allied Governments,·the note continued, had adppted 
the view of the commander of the Prinz Eitel Friedrich, 
46EW No. 3, pp. 146-151 at p. 150. 
4 s, several writers have wanted to put the whole category of mail 
into the class of those somewhat dubious "analogues of contraband," 
but the practice of nations has been to consider missive mail as ca-
pable of transmission to the enemy through neutral channels, with~ 
out being captured. The only exception made is in the case of a ves-
sel bound with mail for a blockaded port, which manifestly would be 
bound to suffer seizure. Cf. Scott, R eports , p. 732. 
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which, in their opinion, was fully founded in law and super-
aboundantly justified by the facts. The carriage in parcel 
post packages of such substances as rubber, wool and other 
"worthless samples" of such nature in large quantities to 
Germany was particularly complained of. After citing 
these examples of subterfuge and surreptitious trafficking, 
the note adds that from a legal standpoint the right of the 
belligerent governments to exercise police supervision over 
vessels and their cargoes, of whatever nature, had never 
been subject to exceptions, up to the adoption of the Elev-
enth Hague Convention of 1907. 
As a result of this, the Allied Governments held that from 
this standpoint of their right of visitation and eventual ar-
rest and seizure, merchandise shipped in post parcels would 
not be treated in any other manner than ordinary merchan-
dise; that the "inviolability of postal correspondence" stipu-
lated in the Eleventh Convention would not affect the right 
of the Allied Governments to visit, and if occasion rose, to 
search, arrest and seize merchandise hidden in the wrap-
pers, envelopes or letters contained in the mail bags ;47 
otherwise the Allied Governments would continue to re-
frain from seizing and confiscating such correspondence, 
letters or dispatches, and would insure their speediest pos-
sible transmission, as soon as their genuineness and the 
sincerity of their character should have been ascertained. 
In reply to this contention on the part of the Allied Gov-
ernments, Mr. Lansing, in a note to the British and French 
Ambassadors, under date of May 24, 1916, stated that the 
United States did not consider that the Postal Union Con-
vention of 1906 applied to the interference with mails of 
which complaint had been made. The United States was 
quite ready to admit that post parcels might be treated as 
merchandise subject to the exercise of belligerent rights as 
recognized in international law, but could not admit that 
47The British Government gave judicial sanction to this view in 
the case of The Simla, in which it was held that the Eleventh Hague 
Convention did not apply to post parcels. Cf., Trehern, British and 
Colonial Prize Cases, I, 281. 
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such parcels were subject to the exercise of belligerent 
rights "which belongs to belligerents as to all cargoes on 
the high seas."4 " Further than this, the United States was 
willing to concede "that the class of mail matter which in-
cludes stocks, bonds, coupons and similar securities was to 
be regarded as of the same nature as merchandise or other 
articles of property and subject fo the same exercise of 
belligerent rights."49 Under Article 24, ( 4), of the Decla-
ration of London, gold and silver in coin or bullion, and • 
paper money were regarded as conditional contraband, the 
report of the Drafting Committee holding that "paper 
money" included only inconvertible paper money, i.e., bank-
notes .which might or might not be legal tender. Bills of 
exchange and cheques were excluded. 5 0 But almost in the 
same sentence the United States' position was further out-
lined: "Money orders, checks, drafts, notes, and other ne-
gotiable instruments which may pass as the equivalent of 
money, are, it is considered, also to be classed as merchan-
dise." This was, it would appear, a rather awkward ad-
mission on the part of the United States, as it in effect com-
promised every effort later to be made to secure liberty of 
passage for shipping documents and money order lists, etc.; 
which the United States contended could not be classed as 
merchandise and must therefore be regarded as genuine 
correspondence. For this reason, the Allied Governments, 
in their final reply on October 12, 1916, took issue with the 
United States on the latter question and held that 
as a matter of fact, the lists of money orders mailed from 
the United States to Germany and Austria-Hungary corres-
pond to moneys paid in the United States and payable by the 
German and Austro-Hungarian postoffices. Those lists ac-
quainted those postoffices with the sums that had been paid 
there, which in consequence they had to pay to the ad-
dressees. . In practice, such payment was at the disposal of 
the addressees and w a_s effected to them directly the lists ar-
rived, and without the requirement of the individual orders 
4BEW No. 3, pp. 151-156, at p. 152. 
49/bid., loc. cit., at p. 156. 
socohen, op. cit., pp. 96-97. 
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having come into the hands of the addressees. These lists 
were thus really actual money orders transmitted in lump 
in favor of several addressees. Nothing, therefore, in the 
opinicn of the Allied Governments, seemed to justify the 
liberty granted to an enemy country so to receive funds in-
tended to supply by that amount its financial resisting 
power.5 1 
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Thus ended the considerations affecting post parcels and 
their alleged inviolability. In regard to ordinary corres-
pondence, the viewpoints of the United States and the Al-
lied Governments differed much more rf!dically. In the first 
note above mentioned, the United States made complaint 
about the fact that in the cases of the Dutch steamer Nieuw 
Amsterdam (December 23. 1915) and other such vessels, 
"the entire mails, including sealed mails and presumaoiy 
the American diplomatic and consular pouches. from the 
United States to the Netherlands, were removed by the 
British authorities." This treatment of tht: diplomatic 
mail of the United States the State Den~rtment held to be 
"an aggravating circumstance in a pract ice which is gen-
erally regarded as vexatiously inquisitorial and without 
compensating military advantage to Great Britain." In 
reply to this charge the Allied Governments made no ad-
mission of such acts, but stated that "should any abuses, 
grave errors or derelictions committed by the Allied au-
thorities charged with the duty of inspecting mails be dis-
closed to the Governments of France and Great Britain, 
they are now as they ever were ready to settle responsibil-
ity therefor in accordance with the principles of law and 
justice which it never was and is not now their intention 
to evade."52 
The case of the seizure of ordinary missive mail was 
much more difficult of adjustment and was the main sub-
ject of discussion between the United States and the Al-
lied Governments. In this connection it may be of interest 
to reyiew the status of postal correspondence under the 
'
1EW No. 4, p. 58. 
52EW No. 4, p. 59. 
30 University of Texas Bulletin 
Eleventh Hague Convention of 1907. Article I of Chap-
ter I, which dealt with Postal Correspondence, states that: 
The postal correspondence of neutrals or belligerents, 
whatever its official or .private character may be, found on 
the high seas on board a neutral or enemy ship, is inviolable. 
If the ship is detained, the correspondence is forwarded by 
the captor with the least possible delay. 
The provisions of the preceding paragraph do not apply in 
case of violation of blockade, to correspondence destined for 
or proceeding from a blockaded port. 
Article II reads as follows: 
The inviolability of postal correspondence does not exempt 
a neutral mail ship from the laws and customs of maritime 
war as to neutral merchant ships in general. The ship, how-
ever, may not be searched except when absolutely necessary, 
and the nonly with as much consideration and expedition as 
possible.53 
The German delegation at the Second Hague Conference 
submitted to the committee dealing with these subjects the 
following proposition: 
ARTICLE I. Postal correspondence shipped by sea is in-
violable, whatever its character, official or private, and 
whether it is the correspondence of neutrals or belligerents. 
In case of the seizure of the vessel carrying this correspon-
dence, provision shall be made to forward it by the quick-
est route possible. 
ARTICLE II. Apart from the inviolability of postal cor-
respondence, mail steamers are subject to the same prin-
ciples as other merchant ships. Nevertheless, belligerents 
shall abstain, insofar as possible, from exercising. the right 
of search with respect to them, and the search shall be pur-
sued with as much consideration as possible.54 
The fact that the final convention text is so similar to 
the German proposition was the fact that led the Allied 
Governments to doubt the sincerity of motive behind a 
proposition that looked so pacific. However, M. Fromageot. 
53Scott, Reports; p. 732. 
54Scott, Reports, p. 741. 
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the reporter of the particular committee, said in his report 
on the Eleventh Convention : 
In the present state of international law, the transporta-
tion of postal correspondence at sea is not effectively guar-
anteed in time of war. A distinction is indeed made accord-
ing to whether the correspondence is official or private, 
whether or not the senders and addressees belong to the ene-
my's service, whether or not the vessel is a regular mail car-
rier, and according to the place of departure and destination. 
The result is none the less that mail-bags carried by sea in 
time of war do in fact ordinarily undergo seizure, opening, 
rifling, confiscation, if need be, and at any rate, delay or even 
loss ... 
As so many private commercial interests at the present 
day depend upon regular mail service, it is indispensible (in 
the eyes of the German delegation) to remove this service 
from the disturbances of naval warfare. The advantages to 
be gained by belligerents from the control of the postal serv-
ice is out of all proportion to the harm done to inoffensive 
commerce. Telegraphy and radiotelegraphy offer belliger-
ents more rapid and surer communications than mail. 
Altho dispatches are, by analogy, often considered articles 
of contraband, it is proper to note that the question is, on 
the whole, quite independent, since it arises, whatever may 
be the flag of the vessel carrying the mail, whether neutral 
or enemy. However, this distinction between enemy and 
neutral nationality had to be put in the text by reason of 
the apprehension of certain Powers in the matter of mail 
carried under an enemy flag .... 
The best guaranty to the postal service would assuredly 
have been to exempt regular mail carrying vessels from the 
right of search and from the ordinary treatment of merchant 
ships in time of war. But it was thought advisable to state 
that in case search of a mail-carrying ship is necessary, it 
should be done with all possible dispatch.55 
In the light of this enlightened international attitude, 
the first protest of the United States presents the case quite 
strongly. The objections to parcel post seizures had been 
based on two grounds, (1) that while the United States re-
garded postal correspondence such as parcel post packages 
assimilable to merchandise, the unlawful bringing in of 
55/bid., pp. 735-736 . 
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ships for search in port and improper assumption of juris-
diction over ships and cargoes could not be admitted, and 
(2) the case of blockade contemplated in the Hague Con-
vention was inapplicable because the United States did not 
consider the "blockade" proclaimed by the British Govern-
ment as legal. Now the State Department claimed that the 
Department could not admit the right of the British au-
thorities to seize neutral vessels plying directly between 
American and European neutral ports without touching at 
British ports, to bring them into port and while there to 
remove or censor mails carried by them. 
In the opinion of the Government of the United States 
modern practice generally recognized that mails were not 
to be censored, confiscated, or destroyed on the high seas, 
even when carried by belligerent mail-ships. To attain the 
same end by bringing such mail ships within British juris-
diction for purposes of search and then subjecting them to 
local regulations allowing censorship of mails could not be 
justified on the ground of national jurisdiction. In cases 
where neutral mail ships merely touched at British ports~ 
the Department believed that the British authorities had 
no international right to remove the sealed mails or censor 
them aboard ship. Mails on such ships never came right-
fully into the custody of the British mail service, and that 
service was entirely without responsibility for their transit 
or safety. 
The Allied Governments replied that, the Eleventh 
Hague Convention of 1907 not having been ratified by all 
the powers engaged in the war, they would regard it as in-
applicable to the existing situation. As regards missive 
letters, etc., it was found that even in them rubber and 
other valuable articles were very frequently concealed. 
These the Allied Governments, as has already been shown, 
reserved the right to seize; otherwise they would refrain 
from seizure or confiscation of missive correspondence on 
the high seas. To this the United States was constrained 
to reply that it did not admit that belligerents might search 
other private sea-borne mails except for the purpose of <lis-
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covering whether they contained articles of enemy owner-
ship carried on belligerent vessels, or articles of contra-
band transmitted under sealed covers as letter mail, though 
they might intercept at sea all mails coming out of or going 
into ports of the enemy's coasts which were effectively 
blockaded. 
The note then took up the question raised by the practice 
of the Allied Governments of seizing and confiscating mail 
from vessels in port instead of at sea, thus compelling ship-
ping lines through some form of duress to send their mail 
ships via British ports, or detaining all vessels merely by 
calling at British ports, thus acquiring by force or unjusti-
fiable means an illegal jurisdiction. The removal of such 
correspondence to London for censorship to determine "the 
sincerity of their character" before forwarding it to its 
destination caused irreparable delay and damage. The 
legal distinction between· the seizure of mails at sea, which 
the Allied Governments announced they had abandoned, 
and their seizures from vessels voluntarily or involuntarily 
in port, where the Allied Governments obtained greater 
belligerent rights than they could exercise on the high seas, 
was entirely gone, in the opinion of the Department of 
State, and amounted to an unwarranted limitation of the 
use of the free seas by neutrals for the transmission of cor-
respondence. Contrary to previous American and French 
practice, and to the principles accepted by the Allied Gov-
ernments in the case of the Floride, already cited, the 
United States held that these interferences were wrong 
both in principle and in practice. The loss. of mails delayed 
in transmission by the British censorship was irreparable. 
American commercial interests were injured, the rights of 
property were disregarded, and the rules and practice of 
international law were palpably and continually violated. 
The United States Government therefore held that it would 
be compelled to press claims for full reclamation upon the 
attention of the British and French Governments. 
·To submit to a lawless practice of this character would 
open the door to repeated violations of international la w by 
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the belligerent powers on the ground of military necessity 
of which the violator would be the sole judge. Manifestly, 
a neutral nation cannot permit its rights on the high seas 
to be determined by belligerents or the exercise of those 
rights to be permitted or denied arbitrarily by che Govern-
ment of a warring nation. The rights of neut!'al !" are as 
sacred as the rights of belligerents and must be strictly 
observed ... Only a radical change in the present French 
and British policy, restoring to the United States its full 
rights as a neutral power, will satisfy this Government.56 
The Allied Governments, in reply, while claiming that the 
treatment of _vessels in port was on the same footing as that 
on the high seas, ignored completely the question of taking 
the mails off of the ships and censoring them on land; all 
ships touching in Allied ports, they alleged, were really 
"voluntarily" doing so. "In calling at an Allied port, the 
master acts not on any order from the Allied authorities, 
but solely carries out the instructions of the owner; neither 
are those instructions forced upon the said owner. In con-
sideration of certain advantages derived from the call at 
an Allied port, of which he is at full liberty to enjoy or re-
fuse the benefits, the owner instructs his captain to call 
at this or that port. He does not, in truth, undergo any 
constraint. . . . It is ~ rule generally accepted that mer-
chant ships entering a foreign port place themselves under 
the laws in force in that port, whether in time of war or of 
peace, and when martial law is in force in that port." The 
tremendous importance of detecting the plans of the enemy 
as they might be concealed in correspondence wais urged 
as the main motive for the vigilance of the Allied Govern-
ments in maintaining their attitude towards seizures. 
Aside from this, their endeavor was to avoid an encroach-
ment by the exercise of their belligerent rights on the 
legitimate exercise of the rights of innocent neutral com-
merce. The rights of the United States as a neutral power 
could not, in their opinion, imply their protection, or the 
protection granted by the United States to correspondence 
having a hostile destination, as they held that it was their 
0GEW No. 3, p. 156 (24.V.16). 
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belligerent right to exercise on the high seas the supervis-
ion granted them by international law to impede any trans-
portation intended to aid their enemy in the conduct of the 
war, and to uphold his resistance.57 
In this manner ended the controversy concerning mails, 
the maritime rights of the Allied Governments being vindi-
cated by their possession of superior sea-power. Inexor-
able as it might seem, it was in effect the ancient law of 
the sea, and against that law the anathema of the neutral 
could not prevail.58 A year earlier the Department of State 
had taken too indulgent an attitude toward the Allied Gov-
ernments, and had lost the opportunity of making an ef-
fective protest. Thus the day of the neutral had come and 
gone, and the belligerents' view of the law of the sea pre-
vailed. 59 
51EW No. 4, pp. 53-9. (12.X.16). (Italics are the writer's). 
58For a detailed and critical discussion of this and previous inter-
national practice as to mails, cf. Allin, C. D., "Belligerent Inter-
ference With Mails," 1 Minnesota Law Review, 293-313; Hershey, 
A. S., "The So-called Inviolability of Mails," 10 AJIL 581-4; Garner, 
J. W., Iuternational Law and the World War, II, 350-362; and 
Hyde, Int . Law, II, 444-451. 
59EW No. 2, p. 58. (20.1.15). 
CHAPTER III. 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER THE DECLARATION 
,OF LONDON 
A discussion of the role played by the Declaration of 
London in the controversies between the United States 
and the Allied Governments respecting neutral rights and 
commerce necessarily involves a brief explanation as to the 
origin of the Declaration and its status on the outbreak of 
the World War. Inasmuch as serious divergences of opin-
ion among the naval powers had revealed themselves at 
the Second Hague Conference in 1907 and the Conference 
failed to reach an agreement on various important points 
in the law of maritime war which were susceptible of a high 
degree of misinterpretation, the British Government, be-
lieving that · this situation created a serious obstacle to the 
successful working of the proposed International Prize 
Court, suggested to the powers several topics which might 
form the basis of the program of a naval conference. 
The circular embodying the British Government's sug-
gestions w~s sent to Germany, the United States, Austria-
Hungary, Spain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands and Rus-
sia, and, meeting with favor in those countries, resulted in 
the assembling of such a conference on December 4, 1908, 
at the Foreign Office in London. The outcome of the de-
liberations of the delegates from the various · countries was 
a code of the laws of naval warfare, in seventy-one articles, 
adopted February 26, 1909, and called the Declaration of 
London. The rejection of the Naval Prize Bill embodying 
the provisions of the Declaration by the House of Lords in 
1911 prevented the ratification of the instrument by Great 
Britain, and, as the other naval powers had awaited the 
action of the British Government before ratifying, this 
failure to ratify the Declaration made it merely a projected 
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code, and not an internationally binding instrument at the 
beginning of the war.so 
Whether the Declaration would have been ratified by the 
British Government in virtue of the terms of the Parlia-
ment Act, which would have permitted its approval with-
out the consent of the House of Lords, must always remain 
problematic, though the debates in the House of Commons 
in May, 1914, reveal a strong tendency to secure the re-
passage of the Naval Prize Bill or at least to provide some 
new means of enforcing the terms of the Declaration. On 
the other hand, th~ memoirs of Mr. Asquith reveal that the 
British Government had planned in advance the various 
measures to be taken with respect to the interception of 
commerce intended for the enemy, and had actually drafted 
the proclamations 2-nd Orders in Council to be issued on the 
outbreak of war. For this reason, it would appear, the 
Foreign Office would not commit itself, on the eve of the 
war, as to whether it would accept the Declaration for the 
du.ration of hostilities, though it was besought most earn-
estly by members of the Government to do so. so. 
In view of the indecisive attitude of Great Britain, Mr. 
Bryan, on August 6, 1914, formally asked the British Gov-
ernment whether it would be willing to agree that the laws 
of naval warfare as laid down by the Declaration in 1909 
should be regarded as applicable to naval warfare in the 
ensuing conflict, provided that the Governments with which 
Great Britain might be at war also agreed to such an appli-
cation. Because of that great uncertainty in which neutral 
governments were placed by the failure of the belligerent 
powers so to ratify the Declaration, it was the belief of the 
Government of the United States that an acceptance of · 
these laws laid down in the Declaration of London by the 
belligerents would prevent grave misunderstandings. To 
s0 The United States, alone of all the signatories, obtained the ad-
vice and consent of the Senate to ratification on April 24, 1912, but 
withheld the deposit of its ratification, pending action by the other 
signatories. 
60
.Cf. Asquith, H. H., The Genesis of the War, pp. 117-118. 
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that end it was earnestly hoped that the suggestion he prof-
fered would meet with acceptance by all the belligerent 
governments. 6 1 
Such was the stand that the United States took from the 
very beginning towards all the belligerents, but particular-
ly towards Great Britain, inasmuch as it was her fiat that 
was law upon the uncharted continents of seven seas in re-
gard to those subjects on which she deigned to pronounce 
an opinion. All her allies looked to her for guidance in the 
World War in the formulation of their maritime policy, and 
their action throughout was consistent with British prac-
tice, save in a few isolated instances. 
In the confusion that followed the beginning of the war, 
the request of the United States was not heeded for nearly 
a month, and the first reports that were received, from Rus-
sia, indicated that the Declaration of London would not be 
accepted by the Allied Governments at its face value.6 2 With 
the Central Powers, however, the case was exactly the re-
verse, and Germany, long before either Great Britain or 
France, replied to Mr. Bryan's inquiry that she would ac-
cept the Declaration of London integrally, on the terms sug-
gested by the United States. 
More than that, Germany, as if in serious expectation 
that the World War was about to break out, had already, on 
June 29, 1914, reaffirmed the adjustments made in her prize 
regulations of September 30, 1909, to make them keep pace 
with the developments of maritime law as laid down in the 
Declaration of London. 63 Thus, while Germany had not 
officially ratified the Declaration of London, she had done 
more than the British Government was able to do, and had 
made the entire set of the provisions of the Declaration an 
integral part of her Prisenordnung in a patent endeavor to 
consciously adapt her practices to the standards covenated 
upon between nations at London.6 4 Thus Russia's unfa-
vorable reply was dated August 20, Berlin's agreement to 
s1EW No'. 1, p. 5 (6.VIII.14) . 
6 2lbid., p. 5. 
G3Cf. 107 British and Foreign State Papers, 856. 
64EW No. 1, p. 27. (4 .IX.14). 
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the Declaration on August 22, 60 with a confirming note of 
September 4 relating the German Government's stand as 
of August 10. A slight evidence of disingenuousness on 
the part of Germany appears in the reservation apparent-
ly made in a note verbale of August 6, 1914, by the Ger-
man Foreign Office to the American Embassy in Berlin, to 
the effect that Germany would add to her conditional con-
traband list, from the so-called "free list" of the Declara-
tion, what articles she saw fit to include under that cate-
gory. It is, however, very significant that Germany did not 
formally announce this until October 22, 1914, the very 
day when the United States came to its final conclusions 
regarding the practicability of the Declaration of London.66 
That Germany's stand in favor of the Declaration was 
identic with that of Austria-Hungary is shown by the fact 
that Austria answered directly on August 13, 1914, ttat 
she had instructed her forces to observe the stipulations 
of the Declaration of London as applied to naval as well as 
land warfare during the existing conflict, conditional on 
like observance on the part of her enemies.6 7 Similarly, 
Austria-Hungary did not in any way modify the lists of 
either absolute or conditional contraband as laid down in 
the Declaration in her published list of contraband articles, 
and made no additions thereto until January 14, 1915, long 
after the list had been subject to serious modifications at 
the hands of the Allied Governments. 68 Turkey, coming 
into the war at a much later date, and never having been 
. consulted as to what, in her own opinion, would be the 
status of the Declaration, published a very much extended 
list of contraband, both absolute and conditional, and made 
no direct reference whatsoever to the Declaration.69 Had 
the Declaration been in effect, no such notification would 
have been necessary, as the report of the drafting commit-
tee plainly shows, inasmuch as the lists agreed to were to 
65Jbid. , p. 5. (22.VIII.14). 
t6Jbid, p. 27. (22.X.14). 
61EW No. 1, p. 5. (4.IX.14). 
6BJbid., p. 32. (7.DU4). 
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be so treated without notification (de plein droit) and the 
provisions covering contraband were to become operative 
by the mere fact of war. 10 
In the hands of the Allied Governments the Declaration 
did not fare so well. Russia, on August 27, 1914, took the 
step of adopting the Declaration of London "with the ex-
act modifications adopted by England and France."11 This 
involved a rather embarrassing position for the moment, 
as the modifications adopted by England and France were 
by no means identic. Japan and Belgium, being inconse-
quential as far as any controversy we had with their Allies 
might affect them, notified no lists to our State Depart-
ment, and the remaining governments were not in any po-
sition to declare maritime law either for themselves or on 
the basis of acceptance of British and French doctrines. 
France, on August 11, 1914,72 published in the Journal 
Officiel her lists of contraband, identic with those laid down 
in the Declaration save for the transfer of aircraft from 
conditional to absolute contraband. This slight modifica-
tion, unimportant as it may seem by itself, constitutes the 
first serious infringement of the whole theory on which the 
Declaration of London was drawn up. The aim of the Lon-
don Naval Conference to establish an agreement whereby 
the various articles useful or inutile in war might be de-
noted was the greatest safeguard to the neutral, in whose 
interest they were manifestly made. The fundamental idea 
was that of the limitation of the power of ~ belligerent to 
declare arbitrarily what would and what would not be con-
sidered contraband; a common covenated agreement had 
therefore been attempted. In this respect Article 23 of 
the Declaration may be said to have been wanting in suf-
ficient strictness. It stated that articles exclusively used 
69/bid., pp. 33-35. It should be remembered, however, that by mu· 
tual consent both Italy and Turkey applied the Declaration without 
reservations during the Turco-Italian War . 1911-12. Cf. 20 Revue 
Generale de Droit International Public ( 1913), p. 652. 
1ocohen, op. cit., p. 93. 
nEW No. 1, p. 7. (27.VIII.14). 
12/bid., p. 8. (3.IX.14) . 
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for war might be added to the list of absolute contraband 
by a declaration which must be notified. Such a notifica-
tion must be addressed to the governments of other pow-
ers, or to their representatives accredited to the power 
making the declaration. As a matter of course, a notifica-
tion made after the outbreak of hostilities was to be noti-
fied to neutral powers only.7 3 
Wherein lay the menace of this action? In that it broke 
down the fundamental distinctions whiGh the Declaration 
had attempted to achieve so as to protect neutrals; it opened 
the door to all manner of caprice at the hands of the bel-
ligerent governments, because once that a transition from 
the conditional to the absolute contraband list had been 
made, it opened the way for everything in the category of 
conditional contraband to follow. But a criterion was al-
ready laid down in this very article. The test was to be 
that of exclusive usefulness for war. On the respect of the 
belligerents for that provision hung the law and the future 
of maritime war. The drafting committee recognized this 
clearly. 74 Certain discoveries or inventions might make 
the list of absolute contraband insufficient. Additions 
might be made tb it on condition that they concerned ar-
ticles exclusively used for war. The right given to a power 
to make an addition by mere declaration had been thought 
too wide, hence declaration and notification were both or-
dered. "If a power claimed to add to the list of absolute 
'contraband articles not exclusively used for war, it might 
expose itself to diplomatic remonstrances, because it would 
be disregarding an accepted rule." In addition, it would 
be quite possible for the powers notified to refu~e to be 
bound by such declarations on the part of a belligerent, 
with an outcome which no international lawyer could wish 
to prophesy.75 
Aside from that, four other conditions of acceptance 
were laid down in the French reply. In the first place, any 
73Cohen·, op. cit ., p. 94. 
HCohen, op. cit., p. 94. 
75Bentwich, Declaration of London, p . 62. 
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neutral ship which might have succeeded in carrying con-
traband to the enemy by means of false papers might be 
seized for that reason if met with before completing its 
return journey. In regard to this, the Declaration of Lon-
don provided, for both absolute and conditional contra-
band, that the ship's papers were to be conclusive proof 
as to the voyage on which she was engaged and, with re-
spect to conditional contraband, also proof as to the port 
of discharge of the goods, unless the vessel were clearly 
.out of the course indicated by her papers when she was 
found, and if she were unable to give adequate reasons to 
justify such deviation.76 
Some explanation, however, is to be made as to the con-
struction of these provisions, as their all too rigid appli-
cation might have rendered nugatory any measures taken 
by a belligerent government against frauds perpetrated 
on it by neutral shippers. It was the intention of the De-
claration to exclude the doctrine of continuous voyage for 
conditional contraband, and it was expressly stated that 
conditional contraband was not liable to capture, except 
when found on board a vessel bound for territory belong-
ing to or occupied by the enemy, or for the armed forces of 
the enemy, and when it was not to be discharged in an in-
tE:rvening neutral port. 11 
The doctrine of continuous voyage (comments Bentwich) 
is excluded for conditional contraband, which is only liable 
to capture when it is to be discharged in an enemy port. As 
soon as the goods are documented for discharge in a neutral 
port they can no longer be considered contraband, and no ex-
amination will be made as to whether they are to be for-
warded to the enemy by land or sea from that neutral port. 
It is here that the case of absolute contraband is essential-
ly different .... 
This rule as to the proof furnished by the ship's papers is 
intended to prevent claims frivolously raised by a cruiser 
and giving rise to unjustifiable captures. It must not be too 
literally interpreted, for that would make all frauds easy . 
. . . A search of the vessel may reveal facts which irre-
76Cohen, op. cit., pp. 104, 108-109. 
11Declaration of London, Article 35. 
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futably prove that her destination or the place where the 
goods are to be discharged is incorrectly entered on the 
ship's papers. The commander or" the cruiser is then free 
to judge of the circumstances and capture the vessel or not, 
according to his judgment. To resume, the ship!s papers 
are proof unless facts show their evidence to be false. This 
qualification for the value of a ship's papers as proof seems 
self-evident and unworthy of special mention ... 
It does not follow that, because a single entry in the ship's 
papers is shown to be false, their evidence loses its value as 
a whole. The entries which cannot be proved false retain 
their value. 
In the light of this reservation, it may be taken that the 
ship's papers are not evidence either when they are found 
to be false, simulated or deceptive, or the ship is found out 
of the course indicated by them. 1s 
43 
In this connection the provisions of Article 36; that con-
ditional contraband, if shown to have the destination re-
ferred to in Article 33 (the armed forces or government 
department of the enemy State), is liable to capture in 
cases where the enemy country has no seaboard, are to be 
noted, because of the facts later adduced to show that save 
for the narrow coastal strip of Heligoland Bight, Germany 
practically had no legally accessible seaboard. The case 
of the Baltic littoral will be discussed under the subject of 
blockade. So much for the moment as regards the mean-
ing of "contraband." 
The question of the treatment of a vessel which had car-
ried contraband successfully to the enemy is abundantly 
covered by Article 38 of the Declaration, which states that 
a vessel may not be captured on the ground that she carried 
contraband on a previous occasion if such carriage is in 
point of fact at an end. To this the drafting committee 
added all too lucidly for the French Government that a ves-
sel was liable to capture for carrying contraband, but not 
for having done so. Consequently, as regards this point 
in the French note of acceptance of the Declaration, it may 
be seen that the French Government sought from the very 
beginning to thwart the entire purpose of the Declaration, 
78Bentwich, Declaration of London, p. 65. 
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and to d<1Ubly render thQ carrying of conditional contra-
band difficult, if not impossible, for neutrals. 
Second of the points in the French note was ·the state-
ment that the purpose within the meaning of Article 33 of 
the Declaration might be inferred from any sufficient proof, 
and (besides the assumption contained in Article 34) should 
be considered as existing if the merchandise was consigned 
to or in the name of an agent of the enemy, or to or in the 
name of any dealer or of any person acting under control 
of the authorities of the enemy. Article 34 stated that the 
destination for the enemy's ·armed forces or government 
department was presumed to exist if the goods were con-
signed to enemy authorities, or to a contractor established 
in the enemy country, who, as a matter of common knowl-
edge, supplied articles of such a kind to the enemy. A 
similar presumption was to arise if the goods were con-
signed to a fortified place belonging to the enemy, or to any 
other place serving as a base for the armed forces of the 
enemy. This was a point much labored in the debates on 
ratification in the British Parliament in 1911, because of 
the difficulty of ascertaining what was meant by an enemy 
base. No such presumptions arising, destination of both 
vessel and cargo was presumed to be innocent. The wide 
range of possibilities embraced by such phrases as "in-
fered," "any sufficient proof," "acting under the control 
of the authorities" show what radical steps might be taken 
by the French Government under the guise of observance 
of thti Declaration. In the course of the later controversy, 
any ground of suspicion was sufficient to permit the bel-
ligerent authorities to "infer" enemy destination; deten-
tion on suspicion was resorted to while search for proof 
was going on; while the entire enemy population, so long 
as it was not revolting against the Government, could be 
regarded as acting under its control. 
A third point in the French note was that, notwithstand-
ing the provisions of Article 35, which forbade examination 
of the ultimate destination of a cargo of conditional con-
traband if discharged in an intervening neutral port, if it 
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were proved that there was such an enemy destination as 
above mentioned, a cargo of . conditional contraband was 
liable to capture, whatever might be the port of destina-
tion of the ship and the port where the cargo was to be un-
loaded. This meant, of course, on its very face, (as if the 
extensions of "purpose" and "destination" had not suf-
ficiently covered it before) that the doctrine of continuous 
voyage was to be applied-and that most rigorously-to 
conditional contraband. Clearly against the spirit and the 
letter of the Declaration from the very beginning, not only 
did this acceptance of the Declaration with the reservations 
as to the making of conditional contraband absolute, and 
the extension of the .doctrine of continuous voyage to con-
ditional contraband destroy the entire usefulness of the 
Declaration in practice, but the cynical use which was made 
of the chapter on blockade was sufficient to overthrow the 
value of the Declaration altogether. 
The closing point of the French note dealt with the ques-
tion of the presumption of knowledge of blockade, stating 
that the existence of a blockade should be deemed known 
(a) for all ships starting from or touching at an enemy's 
port within a sufficient delay after notification of blockade 
to the local authorities to have allowed the enemy's gov-
ernment to make known the existence of the blockade ; ( b) 
for all ships which might have left or touehed at a French 
or Allied port after publication of a declaration of blockade. 
Seemingly innocent in its nature, as an endeavor to walk 
clearly within the law, it in fact meant that the Allied Gov-
ernments were not necessarily bound to notify the exist-
ence of a blockade to neutrals as provided by Article 11 of 
the Declaration, and that neutral vessels, in order to escape 
being seized for the carriage of contraband, or on the pre-
sumption of attempting to run the blockade, must perforce 
call at a French or Allied port, and there have their cargoes 
examined. 
Such practices, while manifestly not mandatory upon 
neutral vessels from a standpoint of law, were in fact al-
most compulsory, if such ships, already beset by all the 
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hazards of war at sea, were to avoid the added dangers of 
seizure for breach of blockade, when no blockade had in 
fact been notified to neutral Powers. To say that neutral 
countries themselves would not be diligent in notifying 
their vessels about to sail for foreign or belligerent ports 
would be tantamount to a disregard of the accepted prac-
tice of nations, recognized plainly, in the report of the 
drafting committee as being "the duty of neutral Govern-
ments advised of the declaration of blockade to take the 
necessary measures to dispatch the news to the different 
parts of their territory, especially their ports."79 Bentwich, 
reviewing the matter critically, points out likewise that 
the duty of the belligerent to declare a blockade is estab-
lished by international usage; but English practice in the 
past has recognized a blockade de facto, constituted merely 
by the fact of investment without any public notification. 
Such de facto blockades cannot henceforth be enforced un-
less the commander of the blockading force issues a Decla-
ration which is notified to the neutral powers and to the 
local authoritie·s according to Article 11.80 
. The provisions of Articles 15 and 16 are also in point: 
Failing proof to the contrary, knowledge of the blockade 
is presumed if the vessel left a neutral port subsequently to 
the notification of the blockade to the power to which such 
port belongs, provided that such notification was made in 
sufficient time. 
If a vessel approaching a blockaded port has no knowl-
edge, actual or presumptive, of the blockade, the notification 
must be made to the vessel itself by an officer of one of the 
ships of the blockading force. This notification should be 
entered in the vessel's logbook, and must state the day and 
hour and the geographical position of the vessel at the 
time.8 1 
Thus, comments Bentwich: 
Notification as well as declaration of blockade is now ren-
dered compulsory on belligerents. Subject to the provisions 
of Articles 15 and 16, this notification is deemed to give notice 
of the blockade to all neutral ships and merchants, and to 
1scohen, op. cit., p . 80. 
soBentwich, op. cit., pp. 50-51. 
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make them liable for any breach of blockade attempted sub-
sequently. s2 
47 
Such was the French acceptance of the Declaration of 
London. Innocent and fair-minded as it seemed, it was an 
attempt, in effect, to conceal plans for unnotified blockades 
and the transfer of conditional contraband to the class and 
the consequences of absolute contraband. Much as the 
French Prize Regulations of 1913 may have been modeled 
in outward form to suit an eventual operation of the Dec-
laration of London, in substance the qualified acceptance 
of the Declaration was such as to make it all but meaning-
less in regard to the two most important subjects in its 
scope. The later experience of the Dacia was to show how 
seriously the other provisions were regarded. 
It was on August 22, 1914, that Sir Eyre Crowe, answer-
ing for Sir Edward Grey, replied to the representations 
made by Ambassador Page, and stated the viewpoint of the 
British Government towards the Declaration of London in 
the following terms : 
His Majesty's Government, who .. . are animated by a 
keen desire to consult, so far as possible, the interests of 
neutral countries, have given this matter their most care-
ful consideration and have pleasure in stating that they have 
decided to adopt generally the rules of the Declaration in 
question, subject to certain modifications and additions which 
they judge indispensable to the efficient conduct of their 
naval operations. A detailed explanation of these additions 
and modifications is contained in the enclosed memorandum. 
The necessary steps to carry the above decision into ef-
fect have now been taken by the issue of an Order in Coun-
cil, of which I have the honor to enclose copies herein for 
Your Excellency's information and for transmission to your 
Government. . . . 
His Majesty's Government, in deciding to adhere to the 
rules of the Declaration of London, subject only to the afore-
said piodifications and additions, have not waited to learn the 
intention of the enemy governments, but have been actuated 
by a desire to terminate at the earliest moment the condi-
sicohen, op. cit., p. 83. 
s2Bentwich, op. cit., p. 51. 
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tion of uncertainty which has been prejudicing the inter-
ests of neutral trade.83 
Preliminary to an examination of the memoranda and 
the Orders in Council which follow, it should be stated that 
on August 4, 1914, on the very day of the entrance of Great 
Britain into the war, an Order in Council established the 
same list of contraband that had been given under the 
French acceptance declarations. Thus, the questions as to 
transfers of contraband from one category to the other 
make it essentially subject to the same criticism as the list 
published by the French Government. But besides this, 
the memorandum sets forth with much greater lucidity the 
reasons for the qualified acceptance of the Declaration on 
the part of Great Britain. One very important gain was 
that mentioned in section 5 of the memorandum, accepting 
the commentary on the Declaration drafted by M. Renault 
as authoritative. This was a step towards conformity to 
continental practice, and marked the beginning of that fur-
ther fusion of English and French maritime practice which 
was to give rise to no little conflict. 
The point already labored as to the capture of a vessel 
on its return voyage for having carried contraband suc-
cessfully to the enemy on its outward voyage recurs in the 
memorandum. 
His Majesty's Government do not feel able to accept in its 
entirety the rule laid down ... in the Declaration.84 It 
has been the practice of the British Navy to treat as liable 
to capture a vessel which carried contraband of war with 
false papers if she _was encountered on the return voyage, 
and to this exception His Majesty's Government feel it neces-
sary to adhere. 
The reason for the application of the doctrine of con-
tinuous voyage to conditional contraband was naively stated 
thus: 
The peculiar conditions in the present war due to the fact 
that neutral ports such as Rotterdam are the chief means 
83EW No. 1, p. 6. (22.VIIl.14). (Italics are writer's.) 
8<Declaration of London, Article 38. 
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of access to a large part of Germany and that exceptional 
measures have been taken in the enemy country for the con-
trol by the Government of the entire supply of foodstuffs 
have convinced His Majesty's Government that modifications 
are required in the application of Articles 34 and 35 of the 
Declaration. These modifications are contained in the ac-
companying Order in Council. 
Article 15 of the Declaration contains a provision as to 
presumptive knowledge of the blockade in certain cases if the 
vessel has sailed from a neutral port. No mention is made 
of British or _allied enemy ports. These omissions are sup-
plied by the Order in Council.85 
49 
This was the explanation by which the possibilities of 
undeclared blockades were camouflaged, for although the 
formal blockade was not announced until March 11, 1915, 
as affecting German ports, a limited blockade was practi-
cally sustained by virtue of this Order in Council, as no 
mention of the use or limitations of blockade would have 
been necessary unless a blockade was seriously being con-
templated. The Order in Council announced the measures 
taken as being concerted action on the part of the allied 
Russian, French and British Governments with regard to 
neutral ships and commerce. 
At last the Declaration of London was in a way of accept-
ance, in so far as might be practicable. The greatest mari-
time powers had accepted, in varying degrees, the propo-
sitions contained in that celebrated document. Yet the 
United States felt otherwise in the matter. It had had pre-
vious experience with Orders in Council of none too mild 
a nature. Many things had been done in the name of in-
ternational law by Orders in Council that were travesties 
upon the accepted law of nations. Hence Mr. Lansing, 
taking for the first time his part in directing the current 
of our war-time policy, was impelled to write: 
Inasmuch as the British Government consider that the 
conditions of the present European conflict make it impos-
sible for them to accept without modification the Declara-
tion of London, ... in the circumstances the Government 
a"EW No. 1, p . 6. 
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of the United States feels obliged to · withdraw its sugges-
tion that the Declaration of London be adopted as a tem-
porary code of naval warfare to be observed by belligerents 
and neutrals during the present war; . . . therefore this 
Government will insist that the rights and duties of the 
United States and its citizens in the present war be defined 
by the existing rules of international law, and the treaties 
of the United States irrespective of the provisions of the 
Declaration of London; and .. . this Government reserves 
to itself the right to enter a protest or demand in each case 
in which those rights and duties so defined are violated or 
their free exercise interfered with by the authorities of His 
Britannic Majesty's Government. as 
This determination on the part of the United States was 
communicated to the Central Powers opportunely. The 
preliminary battle for its adoption had been half won, half 
lost; it remained for time to show the utter collapse of the 
Declaration.8 7 
BSEW No. 1, p. 8. (22.X.14) . 
B7For a critical discussion of the role of the Declaration of London 
in the late war cf. Garner, James Wilford, International Law and 
the W orld War, I, 27-34. 
CHAPTER IV. 
UNNEUTRAL ACTS AND UNNEUTRAL SERVICE. 
The London Naval Conference of 1908-1909 grouped the 
various topics of maritime law under various headings, to 
enable the lines of distinction between certain acts of one 
kind and another to be more clearly drawn. Because of the 
virtual "acceptance" of the Declaration by the Allied Gov-
ernments, it becomes convenient to classify under the re-
spective chapters of the Declaration the main lines of con-
troversy between the United States and the Allied Govern-
ments. For those purposes the topics of unneutra! acts 
and service, contraband, enemy character, and blockade, 
will be so treated. 
The general question of unneutral acts has been dealt 
with in the discussion of American neutrality laws. The 
specific instances in which these laws were violated, or in 
which the neutrality of the United States88 was jeopardized 
will now be dealt with. 
As early as September, 1914, correspondence between 
the Department of State and the various embassies of the 
belligerent governments took place, due to the allegations 
on the part of the various belligerents that the warships 
of their antagonists were receiving aid or supplies in Amer-
ican ports, or from tugs or tenders leaving American ports 
surreptitiously.89 Thus the German cruiser Leipzig, leav-
88Exclusive of the Canal Zone. For cases arising there, see Chap-
ter I , pp. 17-18. 
S9Jn view of this fact, the Department of State, in a memo-
randum issued on September 19, 1914, dealing with Merchant Vessels 
Suspected of Carrying Supplies to Belligerent Vessels, defined its at-
titude in the matter. Coaling or the obtaining of supplies by a bel-
ligerent man-of-war, directly or by means of naval tenders, neutral 
or belligerent, from an American port more than once in three months 
operated, according to the memorandum, to create a presumption of 
the use of such port as a base of operations for belligerent warships. 
While rumors that merchant vessels laden with such supplies might 
be carrying them to belligerent warships on the high seas did not 
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ing American waters on the outbreak of the war, was 
forced to seek supplies from San Francisco in the month 
of September, 1914, and a barge-load of supplies was car-
ried to her as she lay off the Golden Gate under cover of 
night, and in the path of the British cruiser Railnbow. The 
British Government, however, made no protest in the mat-
ter as far as officially disclosed. Shortly thereafter it was 
reported to the State Department that a British warship 
had communicated with the shore at New York a request 
for supplies. Thereupon Mr. Lansing notified the British 
Embassy that this would be considered a violation of 
American neutrality. In reply Sir Cecil Spring-Rice noti-
fied the State Department that the British Admirality had 
instructed their vessels on no account to telegraph to New 
York for supplies or newspapers.90 On October 21, 1914, 
the German Embassy called the attention of the State De-
partment to the departure of the tugs F. B. Dalzell and 
impose upon a neutral Government any obligation to detain such a 
vessel unless she had previously acted in this manner, circumstantial 
evidence, such as the presence of a belligerent warship, or the pre-
sumption of its presence off the particular port in question, the fact 
that the merchant vessel was of the same nationality as such a war-
ship, the failure to arrive in port on a previous voyage with naval 
supplies, coal, etc., or the presence of a belligerent agent on board 
such a vessel, would be sufficient to warrant the detention and in-
vestigation of the vessel. Mere presence of a cargo of naval sup-
plies on board the vessel was not sufficient evidence to withhold clear-
ance, unless this had occurred twice within a period of three months, 
the essential idea of neutral territory becoming the base for naval 
operations being repeated departures from such territory of naval 
tenders or supply vessels. While such clearances might be made for 
another neutral country, and such cargoes might be transhipped there, 
the fact was not mandatory upon the neutral government first con-
cerned to prevent such departure. Trade directly with the naval 
bases of a belligerent, by private citizens of a neutral state, was no 
ground for the detention of such vessel, as a neutral could be charged 
with unneutral conduct only when supplies furnished to a belligerent 
warship were furnished directly to it in the port of the neutral or 
through naval tenders or merchant vE'ssels departing from such port. 
Cf. EW No. 2, pp. 43-4. (9.IX.14). 
9oEW No. 2, p. 29. (24.IX.14). 
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G. H. Dalzell from New York on the nights of September 
31-0ctober 1 and October 1-2 to carry provisions to the 
British cruiser Essex . In this way, the note alleged, forty 
tons of meat were supplied to the Essex, which was then 
about five miles off shore. Thhe German Government 
therefore requested the State Department to make an in-
vestigation and ascertain whether it constituted a violation 
of American neutrality.9 1 In reply, Mr. Lansing wrote, on 
November 23, 1914, that an investigation had been made 
but that there was not sufficient evidence to show that the 
F. B. Dalzell had done any such acts as alleged. Nothing 
was said concerning the G. H. Daizell. On this basis Count 
von Bernstorff dropped the discussion, as he was unable to 
adduce any further evidence in the matter. 
Meanwhile, the British Ambassador had brought to the 
attention of the State Department the action of the Italian 
steamship Amista in leaving Newport News, October 17, 
1914, for Montevideo via Barbados, laden wjth coal. The 
vessel was then under strong suspicion of being engaged 
in supplying German cruisers with coal. Having cleared 
for Barbados, she never arrived there, causing the British 
Embassy to confirm its previous suspicions as to the char-
acter of the vessel. 92 
"The systematic way in which neutral ships have left 
American ports in order to supply German cruisers, and 
have been allowed to operate freely in the ports of the 
United States, in spite of the warnings given," continued 
the note, "is a matter which causes grave anxiety to His 
Majesty's Government. In view of the usages of interna-
tional law and the terms of the instructions of the United 
States Government to local authorities for the preservatioi; 
of the neutrality of the United States," the Ambassador 
added, he ·had been instructed to request that "such meas-
ures as are possible may be taken to prevent the use of 
ports of the United States for this unneutral purpose." 
In reply, Mr. Lansing wrote, on November 2, 1914, that 
91/bid., p . 29. (21.X.14). 
92[bid., p. 29. (31.X.14). and reply, p . 30. (2.XI.14). 
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the Department would make a full investigation of the case 
of the Amista, and that as regards the unnentral services 
rendered by American vessels to belligerent war-vessels, 
every instance had been thoroughly investigated, when 
there was any basis of fact to confirm suspicions, to de-
termine the bona fide character of such transactions as 
complained of. 
Further than this the Government of the United States 
does not understand that its duty in these matters requires 
it to go, for otherwise the war would impose on the United 
States the burden of enforcing restrictions which are not, in 
the opinion of the Government, prescribed by the rules of in-
ternational law. The Government of the United States feels 
obliged to decline to accept any suggestion intimating that 
its vigilance in the maintenance of its neutral duties under 
international law has been relaxed so as to allow vessels 
engaged in violations of such duties to operate freely in the 
ports of the United States. 
Once again, in March, 1915, the State Department was 
compelled to draw the attention of the British Embassy 
to the action of British cruisers operating in the North 
Atlantic, in a series of unofficial exchanges of views, con-
cluding with a formal reply by the British Ambassador on 
March 24, 1915, to the effect that renewed orders had been 
issued by the Admiralty impressing naval officers with the 
duty of strictly observing the terms of the United States 
neutrality regulations.93 Mr. Lansing replied on March 27, 
1915, calling the attention of the Ambassador to the fact 
that several times during the preceding winter belligerent 
ships of war had taken on coal, and perhaps other sup-
plies, within the territorial waters of the United States in 
the vicinity of the islands off the Santa Barbara Channel, 
opposite California, and had had communication with the 
mainland in this locality. He specified the instance of the 
coaling by the British steamship Bellerophon of the British 
cruiser Rainbow within a mile of the western shore of 
Ancapa Island, while a launch left the vicinity of Hueneme, 
California, and communicated with the above-mentioned 
93EW No. 2, p. 33 (27.IIl.15). 
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vessels. Mr. Lansing therefore requested the British Gov~ 
ernment to issue such instructions to their ffeet as would 
make a recurrence of such violations of American neutral-
ity impossible. Nothing further was heard of the matter, 
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice having once promised to bring it to 
the attention of the British Government. 
A minor case involving the rigid maintenance of Amer-
ican neutrality may be instanced in the request of the 
British Government on December 20, 1915, for permission 
to let discharged, though uniformed, Canadian soldiers, re-
turning to their homes from England, pass through the 
northern part of Maine from Vanceboro to Lowelltown, en 
route from St. John to other portions of Canadian terri-
tory. A similar request was made in the case of men in-
valided home, who, while still in the Canadian Expedition-
ary Forces, would be traveling as individuals and not as 
parties. Mr. Lansing replied to this on December 23, 1915, 
stating that the United States regretted to deny this re-
quest, but was compelled to do so "on account of the em-
barrassment which would almost surely follow if such pass-
age were permitted." Here again the United States ad-
hered to its strict policy of neutrality in lieu of rendering 
anything that might savor of unneutral service.94 
Such comprise the cases of unneutral acts committed 
or alleged to have been committed in American waters on 
behalf of belligerents. The cases arising under the class of 
acts described as unneutral service in the Declaration of 
London will next be considered. 
Under Article 45 of the Declaration of London, a neutral 
vessel is liable to condemnation "if, to the knowledge of 
either the owner, the charterer or the master, she is trans-
porting . . : one or more persons, who, in the course of 
the voyage, directly assist the operation of the enemy." 
The determination of the obligations arising under this 
article is difficult and was so recognized in the report of 
the drafting committee. 
9 4EW No . 4, pp. 81-2. 
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It would be difficult, perhaps even impossible, without 
having recourse to vexatious measures to which neutral 
governments would not unwillingly (sic) submit, to pick 
out among the passengers in a vessel those who are bound 
to perform military service and are on their way to do so. 
The transmission of intelligence in the interest of the enemy 
is to be treated in the same way as the carriage of passen-
gers embodied in his armed force. 
Likewise in Article 47 of the Declaration it is stated that 
"any individual embodied in the armed forces of the enemy 
who is found on board a neutral merchant vessel may be 
made a prisoner of war, even if there be no ground for the 
capture of the vessel." Concerning this, the report of the 
drafting committee stated: 
Individuals embodied in the armed military or naval 
forces of a belligerent may be on board a neutral merchant 
vessel when she is searched. . . . The belligerent cruiser 
cannot be compelled to set free active enemies who are physi-
cally in her power ... She must naturally proceed with 
great discretion, and must act on her own responsibility in 
requiring the surrender of these individuals, but the right to 
do so is hers. 95 
The first instance to be mentioned under this heading is 
the case of the United Fruit Company's steamer Metapan, 
stopped by the commander of the French cruiser Conde, 
who arrested several suspected German reservists on board 
her, but ultimately released them on parole, when it was 
seen that some of them had exemption papers, and that the 
others promised not to take up arms in behalf of the Cen-
tral Empires during the remainder of the war. The De-
partment of State, on the basis of the consular report, 
whose substance is given in an appendix, '"·a made a formal 
protest to the French Government against the unwarranted 
actions of the Conde in so remote a region from the scene 
of war. 
More important was the case of the detention of the 
American ship Windber, about November 13, 1914, in Car-
ibbean waters, and the removal from her by officers of the 
95Cohen, op. cit., pp. 119-126. 
95aCf. pp. 177-178, infra. 
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Conde of one August Piepenbrink, a German by birth, who 
had regularly filed his declaration of intention to become an 
American citizen at Sacramento, California, in 1910. He 
was subsequently taken to Kingston, Jamaica, and put in 
charge of British officials. On December 7, 1914, Mr. 
Bryan cabled Vice-Consul Bundy at Kingston to ask for the 
release of Piepenbrink, while on the same d.ate he sent a 
dispatch to Ambassadors Sharp and Page, asking that the 
respective governments authorize such action. On Janu-
ary 4, 1915, the British Government replied that, in their 
opinion, Piepenbrink was still a German subject, inasmuch 
as he had not completed his naturalization. The French 
Government replied in the same tenor on January 22, 1915. 
Mr. Bryan now raised the point that under Section 2174 
of the United States Revised Statutes every foreign seaman 
employed in the American merchant marine having de-
clared intention of becoming a citizen was, for all purposes 
of protection as an American citizen, to be deemed such 
after the filing of declaration of intention to become such 
citizen. Furthermore, there was no evidence that anything 
under Article 47 of the Declaration of London applied to 
the case of Piepenbrink. It was contrary to the position 
taken by Great Britain and France in the Trent affair 
that :96 
"If the real terminus of the voyage be bona fide in neu-
tral territory, no British . . . or American authority 
could be found which had ever given countenance to the 
doctrine that either men or dispatches could be subject 
during such a voyage, and on board a neutral vessel, to 
belligerent capture ·as contraband of war." 97 A similar 
note to the French Government laid down the French prece-
dent in the same case that98 
The destination of the Trent was not a point belonging to 
one of the belligerents. She had taken on her cargo and her 
passengers in a neutral country, and moreover had taken 
96EW No. 2, pp. 133-4. 
97Moore, Digest, VII, 772. 
uscalvo, Fifth Edition, V, 94-95. 
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them on in a neutral port. If it were admissible that under 
such conditions the neutral flag did not completely cover the 
persons and merchandise which it was transporting, its im-
munity would not longer be anything but an empty word; 
at any time the commerce and navigation of third powers 
would have to suffer from their harmless or even indirect 
relations with one or the other of the belligerents; the latter 
would no longer be entitled merely to require entire im-
partiality of a neutral and to forbid him from interfering 
in any way in the hostilities, but they would place upon his 
freedcm of commerce and navigation restrictions the law-
fulness of which modern international law has refused to 
admit. 
On April 3, 1915, the British Government replied that, 
in common with the French Government, they had decided 
to liberate Piepenbrink as a friendly act, while reserving 
the question of principle involved. This was confirmed in 
a note of April 15, 1915, from the French Foreign Office.99 
The last and most important instance of this kind was 
the case of the China, an American vessel plying between 
Shanghai and Nagasaki, which was stopped by the Brit-
ish cruiser Laurentic about ten miles from the Yangtze-
kiang on February 18, 1916. An armed party from the 
Laurentic boarded her, and despite the captain's protest 
removed from the vessel 28 Germans, 8 Austrians and 2 
Turks, including merchants and physicians, and took them 
to Hongkong, where they were detained as prisoners in the 
military barracks. 
On February 23, 1916, Mr. Lansing sent a vigorous note 
to the British Government protesting against the seizure 
and insisting that if the facts were as reported, immediate 
orders be given for the release of the men taken from the 
China, inasmuch as it was understood that none of the men 
seized were incorporated in the armed forces of the enemy, 
and it was regarded as an unwarranted invasion of the 
sovereignty of the United States on the high seas. After 
the assurances given in Piepenbrink's case, the United 
States was surprised at such action on the part of the Brit-
99EW No. 2, p. 136. 
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ish authorities in exercising belligerent power on the high 
stas so far from the zone of hostile operations.100 
The answer of the British Government was made on 
March 16, 1916, in a note stating the reasons for the meas-
ures taken. The British Government, it was pointed out, 
had adhered to the literal interpretation of Articles 45 and 
47 of the Declaration of London as given by the drafting 
committee, reserving the liberty, as the Declaration was 
an unratified instrument, to cancel at any time their ad-
herence, provided always that their subsequent action did 
not conflict with the general principles of international law. 
On November 4, 1914, the British Government had ad-
dressed a circular note to the neutral powers represented at 
London, stating that it was impossible to accept any longer 
the restrictions laid down in the drafting committee's re-
port, and that thereafter they would arrest all enemy re-
servists found on board neutral ships on the high seas, no 
matter where they might be met. 
It was evident ... that the principle that there are cer-
tain persons who are not protected by the neutral flag on the 
high seas and may therefore without an invasion of the 
sovereign rights of the neutral be removed from a neutral 
ship was generally admitted. The carriage of such per-
sons might in some cases amount to unneutral service, but 
even where this was not so, the removal of such persons 
from a neutral ship by a belligerent did not justify any 
complaint by the neutral power concerned. . . . From 
actual occurrences and information reliably received, it 
had been definitely established that the Germans resident 
in Shanghai had been engaged in gathering arms and am-
munition to send clandestinely to India, and to fit out a ship 
as a commerce raider. Their plans having been frustrated 
in Shanghai by the British authorities, the Germans 
planned to shift the center of their activities to Manila, 
and hence embarked on the China for this purpose, as sub-
sequent information had confirmed. In view of the British 
Government, therefore, it would not be disputed that these 
ioospecial supplement to 10 AJIL, p. 427. 
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men must be placed in the category of those who, without 
any infraction of the sovereignty of a neutral state, might 
be removed from a neutral vessel on the high seas. ThP. 
object of their journey was to find another neutral asylum 
in which they might continue their operations against 
Great Britain. The acts which they desired to perform 
upon the soil of the United States were such as possibly to 
compromise the neutrality of the United States or to con-
stitute an offense against its criminal Jaws. They were in 
effect persons whose past actions and future intentions 
deprived them of any protection from the neutral flag un-
der which they were sailing. 
It is far from the wish and intention of His Majesty's 
Government to take any action involving an invasion of the 
sovereign rights of the United States Government; the above 
observations will have made it clear that no such invasion 
was involved in the action of H.M.S. Laurentic, and ... 
that after the foregoing explanations in regard both to the 
general question involved, and to the removal of enemy sub-
jects from the China the United States Government will not 
feel disposed further to contend that this action was not 
justified.101 
This note closed the incident, which is the last that may 
be assimilated to the heading of unneutral service in the 
controversies formally arising between the United States 
and the Allied Governments. 102 American rights may have 
suffered slightly, but so far as the Government of the 
United States was knowingly involved, the neutrality of 
the United States had not been compromised. 
101 Special Supplement to 10 AJIL, pp. 428-432. (16.III.16). 
102Cf. Garner, op. cit., II, 362-370, for a discussion of these cases 
and those of Garde and others, concerning which no documentary 
evidence was disclosed by the Department of State. 
CHAPTER V 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER ARMED MERCHANT 
SHIPS 
One of the legacies of uncertainty bequeathed by the 
London Naval Conference to the belligerents and neutrals 
in 1914 was the problem of the treatment of armed mer-
chant ships. Something had been done by way of prescrib-
ing the measures for conversion of merchantmen into men 
of war at The Hague in 1907, but the regulations to be ap-
plied to armed merchant ships had not been decided upon. 
The problem presented itself principally from the angle 
of neutrals, whose position, were merchantmen to be con-
verted in their ports, would be drawn into question, and 
was complicated by the return of various governments to 
the habit of arming their liners defensively with the avowed 
object of mere self-protection. In view of the controversies 
which had arisen between the United States and Great 
Britain during the American Civil War, and the resultant 
rules regarding the responsibility of a neutral power for 
permitting the departure of potential warships from its 
ports, the United States felt a lively interest in the whole 
problem. The issue was raised simultaneously with the 
the entrance of Great Britain into the war. Not only in 
this instance was the United States deeply concerned, due 
to the special provisions of the Treaty of Washington, now 
altered only by the fact that America was the neutral and 
Great Britain the belligerent, but. the fact that the subject 
had been covered in the discussions and the conventions of 
the Second Hague Conference of which both Great Britain 
and the United States were signatories involved a thorough-
going consideration of our rights and duties in the matter. 
On August 4, 1914, therefore, Mr. Colville Barclay, thElj 
British Charge d'Affaires in Washington, sent a formal 
note103 to the Secretary of State, reminding the United 
io3EW No. 2, p. 37. (4.VIII.14). 
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States of its duties under the Three Rules of the Treaty of 
Washington and the eighth article of the Thirteenth Hague 
Convention of 1907.104 
In the report of the committee on the Thirteenth Conven-
tion, no mention is made of this question of conversion of 
merchantmen either in port or elsewhere, and in the 
Seventh Convention of The Hague of 1907, relating to the 
conversion of merchant ships into war-ships, no formal 
mention is made of the place where the conversion is to 
take place, 105 nor was any mention of reconversion put into 
the Convention. The right of a belligerent to convert his 
merchantman into warships being unquestioned, the only 
question arising was that involving the conditions of con-
version. "Without questioning the possibility or impossi-
bility of using neutral waters to effect conversion, it was 
considered that the question whether it was proper to limit 
the places where conversion might be effected to national 
or occupied ports should first be discussed. The arguments 
in favor of this proposition were supported especially by 
the British delegation, who gave the following reasons: 
conversion on the high seas would leave neutrals in igno-
rance of the character of a ship which had left its last port 
of departure as a merchant ship; the conversion would be 
an act of sovereignty which could be performed only in 
places where that sovereignty ·had jurisdiction." To this 
proposition, Germany, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary 
and Serbia were quite opposed, although they argued 
1°4The latter article reads as follows: 
"ARTICLE VIII. A neutral government is bound to employ the 
means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of any ves-
sel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended 
to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a Power with which 
that government is at peace, and also to display the same vigilance 
to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended 
to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, this vessel having been 
adapted entirely or partly within the said jurisdiction for use in 
war."-Scott, Repor ts, pp. 833-845-6. 
100/bid., pp. 590-699, passim. 
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against the possibility of reconversion. Substantial agree-
ment was reached, however, on the following proposition: 
ARTICLE I. A merchant ship converted into a warship 
cannot have the rights and duties accruing to such vessels 
unless it is placed under the direct authority, immediate 
control and respansibility of the state whose flag it flies. 
In the opinion of the committee on the Seventh Conven-
tion, the object of the entire convention was to give a guar-
antee against any return to privateering, however disguised 
it might be. By Article VI of the convention, such conver-
sion must be announced by the belligerent. The delegation 
from the United States had proposed conditions almost 
identic with those laid down by the British delegation in 
claiming that in time of war no merchant vessel should be 
transformed into a warship save in the territorial waters 
of the state owning the vessel or in those over which it ex-
ercised by its military forces an effective control.1°6 These 
the United States again sustained at the London Naval 
Conference, and in 1913 the Naval War College concluded 
that the conversion of a private ship into a vessel of war 
should not take place except in the waters of its own state 
or of an ally or in the waters occupied by one of these.101 
These considerations will suffice to show the respective 
attitudes of Great Britain and the United States on the sub-
ject of conversion. They endeavor to show the dangers to 
which neutral countries might expose themselves in treat-
ing certain converted merchantmen now as men of war 
and now as ordinary merchantmen. It was with these ap-
prehensions in mind that Mr. Barclay wrote: 
It is probable that attempts will be made to equip and 
despatch merchantmen for conversion from the ports of the 
United States. Even if the final completion of the measures 
to fit out merchantmen to act as cruisers may have to be 
effected on the high seas, most of the preliminary arrange-
ments will have been made before the vessels leave port, so 
that the warlike purpose to which they are to be put after 
iocscott, Reports, p. 614. 
101u. S. Naval War College, International Law Topics, 1913, p. 148. 
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leaving neutral waters must be more or less manifest before 
their departure. His Majesty's Government will accordingly 
hold the United States Government responsible for any dam-
ages to British trade or shipping, or injury to British inter-
ests generally, which may be caused by such vessels having 
been equipped at, or departing from, United States ports. 
This was reviving the shadow of the Shenandoah and the 
Alabama with no little vigor. On August 9, Mr. Barclay 
wrote to the Secretary of State, making further explana-
tions of the British stand as to armed merchantmen, in the 
following terms : 
As you are no doubt aware, a certain number of British 
merchant vessels are armed, but this is a precautionary 
measure adopted solely for the purpose of defense, which 
under existing rules of international law, is the right of 
all merchant vessels when attacked. According to the Brit-
ish rule, British merchant vessels cannot be converted into 
men-of-war in any foreign port, for the reason that Great 
Britain does not admit the right of any power to do this on 
the high seas. The duty of a neutral to intern or order the 
immediate departure of belligerent vessels is limited to ac-
tual and potential men of war, and, in the opinion of His 
Majesty's Government, there can therefore be no right on 
the part of neutral governments to intern British armed 
merchant vessels, which cannot be converted into men of war 
on the high seas, nor to require them to land their guns be-
fore proceeding to sea. 
On the other hand, the German Government have consist-
ently claimed the right of conversion on the high seas, and 
His Majesty's Government therefore maintain their claim 
that vessels which are adapted for conversion and under 
German rules may be converted into men of war on the high 
seas, should be interned in the absence of binding assurances, 
the responsibility for which must be assumed by the neutral 
government concerned, that they shall not so be converted.1os 
This rather astounding endeavor to make the neutral 
governments bear the onus probandi for any misdeeds in 
regard to a matter so greatly disputed was not an isolated 
instance, for the British Government communicated the 
same memoranda to all neutral countries.109 
1osEW No. 2, pp. 37-8. (9.VIII.14). 
109Jbid., p. 38. (12.VIII.14). 
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Before discussing the American reply to these notes, it 
will be necessary to cite several cases to elaborate the at-
titude of the United States towards privately armed mer-
chantmen. In this connection, the endeavors of President 
Adams in 1797 to secure protection for American com-
merce by authorizing the arming of American merchant-
men will be remembered. The mere fact of the arming of 
merchantmen as an incident in a policy of armed neutrality 
does not invalidate the fact that the United States, as a 
matter of policy, had recognized the propriety of this ac-
tion. The penalties prescribed in the neutrality laws of 
the United States for the misuse of armed liners fall only 
on those who intend to use such vessels "to cruise or com-
mit hostilities against the subjects, citizens or property of 
any foreign prince or state, or of any colony, district or peo-
ple with whom the United States are at peace."110 This law 
does not, therefore, apply in such cases. In 1877, the De-
partment of State, being asked for its position on the ques-
tion, stated that it was 
not aware of any international prohibition or of any treaty 
provision which would prevent a vessel . . . from carry-
ing . . . guns and arms for the proper and necessary pro-
tection of the vessel against violence . . . provided always 
that the vessel carryil}g such guns and arms itself be on a 
lawful voyage and be engaged in none other than peaceful 
commerce and that such guns and arms be intended and be 
used only for the purpose o~ defence and self-protection.111 
Inasmuch as the dangers from pirates and privateers 
seemed to have disappeared following the signing of the 
Declaration of Paris in 1856, the main motive that had led 
to the arming of merchantmen in the course of the Napole-
onic wars no longer existed, and it was only at the begin-
ning of the twentieth century that a disposition to resume 
the habit of arming merchantmen seems to have been re-
.sumed. In the Naval Code of 1900, the United States Navy 
specifically recognized the right of merchantmen to arm, 
11°Chapter LXVII, R evised Statutes of the United States, Sec. 5289. 
11 1 Fish t o Morrill (8.II.1877), Moore , Dige[t , II, 1080. 
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and give the members of the crews of such vessels the 
status of prisoners of war if captured.11 2 In the case of 
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States arrange-
ments were made with steamship lines in each country to 
turn over their vessels to the Government for its use on 
the outbreak of war, or else to be ready to accept arma-
ment. In Great Britain, the Cunard and White Star liners 
enrolled themselves with the Admiralty as being capable 
of conversion and thereby of inclusion in the auxiliary 
cruisers of the British fleet. 
These may be regarded as instances of a practice which 
has the sanction of the majority of nations behind it, and 
also the consensus of opinion of leading authorities on in-
ternational law. Commenting on this situation, Professor 
A. P. Higgins states :m 
The situation today bears a curious resemblance to that 
which existed a century ago with, however, certain modifica-
tions resulting from the Declaration of Paris and the Sixth 
Hague Convention of 1907 relative to ' the status of enemy 
merchant ships at the outbreak of hostilities, which may be 
considered as a supplementary and explanatory treaty. Pri-
vate merchant ships are still constantly hired as transports, 
though they are not generally armed or commissioned, and, 
therefore, retain their character of merchant ships. Most 
states have arrangements whereby in time of war certain 
vessels armed by private owners, companies or individuals, 
are taken over by the state and equipped with arms and in-
corporated into the fighting forces of the state. These ves-
sels take the place of the old letters of marque or private 
ship of war; but they are no longer fitted out by private own-
ers for their own pecuniary benefit, but rank in all respects, 
when conforming to the Sixth Hague Convention, as public 
ships of war. Lastly there is a return to the armed and 
uncommissioned merchant ship, not armed compulsorily un-
der an Order in Council, but armed at the expense of the 
state, by the willing cooperation of the owners. 
The right of a merchant ship to arm in self-defense seems 
112u . S. Naval War College Int. Law Topics, 1903. Appendix I, 
Art. 10, p. 3. . 
mA. P. Higgins, 8 AJIL, 711-712 (1914). Also in Senate Docu-
ment 332, 64th Congress, First Session, pp. 25-38. 
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to be supported on the ground that "whereas the visit of a 
belligerent warship to a neutral vessel, though justified 
by the fact of the existence of war, is not a hostile act," 
and is one to which the neutral must submit, if she is to 
prove her innocent character, "the visit to an enemy ship 
is, under the existing law, merely the first step to capture 
and is itself a hostile act. . . . A belligerent has a right to 
capture an enemy merchant ship, and the latter is under no 
duty to submit; it has a corresponding right to resist cap-
ture, which is an act of violence and hostility. By resist-
ing, the belligerent violates no duty, he is held by force and 
may escape if he can." 
This thesis sustained by Mr. Higgins has been severely 
criticized by Jonkheer W. J. M." von Eysinga, of Leyden 
University, on the ground that the arrest of a merchantman 
by a hostile belligerent cruiser does not in itself constitute 
a legal attack. This ·point of view, rather than that ad-
vanced by Dr. George Schramm, as Counselor of the Ger-
man Imperial Navy Department, which denies to any mer-
chantman the right to resist, seems to be the logical view-
point to take if any critique is to be made of the raison 
d'etre of the practice of resistance to capture. The view of 
American authorities in this regard is perhaps best e:;-
pressed by Professor C. C. Hyde of Northwestern Uni-
versity :114 
Under normal circumstances it is believed that a bellig-
erent should refrain from arming its merchantmen as · a 
means of defending them from lawful capture by legitimate 
processes, and against an enemy not failing to respect the 
equities of unarmed private ships. The merchantman when 
equipped with a gun of great destructive force and long 
range becomes itself a valuable weapon of offense. The mas-
ter is encouraged to engage any public vessel of the enemy, 
of inferior defensive strength, and of whatsoever type, 
which comes within range, and that irrespective of whether 
the latter initiates hostilities. As the merchantman by rea-
son of its armament may be deemed by the enemy to be 
1 HHandbook on Maritime War issued by the Department of State, 
p. 80. Cf. also Hyde, C. C., International Law, II, 405. 
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justly subjected to attack :without warning, the master may 
fairly regard himself as on the defensive whenever his ship 
is pursued by an enemy warship, or even sighted by one. 
Thus the armed merchantman, although its chief mission be 
the transportation of passengers or freight, becomes neces-
sarily a participant in the conflict. Lacking a formal com-
mission from its government, it fails to satisfy the condi-
tions imposed upon a ship converted into a naval auxiliary. 
The reply of the United States, made by Mr. Bryan on 
August 19, 1914, noted that the assertion of the right of 
conversion claimed by Germany at the Second Hague Con-
ference and at the London Naval Conference could not be 
construed by the Government of the United States as an 
intention of the German Government so to deal with its 
merchant ships which might be in American harbors, and 
that the United States would discuss the facts and circum-
stances of such cases only as they arose. As to the policy 
that the United States itself would follow, the Department 
declared it inexpedient at the time to declare what attitude 
the United States would assume in a contingency which had 
not yet arisen. Inasmuch as the United States accepted the 
interpretation of the clauses of Article VIII above men-
tioned, that a neutral was "bound to employ the means 
at its disposal," to prevent the violations of its neutrality, 
and at all times "to display the same vigilance," as the 
standard of its conduct, it seemed obvious that neither by 
the terms nor the interpretation of these provisions was the 
United States bound to assume the attitude of an insurer, 
consequently the British position could not be entertained 
by the United States. Mr. Bryan, therefore, requested the 
British Ambassador to inform his government that there 
was no reason to anticipate that the United States would 
be disregardful of its neutral duties. 11 5 
The reply of the United States to the second British note 
was made by Mr. Lansing on the following day, noting that 
the Department of State acknowledged without comment 
the statement of British policy, and the apprehensions en-
tertained as to Germany's intentions and policy, but main-
tained Mr. Bryan's view as to the responsibility of the 
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United States as above stated.116 On August 25 came an-
other note from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice stating that in view 
of the fact that British armed merchantmen would be visit-
ing American ports, he had been instructed by Sir Edward 
Grey to give the fullest assurances that ·British merchant 
vessels would never be used for purposes of attack, that 
they 'Yere merely peaceful traders armed only for defense, 
that they would never fire unless first fired upon, and that 
they would never under any circumstances attack any ves-
sel.111 This statement the Department promptly acknowl-
edged without comment. 
The Department first tested out its attitude towards 
armed merchantmen in the instance of the Merrion, a Brit-
ish merchant vessel entering an American port with six 
guns mounted aboard her. The Department called the at-
tention of the British Ambassador to this instance, con-
cerning which he inquired of Sir Edward Grey what atti-
tude to take. On September 4, 1914, the views of the Brit-
ish Government were presented in a note stating that it was 
not in accordance with neutrality and international law to 
detain in neutral ports merchant vessels armed with purely 
defensive armaments. Due to the fact that the United 
States was detaining armed merchant vessels prepared for 
offensive warfare, and in order to avoid the difficult ques-
tion of the character and degree of armament which would 
justify detention, the guns of the Merrion would be landed, 
if provision were made for taking these guns back as cargo 
on some other vessel. This action, it was pointed out, had 
been taken without prejudice to the general principle enun-
ciated and still adhered to by the British Government.118 
On September 9, 1914, the British Embassy submitted 
two memoranda with regard to the status of armed mer-
chantmen, stating that the British Admiralty had been com-
pelled to arm a certain number of merchant ships for self-
defense, .in view of the fact that the German Government 
m EW No. 2, ·pp. 38-40. (19.VIll.14). 
116Jbid., pp. 40-41. (20.VIIl.14). 
m Jbid., p. 41; (25.VIIl.14) reply, (29.VIll.14). 
m Jbid., pp. 41-2. ( 4.IX.14) . . 
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had openly entered upon a policy of arming merchant ships 
as commerce destroyers, and had claimed the right to carry 
out the process of arming and equipping such merchant ves-
sels in neutral harbors or on the high seas. In undertaking 
this counter-measure, the Admiralty held that a merchant 
vessel armed purely for self-defense was entitled under in-
ternational law to enjoy the status of a peaceful trading 
ship in neutral ports, without asking any better treatment 
than that accorded to ships of other powers. Only mer-
chant vessels intended for use as cruisers should be treated 
as ships of war. The question as to whether the armament 
carried was defensive or offensive must be decided by the 
simple criterion as to whether the vessel concerned was en-. 
gaged in ordinary commerce and embarking cargo and pas-
sengers in the ordinary way. If the latter were her pur-
pose, there was no rule in international law that would jus-
tify such a vessel, even if armed, in being treater otherwise 
than as a peaceful trader. 
The second memorandum pointed out that the continued 
presence of German raiders in the Atlantic was possible 
only because of the supplies and coal delivered to them by 
vessels setting out from American ports and by the escape 
of armed commerce raiders from American or South 
American ports. If, therefore, the United States were to 
deny British merchantmen the right of armament in self-
defense, there would ensue deplorable and unavoidable in-
jury alike to British and American trade.119 
On September 19, 1914, Mr. Lansing sent to all the Allied 
missions and to the German Embassy in Washington a mem-
orandum dealing with the status of armed merchant ves-
sels. In brief, the memorandum stated that a merchant 
vessel of belligerent nationality might carry armament and 
ammunition for the sole purpose of defense without acquir-
ing the character of a ship of war. The presence of arma-
ment and ammunition created the presumption that it was 
to be used for offensive purposes, but evidence that it was 
i19EW No. 2, pp. 42-3. (9.IX.14). 
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for self-defense, wherever the armament might be lo-
cated,120 must be presented in each cause independently at 
an official investigation which must show that the caliber of 
guns carried did not exceed six inches; that guns and small 
arms carried were few in number; that no guns were 
mounted on the forward part of the vessel; that the quan-
tity of ammunition was small, and that the vessel was 
manned by its usual crew, the officers remaining the same 
as those on board before war was declared. The vessel 
must clear for a port lying in its usual trade route, or a 
port indicating its purpose to continue in the same trade 
as in pre-war days. Its supplies and fuel must be its 
wonted quota or just sufficient to carry it to its port of des-
tination; its cargo must consist of articles of commerce un-
suited for the use of a ship of war in operations against an 
enemy; its passengers must be, as a whole, unfitted to en-
ter the military or naval service of the belligerent whose 
flag the vessel carried, or of any of the allies of that bellig-
erent, particularly if there were women and children 
aboard; the speed of the vessel must be slow. Whenever 
such armed vessels should arrive in an American port, the 
authorities must ascertain the foregoing and report to 
Washington the intended use of armament, clearance to be 
withheld until authorized from Washington. Conversion 
of vessels from a merchant status to that of a ship of war 
was to be a question of fact which was to be established by 
direct or circumstantial evidence of the intention to use the 
vessel as a ship of war. 
Thus the Department of State handled the question of 
armed merchant ships during the beginning months of 
the war, but with the announcement of the submarine war-
fare against Allied commerce and the developments 
caused by it, the status of armed merchantmen was 
peculiarly affected, and, as American interests became 
more and more involved in the question of safeguarding 
American lives and commerce, new measures had to be re-
i 2oi.e., "mounted or carried below." 
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sorted to for the protection of liners from submarine at-
tack, and of submarines from the attacks of armed mar-
chantmen. With this end in mind, Mr. Lansing submitted, 
on January 18, 1916,1 2 1 an informal and confidential letter 
to the heads of the Allied missions in Washington, regard-
ing warfare between submarines and armed merchant ves-
sels. So far as the questions of the use, aims and objects of 
submarine warfare are concerned, we have, in this connec-
tion, little reason to inquire into their outcome, save to note 
the relation of armed liners to submarine craft. Thus Mr. 
Lansing wrote : 
Prior to the year 1915 belligerent operations against en-
emy commerce on the high seas had been conducted with 
cruisers carrying heavy armaments. Under these condi-
tions international law appeared to permit a merchant ves-
sel to carry an armament for defensive purposes without 
losing it!' character as a private commercial· vessel. This 
right seems to have been predicated on the superior defen-
sive strength of ships of war and the limitation of arma-
ment to have been dependent on the fact that it could not 
be used effectively in offensive against enemy naval vessels, 
while it could defend the merchantman against the gener-
ally inferior armament of piratical ships and privateers. 
The use of the submarine, however, has changed these re-
lations. Comparison of the defensive strength of the cruiser 
and a submarine shows that the latter, relying for protec-
tion on its power to submerge, is almost defenseless in 
point of construction. Even a merchant ship carrying a 
small caliber gun would be able to use it effectively for of-
fense against a submarine .... The placing of guns on 
merchantmen at the present day of submarine warfare can 
be explained only on the ground of a purpose to render mer-
chantmen superior in force to submarines and to prevent 
warning and search by them. Any armament, therefore, 
on a merchant vessel would seem to have the character of 
an offensive armament. 
If a submarine is required to stop and search a merchant 
vessel on the high seas, it would not seem just or reasonable 
that the submarine should be compelled .. . to expose it-
self to almost certain destruction by the guns on board the 
merchant vessel. 
121Ew No. 3, pp. 162-164. (18.I.16). (Italics are writer's. ) 
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It would appear to be a reasonable and reciprocally just 
arrangement if it could be agreed by the opposing belliger-
ents that submarines should be caused to adhere strictly to 
the rules of international law in the matter of stopping and 
searching merchant vessels, determining their nationality 
and removing the crews and passengers to places of safety 
before sinking the vessels as prizes of war, and that mer-
chant vessels of belligerent nationality should be prohibited 
and prevented from carrying any armament whatso-
ever . ... 
My Government is impressed with the reasonableness of 
the argument that a merchant vessel carrying an armament 
of any sort, in view of the character of submarine warfare 
and the defensive weakness of undersea craft, should be 
held to be an auxiliary cruiser and so treated by a neutral 
as well as by a belligerent government, and is seriously con-
sidering instructing its offiicials accordingly. 
'i3 
Whether the foregoing attitude towards armed mer-
chantmen had any bearing on the measures contemplated 
by the Imperial German Government and the Austro-Hun-
graian Government to treat all vessels armed with cannon 
as vessels of war, it is impossible to state, and it is not in 
our province to inquire to what degree the Department of 
State was at this time susceptible to the claims and argu-
ments advanced by the German Foreign Office, but because 
of the attitude subsequently shown to have been taken by 
the Allied Governments in their treatment of submarines 
by armed liners, as revealed in correspondence submitted 
to the United States by the Imperial German Government; 
it will be necessary to make a further inquiry along these 
lines to determine whether the professed English attitude 
was in keeping with its actual practice in the matter. 
The German Government, in a note verbale of February 
10, 1916, 122 submitted a memorandum on the treatment of 
armed merchantmen, reviewing the British practice be-
fore the war, and the legal position already discussed, point-
ing out in addition that the "the British Government set 
up the principle for armed vessels of other flags that they 
were to be treated as war vessels." Thus in Number 1 of 
122EW No. 9, pp. 166-183. (10.II.16). 
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Order 1 of the Prize Court Rules promulgated by the Order 
in Council of August 5, 1914, it was specifically stated that 
"ship of war" should include "armed ship."in As Germany 
had objected to the rules set forth in 1914 by the Department 
of State, pointing out that as far as she \Vas concerned 
the distinction between defensively and offensively armed 
merchantmen was irrelevant, she reiterated this opinion in 
the note in question, and claimed, without submitting any 
specific instances or citing any cases, that certain neutral 
countries had "subjected armed merchantmen of belliger-
ents to the neutrality rules applicable to ships of war."124 
The conduct of English merchantmen during the war, 
the memorandum continued, was such as not only to offer 
resistance to German war-vessels but to attack them on 
their own initiative, cases of which, including the use of 
false flags, were specifically instanced, showing that other 
Allied countries were also adopting the same tactics. 
The explanation of the action of the armed English mer-
chantmen is contained in ... confidential instructions of 
the British Admiralty found by German naval forces on 
captured ships. These instructions regulate in detail artil-
lery attack by English merchantmen on German submarines. 
They contain exact regulations touching the reception, treat-
ment, activity, and control ·of the British gun-crews aboard 
merchantmen; for example, the crew are not to wear uni-
form in neutral ports and thus plainly belong to the British 
navy. Above all it is shown by the instructions that these 
armed vessels are not to await any action of maritime war 
on the part of the German submarines, but are to attack 
them forthwith. (a) Under "Action," it is stated in the 
regulations provided for guidance in the use, care and 
maintainance of armament in defensively armed merchant 
ships: "It is not advisable to open fire at a range greater 
than 880 yards unless the enemy has already opened fire." 
From this it is the duty of the merchantman in principle to 
open fire without regard to the attitude of the submarine. 
(b) The instructions regarding submarines applicable to 
vessels carrying a defensive armament prescribe: "If a sub-
marine is obviously pursuing a ship by day anrl it is evi-
123Tiverton, Prize Law, Appendix, p. 2. 
124Mexico and The Netherlands are referred to. 
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dent to the master that she has hostile intentions, the ship 
pursued should open fire in self-defense, notwithstanding 
the submarine may not have committed a definite hostile 
act such as firing a gun or torpedo." From this also the 
mere appearance of a submarine in the wake of a merchant-
man affords sufficient occasion for an armed attack. 
In all these orders which . . . are unrestricted as re-
gards their validity, the greatest emphasis is laid on se-
crecy, plainly in order that the action of merchantmen, in 
absolute contradiction of international law and the British 
assurances (to the United States Government) might re-
main concealed from the enemy as well as the neutrals. 
It is thus made plain that the armed English merchant-
men have official instructions to attack the German subma-
rines treacherously wherever they come near them, that is 
to say, orders to conduct relentless warfare against them. 
Since England's rules of maritime war are adopted by her 
allies without question, the proof must be taken as dem-
onstrated in respect of the armed merchantmen of the other 
enemy countries also. 
75 
In the exhibits appended to the German note further de-
tails are given which are of material interest. Statements 
such as the order that "in no circumstances should these pa-
pers be allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy"; that 
they should be kept in a place where they could "be de-
stroyed at a moment's notice"; that "fire should not be 
opened under neutral colors"; that vessels carrying a de-
fensive armament and proceeding to neutral ports must 
not be painted in neutral colors or wear a neutral flag"; 
that "in neutral ports the armament should be concealed as 
far as possible" for which canvas covers were provided, 
give some indications as to the sincerity with which the 
statements of Sir Cecil Spring-Rice were being carried out 
by the British Government. 
A subsequent note verbale from the German Foreign Of-
fice brought to the attention of the Department of State fur-
ther revelations concerning British orders as to armed mer-
chantmen and submarines.125 
Any submarine approaching a merchant vessel may be 
treated as hostile . . . If chased by a submarine armed with 
120EW No. s, pp. 193-194. (ll.IV.16). 
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a gun, first attempt to escape; if this proves impossible, 
turn and steer straight for the submarine before she gets 
close enough to use her guns effectively. 
This confirmed the German attitude with regard to the of-
fensive use of "defensively" armed merchantmen, in ram-
ming submarines. 
To return to the suggestion ventured by Mr. Lansing, a 
response from the Allied Governments was received in a 
series of identic notes from the various governments about 
March 22, 1916. These revealed an unwillingness on the 
part of the Aliied Governments "to agree that upon a non-
guaranteed German promise human life might be surren-
dered defenseless to the mercy of an enemy . . . both faith-
less and lawless." While maintaining their former attitude 
as to the legality of arming merchant ships, it was the opin-
ion of the Allied Governments that the proposed treatment 
of armed ships by the United States Government' as auxil-
iary cruisers cruisers "could not be given practical consid-
eration by the American authorities." Such a modification 
of the policy of the United States, .it was claimed, would be 
inconsistent with the general principles of neutrality as 
embodied in the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the preamble 
to Convention XIII of The Hague of 1907 concerning mari-
time neutrality. These stipulated that it was the duty of 
neutral powers to apply the rules concerning its neutrality 
impartially to all belligerents, and not to alter the rules of 
its neutrality in principle, except in a case where experi-
ence had shown the necessity for such change for the pro-
tection of the rights of that power. In that respect, it 
would appear, the contention of the Allied Governments as 
to the necessity or the non-necessity of such change was 
in fact immaterial, as the United States had carefully laid 
down the principle that hers alone was to be the duty of de-
ciding the extent of her xigilance in defense of her neutral-
ity. Moreover, the Allied notes continued, the result would 
be contrary to the Seventh Hague Convention of 1907, 
relative to the conversion of merchant ships, because 
they would not be under the direct authority of the Govern-
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ment whose flag they flew and would not have their crews 
subject to military discipline. Thus, the note concluded, if 
armed merchant vessels were to be treated as auxiliary 
cruisers, they would possess the right of making prizes, and 
this would mean the revival of privateering.126 
The spirit of the Allied note being final, Mr. Lansing saw 
no way except to accept it at its face value, and did so in 
a note under date of April 7, 1916.121 
"It is believed," writes Professor Hyde, "that the Secre-
tary of State sought to formulate no new principle of law, 
but rather to gain recognition of the inapplicability of an 
old rule to existing conditions of maritime warfare which 
were at variance with the theory on which the rule was 
based, and that he endeavored to encourage a practice both 
in harmony with that theory and responsive to the require-
ments of justice. Nor did his proposal indicate ~he aban-
donment of any neutral right."12s 
Into the Congressional furore that ensued upon the an-
nouncement by the Imperial German Government of the 
measures it would take against armed merchantmen, it is 
not our province to enter. The introduction of a resolution 
by Mr. Jefferson MacLemore of Texas into the House of 
Representatives on February 22, 1916, requestini; the Presi-
dent 
to warn all American citizens within the borders of the 
United States or its possessions or elsewhere to refrain 
from traveling on any .and all ships of any and all powers 
now or in future at war, which ship or ships shall mount 
guns, whether such ships be frankly avowed a part of the 
naval forces of the power whose flag it flies or shall be called 
a merchant ship or otherwise, and whether such gun or guns 
or other armament be called offensive or defensive; and in 
case American citizens do travel on such armed belligerent 
ships, they do so at their own risk 
was one of the few sporadic and futile attempts on the part 
i2sEw No. 3, pp. 187-188. (23.III.16). 
i21Jbid., pp. 194-195. (17.IV.16). 
12SC. C. Hyde, Maritime War, p. 76. Cf. also his International 
Law, II, 467. 
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of Congress to direct the foreign policy of the administra-
tion. In a letter to Representative Pou, President Wilson 
stated that any Congressional endeavor to formulate the 
policy of the administration would very seriously embar-
rass the negotiations then going on with the Allied s.nd Cen-
tral Powers in regard to armed merchant ships, hence he 
asked for an early and decisive vote on such questions. As 
a consequence, after four hours of very heated debate, the 
House tabled the warning resolution and the policy of the 
administration was sustained.129 
In such confusion of issues many things were involved, 
and partisan considerations were not entirely in abeyance. 
But apart from that, "the legal problem confronting the 
United States was not one concerning the right of American 
citizens to take passage on British or other armed merchant-
men, but rather one whether the presence of armament 
robbed vessels equipped therewith of the right to demand 
immunity from attack without warning, and hence justly 
exposed the occupants, of whatever nationality, to grave 
personal danger."1 30 
Once that the congressional tempest had calmed down, 
the Department of State, by direction of the President, pre-
pared a memorandum on the status of armed merchant ves-
sels. This statement declared that the status of an armed 
merchantman was to be considered from two points of 
view: ( 1) from that of a neutral when a belligerent armed 
liner entered its ports, and (2) from that of an enemy 
when the vessel was on the high seas. Under the first head-
ing, the Department of State reached the conclusion that if 
the vessel carried a commission of orders issued by a bel-
ligerent government and directing it under penalty to con-
duct aggressive operations, or if it were conclusively shown 
129Congressional Record LUI: 3689-3720 ( 7.III.16). Peculiarly the 
question of the status of armed merchantmen has been seriously con-
fused alike in private and in Government publications with the ques-
tion of Armed Neutrality, with which it has little, if anything, in 
common. 
isoHyde, op. cit., pp: 76-77. Cf. also his International Law, II, 568. 
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that such vessel had conducted such operations, it was to 
be regarded and treated as a warship. In default of such 
evidence, the neutral government, to preserve its neutral-
ity, might presume from facts the status of such vessels, 
declaring a standard of evidence, modifiable according to 
general conditions of naval warfare or specific instances in 
default of any rule of internat~onal law. These changes 
And modifications might be made at any time during the 
progress of the war, since the determination of the status 
of the vessel would affect the liability of a neutral govern-
ment. 
Under the second heading, the Department held that it 
was necessary for a belligerent warship to determine the 
status of an armed merchant vessel of an enemy encoun-
tered on the high seas, since the rights of life and property 
of belligerents and neutrals might be impaired if the status 
of such a vessel were that of an enemy warship. In this 
case, the determination of warlike character must rest on 
absolutely conclusive evidence and not on presumption, 
hence the normal assumption would be that a vessel was 
a peaceful liner. The presence of armament was not war-
rant for attack. 
A neutral government has no opportunity to determine 
the purpose of armament unless there is evidence in the 
ship's papers or other proof as to its previous use, so that 
the government is justified in substituting an arbitrary rule . 
of presumption in arriving at the status of the merchant 
vessel. On the other hand, a belligerent warship can on the 
high seas test by actual experience the purpose of an arma-
ment on an enemy merchant vessel, and so determine by 
direct evidence the status of the vessel. 
The memorandum thereupon proceeded to consider the 
relations of neutrals and belligerents as affected by the 
status of armed merchant vessels in neutral ports. After 
citing the usual recognized rules for the treatment of war 
vessels, it was stated that merchantmen of belligerent na-
tionality, armed only for purposes of protection against the 
enemy, were entitled to enter and leave neutral ports with-
out hindrance in the course of legitimate trade. 
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Armed merchantmen under a commission, or which had, 
with or without such commission, used their armaments 
for aggressive purposes were not entitled to the same hos-
pitality in neutral ports as peaceable armed merchantmen. 
Finally the memorandum discussed the relations of bel-
ligerents and neutrals as affected by the status of armed 
merchant vessels on the h~gh seas. Reciting the accepted 
principles that resistance to search, the carriage of contra! 
band and the rendering of unneutral service were cause for 
confiscation or condemnation, the Department held that the 
only means of avoiding loss was by flight or successful re-
sistance, and that enemy merchant ships therefore had the 
right to arm for purposes of self-protection. The right 
to capture and to prevent capture were recogn;ized ·as 
equally justifiable, subject, however, "to certain accepted 
rules of conduct based on the principles of humanity" such 
as the giving of an opportunity to surrender. "If the mer-
chantman finally surrenders, the belligerent warship may 
release it or take it into custody. In case of an enemy mer-
chantman, it may be sunk, but only if it is impossible to 
take it into port, and provided always that the persons on 
board are put in a place of safety. In the case of a neutral 
m erchantman, the right to sink it in any circumstance is; 
doubtful." The right to self-defense, and the right to cruise 
the seas could not, therefore, be regarded as identical. 
Where armed merchantmen were under commission to 
cruise, or could receive bounties for sinking enemy ships. 
they lost their status as peaceable merchant ships and were 
to be regarded as incorporated to a limited extent in the 
naval forces of their governments. Vessels engaging in 
such operations intermittently, even though acting as com-
mercial carriers, possessed a tainted status entitling them 
only to the status of warships, with corresponding treat-
ment by both enemies and neutrals. Private vessels seeking 
enemy craft without such commission were to be regarded 
as pirates. 1 31 
i:<i EW No . 3, pp. 188-1 '.:3. ('.!6. III.1 6 ) . 
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The position taken by the United States in this mem-
orandum, while not discussed or criticized in any published 
correspondence with the belligerent governments, except 
for a statement by the British Government that1 32 no de-
fensively armed British ship had received any money award 
from the British Government for firing upon an enemy 
vessel, has been subject to criticism from other sources. 
Professor Hyde, in a critique of the memorandum points 
out that: 
It fails to heed the fact that the immunity of merchant 
vessels from attack at sight grew out of their impotency ot 
endanger the safety of public armed vessels of an enemy, 
and that maritime states have never acquiesced in a principle 
that a merchant vessel so armed as to be capable of destroy-
ing a ship of any kind should enjoy immunity from attack 
at sight, at least when encountering an enemy warship of 
inferior defensive strength. 
That an armed merchantman may retain its status as a 
private ship is not decisive of the treatment to which it may 
be subjected. The potentiality and special adaptability of 
the vessel to engage in hostile operations fraught with dan-
ger to the safety of an enemy warship, rather than the de-
signs or purposes of those in control of the former, however 
indicative of its character, have been and should be deemed 
the test of the right of the opposing belligerent to attack it 
at sight. In view of the fact, the presence on board the 
armed merchantman of neutral persons or property cannot 
give rise to a duty towards the ship not otherwise apparent. 
Every occupant thereon must be held to assume that the 
enemy will use every lawful but no unlawful means to sub-
ject the vessel to control or destroy it. 
To test the propriety of an attack at sight by the exist-
ence of conclusive proof of the aggressive purpose of the 
merchantman places an unreasonable burden on a warship 
of an· unprotected type, whether a surface or an undersea 
craft, for no evidence of the requisite purposes of the mer-
chantman may be in fact obtainable until the warship en-
countering the former becomes itself the object of attack. 
The mere pursuit of the merchantman, prior to any signal 
made to it, may cause the vessel to attack the pursuer as 
soon as it gets within range. 
What constitutes an act by way of defense must always 
1a2EW No. 4, p. 66. "(5.VI.16). 
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remain a matter of uncertainty. The possession of substan-
tial armament encourages the possessor to assert or clai.m 
that it acts defensively whenever it opens fire. Thus in 
practice the distinction between the offensive and defensive 
use of armament disappears, for the armed merchantman 
is disposed to exercise its power whenever it can safely do 
so. To presume that such a vessel has "a peaceable charac-
ter" on the supposition that it will not when occasion offers 
open fire on vulnerable warships of the enemy is to ignore 
an inference fairly deducible from the conduct of vessels 
equipped with effective means of committing hostile acts. 
It is believed that the equipment of a belligerent merchant 
marine for hostile service, even though designed to be de-
fensive rather than offensive, serves in principle to deprive 
the armed vessels of the right to claim immunity from at-
tack without warning. It may be doubted whether the wise 
and humane effort to obtain hereafter general recognition 
by maritime states of the solid equities of unoffending bel-
ligerent vessels, and thus also to safeguard the lives and 
property of neutral occupants, will be strengthened by decla-
rations assertive of immunities for armed ships. The pro-
posal of Secretary Lansing of January 18, 1916, is believed 
to indicate the correct theory and therefore the true basis of 
the rule to which states should be generally invited to ad-
here.1 3:i 
Regardless of the arguments advanced by Professor 
Hyde, it may be stated that the attitude assumed by the 
United States in an endeavor to maintain its neutrality was 
praiseworthy, even if in actual practice superior consid-
erations of policy tended to render this attitude nugatory. 
We have thus traced the troubled question of the treatment 
of armed merchantmen in American ports to its last con-
clusion, for once the United States turned away from this 
extreme position toward a denial of its stand, the question 
of armed merchantmen became a nullity and the resort to 
Anglo-French policy was ventured just a year later under 
the caption of armed neutrality.1 3 ~ 
133C. C. Hyde, Maritime War, pp. 77-80. Cf. also his International 
Law, II, 468-472. 
134For a critical discussion of the problem of armed merchantmen, 
cf. Garner op. cit., I, 384-416, and Hyde, International Law, II, 402-
405, 460-476, 739 742, passim. 
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The successful transit of the S.S. Deutschland, an un-
armed submersible merchantman, from Bremen to Balti-
more in the summer of 1916 with a very valuable cargo 
for sale in the United States, and its subsequent return 
voyage, intact, to Bremen, raised a lively discussion as to 
whether the rules of international law covering the rights 
and duties of surface craft could be applied to undersea 
craft of this nature without serious change. 
The Allied Governments viewed this new departure in 
ocean-going craftsmanship with no little apprehension, 
and in a series of identic notes made their position known 
to the Government of the United States.1 35 They deemed 
it necessary to exhort neutral governments to take effica-
cious measures to prevent belligerent submarines, regard-
less of their use, from availing themselves of neutral wa-
ters, roadsteads and harbors. This they did in order to 
protect their belligerent rights and the freedom of com-
mercial navigation, as well as to remove the chances of 
conflict. The facility of such submersibles to navigate and 
sojourn in the seas while submerged prevented the exer-
cise of supervision and surveillance applicable to surface 
craft, as it did the possibility of identifying their national 
character, whether neutral or belligerent, combatant or 
innocent, and of rendering them innocuous. It appeared, 
therefore, that when such a submersible had at its disposal 
a place where it might revictual, that place afforded suf-
ficient advantages to it as to be regarded a base for naval 
operations. Consequently, the Allied Governments held 
that "submarine vessels must be excluded from the benefit 
of the rules theretofore accepted in international law re-
garding the admission and ~ojourn of war and merchant 
vessels in neutral waters, roadsteads and harbors, any sub-
marine of the belligerents that once entered a neutral port 
must be held there." Lastly, the notes pointed out, neutral 
submarines navigating waters frequented or visited by 
belligerent submarines would be in great danger. 
In reply, the Department of State expressed its surprise 
m EW No. 4, pp. 125-6, (21.VIII.16) and reply. (31.VIII.16). 
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at the endeavor of the Allied Powers to determine the rules 
of action governing the use of submarines and to enforce 
acceptance of these rules by neutral governments. In the 
opinion of the United States, nothing had been adduced by 
the Allied Governments to show that the existing rules of 
international law were inapplicable to the situation. In 
view of this fact and of the notice and warning of the Al-
lied Governments, the United States Government notified 
the Allied Powers that, so far as the treatment of either 
war or merchant submarines in American waters was con-
cerned, it reserved its full liberty of action in all respects, 
and would treat such vessels in its traditional spirit of neu-
trality and impartiality. To avoid misunderstanding, how-
ever, the United States announced to the Allied Powers 
that it held it to be the duty of belligerent powers to dis-
tinguish between submarines of neutral and belligerent na-
tionality, and that responsibility for any conflict that might 
arise between belligerent warships_ and neutral submarines 
on account of the neglect of a belligerent to so distinguish 
between these classes of submarines must rest entirely 
upon the negligent power. This stated the case for the 
United States, and the Allied Governments promptly 
dropped the matter. 
In discussing the legitimacy of the right_ of attack on 
such craft, Professor Hyde observes that, in the first in-
stance, the submersible, if unarmed, cannot return the fire 
of a belligerent war-vessel; it has likewise extraordinary 
facilities for escape. "Refusal to obey a reasonable signal 
to lie to, should doubtless subject a submarine vessel to the 
same penalties as a non-submersible ship .... Hence it 
is believed that the undersea .vessel when observed on the 
surface, if its harmless character is then ascertainable, is 
entitled to the same warning which it might.justly claim if 
it could not submerge." Inability to distinguish such a sub-
mersible from an ordinary submarine might lead with 
greater readiness to an attack on it at sight of a belliger-
ent cruiser, hence the need for an agreement as to the en-
sign to be displayed by such submersibles. Likewise, the 
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purpose of the submarine is to be inf erred largely from its 
structure: "If the potentialities of an unarmed submersible 
merchantman are to suffice to justify its destruction at 
sight, there must be evidence not merely that the vessel 
is readily capable of transformation into a warship, but 
also that it is either constructed primarily for use as such, 
or is in fact at the time given over to a public service con-
nected with the prosecution of the war."136 Finally, he 
observes, "The principle that the right of an unarmed ves-
sel of whatsoever type to demand immunity from attack 
at sight depends upon its own defenselessness, requires 
clear perception and general recognition. It must be obvi-
ous that the existence of this right does not imply that such 
a vessel is exempt from capture, but rather that the_mode 
of subjecting it to control is not unregulated."137 
t36Hyde, op. cit., pp. 72-3. Cf. also his International Law, II, 463-
464. 
131For other discussions of the problem raised by the Deutschland, 
cf. Garner, op. cit., II, 437-8; Atherley-Jones in 3 Transactions of the 
Grotius Society, 40, and Reeves, J. S., in 11 AJIL, 149. 
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CHAPTER VI. 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER CONTRABAND AND 
THE RIGHT OF SEARCH 
It was the endeavor of the representatives of maritime 
powers at the London Naval Conference of 1909 to draw 
up distinct lists of materials which in time of war were to 
be considered as absolute contraband, conditional contra-
band, or non-contraband, the latter comprising the articles 
which, either because they were inutile in war, or because 
the powers for some reason in particular declined to con-
sider them as contraband, were left outside the purview of 
confiscable and condemnable articles. Likewise we have 
seen that it was the policy of the Allied Governments, from 
the inception of the war, to extend, as far as possible, the 
content of their contraband lists in order that commerce 
with the enemy might, in so far as possible, be intercepted. 
In view of the confusion that sometimes exists as to the 
dividing line between what is regarded as an action in re-
gard to contraband and what is a measure to enforce block-
ade, certain explanations may be in order, in an endeavor 
to bring out clearly the distinction between these two im-
portant means of intercepting the commerce of an enemy. 
The rule of international law which allows a belligerent 
state to capture contraband is based upon the theory that 
when two states are at war no neutrals are entitled to inter-
fere. If a neutral state lends help to either of the combat-
ants it exposes itself . to attack from the other. If individual 
citizens do so by furnishing supplies by sea of a contraband 
character, they incur the risk of seizure and confiscation. 
Enemy capture is confined to enemy property. Blockade ap-
plies to property of all kinds if found in the prohibited zone 
and directly destined for the blockaded territory. But con-
traband is limited to property of a particular kind which 
is destined to the belligerent, and it may be captured any-
where at sea except in neutral waters ... Some states 
sometimes say that it cannot be captured unless its destina-
tion is to the belligerent territory and for the belligerent 
government. The extreme view on the other side is that, 
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no matter what its port of destination may be, it can be cap-
tured if it is intended ultimately to reach the belligerent 
territory ... The law of contraband may be used so as 
almost to extinguish neutral trade, and to produce nearly 
the same effect as a blockade without the risk and effort of 
employing a sufficient naval force. 
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In this fashion Lord Loreburn1 38 has laid down his con-
cept of the underlying principles of contraband, and the ef-
fectiveness to which the doctrine of contraband may lead 
in the interception of the commerce of an enemy. On the 
other hand a noted German jurist, writing in the days be-
fore the war, leveled his sharpest criticisms of the entire 
system of contraband in the following terms: 
The acceptance of the right of contraband of war means: 
You are unrestricted in the definition of war contraband. 
Consequently, through a proper handling of the meaning 
of war contraband, you may evade the demands imposed 
upon blockade. By overstretching the right of contraband 
you may achieve approximately the results of an effective 
blockade that would otherwise be either impossible for you 
or else highly inconvenient. And by exercising as much as 
possible the right of contraband you may even surpass, un-
der certain conditions, the imperfect, because locally re-
stricted, effect of an efficient blockade.' ~9 
The above are cogently reasoned passages which show 
that because the ultimate effect of each is the same, the 
workings of contraband and blockade tend to be identified. 
In this connection the opinion of Hall is particularly help-
ful: 
The liability of a neutral merchant ship to be captured by 
a belligerent arises either because such a vessel is attempt-
ing to break a blockade, or because she is guilty of carrying 
contraband goods or is herself contraband-Le., a vessel in-
tended to be converted to a warlike use. The two causes 
of liability are to be carefully distinguished. There can only 
be a breach of blockade when one has been established, but 
it is illegal to carry contraband from the moment war has 
I38 Earl Loreburn, Capture at S ea, Chapter V, pp. 103-110, passim. 
1 39Niemeyer, Prinzipien des Seekriegsrechts, 1909, p. 28. 
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been declared. Sailing with any cargo or none to a block-
aded place is illegal, but the liability for carriage of con-
traband depends entirely on the noxious nature of the cargo; 
for the object of blockade is to cut off all intercourse with a 
specific place, while the purpose of the latter is to cut off 
from the enemy everywhere articles of direct use to him in 
prosecuting the war. Again in blockade the ultimate des-
tination of the ship is the test, but in the question of con.-
traband it is that of the cargo. Finally the penalty for 
breach of blockade falls, as we have seen, on both ship and 
cargo, but for carrying contraband it -falls primarily on the 
contraband goods and, except for loss of time and freight, 
only exceptionally on the vessel. Since, then, liability de-
pends on the nature of the cargo, it is necessary to consider 
what is to be regarded as contraband and what as inno-
cent. 140 
It is to the determination of what the policy pursued by 
the Allied Governments during the course of the Great 
War involved that we must now devote ourselves. We 
have already examined the status of contraband at the date 
of the acceptance, with reservations, of the Declaration of 
London by the Allied Governments, by the publication of 
an Order in Council under date of August 20, 1914.141 On 
September 21, 142 by another Order in Council changes were 
made in the lists of contraband on the ground that it was 
"expedient to introduce certain modifications in the Decla-
ration of London as adopted and put into force" and cer-
tain articles enumerated were placed on the list of con-
ditional contraband "notwithstanding anything contained 
in Article 28 of the Declaration of London." Similarly the 
lists of contraband were materially altered and consolidated 
by Orders in Council of October 29, 1914,143 which also 
modified the attitude of the British Government toward the 
Declaration of London. These stated that a neutral vessel 
with papers showing a neutral destination which proceeded 
to an enemy port notwithstanding the destination shown on 
140Hall, J . A., The Law of Naval Warfare, Chapter VII, p. 92. 
14tEW No . 1, p. 7. (20.VIIl.14). 
142fbid., p . 12. (21.IX.14). 
H3fbid., pp. 12-14. (29.X.14). 
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her papers should be subject to capture and condemnation 
if she were encountered before the end of her next voyage; 
that the hostile destination of goods was presumed to ex-
ist if the goods were consigned to or for an agent of the 
enemy state; that, notwithstanding the provisions of Ar-
ticle 35, conditional contraband \VOUld be liable to capture 
on board a vessel bound for a neutral port if the goods were 
consigned "to order," or if the ship's papers did not show 
who was the consignee of the goods, or if they showed a con-
signee of the goods in territory belonging to or occupied 
by the enemy, in which cases it should lie upon the owners 
of goods to prove that their destination was innocent. 
Where it was shown that an enemy government was draw-
ing supplies for its armed forces from or through a neutral 
country, the provisions of Article 35 of the Declaration 
should not apply. So long as such directions were in force, 
a vessel carrying conditional contraband to that country 
should not be immune from capture. Another revised and 
very much extended list of contraband was issued Decem-
ber 23, 1914.144 Lastly, a much more extended list was pub-
lished by one of the Orders in Council of March 11, 1915.145 
Similar changes were made in the French contraband lists 
so that by the beginning of 1915 the lists corresponded ab-
solutely,146 as did the Russian contraband lists.147 
This degree of uniformity having been reached, the proc-
ess of extension did not cease, for by additional Orders in 
Council of May 27, 1915,148 August 20, 1915 (placing cot-
ton and cotton products on the list of absolute contra-
band) ,149 October 14, 1915, 1 50 January 27, 1916,1 5 1 April 
12, 1916, 102 the list was continually extended until, on April 
l HEW No . 1, pp. 14-16. 
145/bid., pp. 17-18. 
146Jbid., pp. 16, 22. 
m /bid., p. 23. ( 26.II.15). 
HBEW No. s, pp. 89-90. (27.V.15). 
149/bid., p. 90. (20.VIII.15). 
150Jbid., pp. 90-93. (14.X.15) . 
151/bid., pp. 107-108. (27.1.16). 
m /bid., pp. 108-109. (12.IV.16) . 
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13, 1916, the lists of conditional and absolute contraband 
were combined, 1"'1 as, in the view of the British Govern-
ment, the distinction between the two classes of contraband 
had ceased to have ·any value. No real distinction could 
be drawn between the armed forces and the civilian popu-
lation of the enemy. So long as such conditions continued, 
the treatment of both kinds of contraband would be the 
same.104 Into the changes themselves we cannot, save in 
particular instances, enter, except to say that the distinc-
tions had ceased to have any real difference long before the 
date of formal abolition of the orders keeping the two in 
separate classes. The loophole in the lists of contraband 
that had been made in the first Order in Council had worked 
all too well and the labors of the London Naval Conference 
had been in vain. 
Notwithstanding the early modification of contraband 
lists and the placing of severe restraints on American com-
merce, it was not until December 26, 1914, that the first 
correspondence with regard to restraints on commerce took 
place. On that date, Mr. Bryan sent a long note to the Brit-
ish Government presenting "a candid statement of the 
views of this Government in order that the British Govern-
ment may be fully informed as to the attitude of the United 
States towards the policy which has been pursued by the 
British authorities during the present war." 
The charges made ag;iinst the conduct of the British au-
thorities mentioned the seizure on the high seas of a large 
103This action of combining both contraband lists was taken only 
by the British Government, and was specifically avoided by the other 
Allied Governments, who clung to the traditional classification. It 
should be noted, however, that as the "free list" was practically ex-
tinguished, and as by the French decree which accompanied the Mari-
time Rights Order in Council, the doctrine of continuous voyage was 
made applicable both to contraband and blockade, the retention of the 
traditional classification was rendered virtually meaningless. The 
British Government alone seem'> to have had the temerity to acknowl-
edge the logical consequences of the far-reaching extension of con-
traband lists. 
W/bid., pp. 109-113. ( 13.IV.16). 
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number of vessels laden with American goods destined to 
neutral ports in Europe; the taking of these vessels 
into British ports and their protracted detention by the 
British authorities. Despite the announcement by the For-
eign Office that it was satisfied with guarantees offered by 
the Norwegian, Swedish and Danish Governments as to 
non-exportation of contraband goods when consigned to 
named persons in those countries, and the consequent ex-
pectation of the United States Government that the seiz-
ures earlier occasioned by the sudden outbreak of war 
would cease, the greater freedom from detention and seiz-
ure resulting from shipments to definite consignees rather 
than "to order" was still awaited. While admitting the 
right of belligerents to interfere with commerce only to the 
extent that such interference was a manifest and impera-
tive necessity, the Government of the United States was 
forced to the conclusion that the policy of the British Gov-
ernment exceeded manifest necessities and constituted un-
justified restrictions upo:n the rights of American citizens 
on the high seas. 
The Government of the United States does not intend at 
this time to discuss the propriety of including certain ar-
ticles in the lists of absolute and conditional contraband . . . 
Open to objection as some of these seem to this Government, 
the chief ground of present complaint is the treatment of 
cargoes of both classes when bound to neutral ports. 
In this particular admission lay the reason for the fail-
ure of the position taken by the United States to bring 
about the slightest vestige of conformity to the principles 
of the Declaration of London. Even so, on the basis of the 
general principles of international law, to which the United 
States Government had ultimately resorted, there was no 
warrant for such an indiscriminate extension of the con-
traband lists as was being effected by the British Govern-
ment, inasmuch as its own position in the Russo-Japanese 
War had been distinctly averse to the extension of the lists 
of contraband. Had an earlier endeavor to enforce con-
formity to a more equitable standard been made, it is pos-
sible that some response would have resulted; by delay and· 
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indecision, by staving off the controversy, the case for the 
extension of contraband lists was materially strengthened, 
and the "free list" doomed to ultimate extinction. 
As regards absolute contraband, complaint was made of 
the capricious treatment accorded such shipments to neu-
tral countries, and the claim was made that a legitimate 
trade was being greatly impaired by the uncertainty as to 
the treatment that the British authorities might impose 
upon it. Conditional contraband had been subjected to 
similar treatment. The seizure of "foodstuffs and other 
articles · which are admittedly relative contraband" in spite 
of the presumption of innocent use because of neutral des-
tination, merely on suspicion, and not upon actual evidence, 
because of a belief or a mere fear that such was not their 
real destination, was a practice condemned by British prac-
tice during the South African War: "Foodstuffs, though 
having a hostile destination, can be considered contraband 
of war only if they are for the enemy's forces; it is not suf-
ficient that they are capable of being so used, it must be 
shown that this was in fact their destination at the time of 
their seizure." On this historic doctrine laid down by the 
British Government the American citizen was entitled to 
rely. 
As regards the right of a belligerent to visit and search 
on the high seas the vessels of American citizens or other 
neutral vessels carrying American goods, and to detain 
them when there was sufficient evidence for so doing, when 
there was a belief that they carried a contraband cargo, the 
Government of the United States willingly conceded this 
right, but could not without protest permit American ships 
or American cargoes to be taken into British ports and 
there detained for the purpose of searching generally for 
evidence of contraband, "or upon presumptions created by 
special municipal enactments which are clearly at variance 
with international law and practice."* 
*The distinction between the International Law of Prize, sanc-
tioned by convention and custom, gathering force from precedent to 
precedent, and the municipal Prize Law of a given country is to be 
kept clearly in mind. The former represents the standard set in the 
Controversy over Neutral Rights 93 
accepted or unquestioned law of nations; the latter, the particular 
standard set by a given country in its interpretation of its bellig-
erent rights. The classical definition of "prize" has been given in 
the words of Lord Mersey155 ·as "the term applied to a ship or goods 
captured jure belli by the maritime force of a belligerent at sea or 
seized in port." The Law of Prize is found embodied in such con-
ventions as the ninth, eleventh and thirteenth Conventions of the 
Second Hague Conference, and in such declarations as the Declara-
tion of Paris. The Prize Law of any given country is to be found 
in the law which its prize courts interpret, and such, whether in 
America or abroad, is based on precedent and on domestic ordinances 
which may at any time, and usually do, take precedence over inter-
national practice, at the whim of the executive concerned. 
The practice of prize courts is regulated by rules of court 
made by the Privy Council, which must be kept exhibited 
in a conspicuous place in each court to which they relate. 
In all cases not provided for by the rules, the practice is 
to be governed either by the old Admiralty Court practice 
or by such practice as the President may direct.1ss 
This is typical of the definitions of municipal prize law and its 
scope. 
The difficulties in protecting neutrals and their rights lie in the 
fact that the stringent measures adopted by a belligerent may over-
step the requirements established under general international prac-
tice and that there is no diplomatic redress for an aggrieved neutral 
who has once submitted his case to the decision of a prize court. This 
was one of the facts leading to the discretionary power given to the 
proposed international prize court to lessen the effects of such legis-
lative regulations as Orders in Council or decrees and the very in-
sistence of the United States Government on this point in the course 
of its protracted discussions with Great Britain on this point cannot 
be too strongly emphasized. It has been the aim of the United States 
to keep the Prize Court unfettered by such rigid legislation as would 
annihilate neutral rights in the long run. To seek redress of griev-
ances in a court bound by the enactments of a belligerent power 
clearly overstepping the bounds of accepted international law is an 
impossibility for a neutral nation, despite the declarations of learned 
judges to the contrary. 
National Prize Courts are subject to the instructions of 
their own sovereign, whether or not these be consistent with 
155Earl of Halsbury, The Lau·s of England, Vol. XXIII, p. 276. 
156Tiverton, Prize Law, pp. 1-2. 
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the ordinary rules of international law. It is for this reason 
that neutral states do not consider themselves bound by the 
judgments of Prize Courts.1°1 
In this particular respect the United States laid down 
its fi.rm attitude in denying the British doctrine that Or-
ders in Council, the "special municipal enactments" in 
question, could have the validity of international law. This 
attitude has been traditional on the part of the United 
States since the days of the Wars of the French Revolu-
tion, and the experience gained at that time has been a 
sufficient deterrent from the acceptance of any such de-
crees or Orders in Council as in any way binding upon the 
United States. 
The last point raised in the note dealt with the grievance 
of American industries in being denied access to long es-
tablished markets in Europe purely because those markets 
were in neutral countries contiguous to the enemies of 
Great Britain. On the ground of this undue interference 
in commerce with neutrals from the United States, the note 
requested that the British Government instruct its officials 
to refrain from all unnecessary interference with the free-
dom of trade between neutrals and to conform more clearly 
to the traditional British practice as regards the maritime 
relations between neutrals and belligerents.158 
To this Sir Edward Grey replied on January 7, 1915, 
that the British Government concurred in the American 
view that belligerents should not interfere in the trade of 
neutrals so long as it was bona fide, or unless it interfered 
with the belligerent's national safety; and that the British 
Government were ready to make redress at any time that 
they exceeded this principle. The note then quoted at 
length figures to prove that American trade had by no 
means declined, inasmuch as exports to the smaller coun-
tries of Europe had greatly increased. Where it was shown 
that consignments such as aluminum had an ultimate enemy 
though an ostensible neutral destination it was not believed 
157Cohen, Declaration of London, p. 4. 
HBEW No. 1, pp. 39-41. (26.XII.14). 
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that the United States Government would question the pro-
priety of taking such suspected cargoes to a Prize Court, 
or object to the use of legitimate means to prevent such 
articles from reaching the enemy. Regarding foodstuffs, 
the British Government gave no unlimited or unconditional 
undertaking to prevent their detention unless it were shown 
that they were destined for the use of the armed forces or 
government of the enemy. Cotton was to be maintained on 
the "free list," though investigation of cotton cargoes for 
concealed contraband would be continually necessary. 
Such search, the note continued, would have to be made 
in port; in no other way could the right of search be ex-
ercised, and but for this practice it would have to be com-
pletely abandoned. This statement can not be too highly 
emphasized for its importance in determining the policy 
of the United States and Great Britain towards search. 
The mere statement of the absolute necessity for such ac-
tion at a time when submarine warfare had not as yet 
begun is of the utmost importance. No complaint could 
be offered as to the action of neutral Governments adjoin-
ing the territory of Great Britain's enemies, although the 
danger that they would become a base of supplies for the 
armed forces of the enemies and for materials for the 
manufacture of armaments was increasingly pressing. 
The interception of goods really destined to the enemy 
without interference in bona fide neutral commerce was 
thus effected, as the United States had agreed, only in the 
interest of the national safety of Great Britain. While not 
contesting the principles of law on which the action of the 
United States was based, and desiring to restrict such in-
terference solely to contraband destined for the enemy, 
any arrangement whereby delays would be avoided and the 
innocence of the cargoes easily proven, would be welcomed, 
as the British Government had no desire to interfere with 
normal commerce from the United States to neutral coun-
tries.150 
is9EW No. 1, pp. 41-44. (7.I.15). 
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In a letter to Senator Stone on January 20, 1915, Mr. 
Bryan laid down the view that in the opinion of the United 
States Government the inclusion of petrol, petroleum prod-
ucts and rubber by the Allied Governments in their con-
traband lists was not improper, due to the absolute neces-
sity of such products for the use of submarines, aeroplanes 
and motors. It was therefore difficult, as these were di-
rectly essential to the pursuit of military operations, to 
argue against their inclusion in the lists of contraband.160 
On February 10, 1915, Sir Edward Grey sent a more de-
tailed note covering the points raised in the first American 
note.161 In it an endeavor was made to show that Ameri-
can trade had substantially increased and that a substantial 
part of this trade was intended for the enemy countries. 
going through neutral ports by routes to which it was pre-
viously unaccustomed. The shortages in means of ocean 
transportation were due to the general existence of war and 
not to British interference. It was open to American own-
ers or shippers interested in detained ships to apply to the 
Prize Court for release of the ships on bail. Speedy dis-
charge of detained cargoes was being pushed in order to 
relieve the acute shortage of shipping from which Great 
Britain was herself the worst sufferer; condemned ships 
likewise were being rapidly sold. German ships detained 
in British harbors by the outbreak of war were being re-
quisitioned to relieve the shortage. · 
In reviewing the principles of international law on which 
British policy was based, the fundamental principle was 
that belligerents are entitled to capture contraband goods 
on their way to the enemy. The doctrine of continuous 
voyage, introduced and extended during the Civil War by 
the United States formed the second basis of belligerent 
right to capture contraband destined directly or indirectly 
for the enemy. What steps should be taken to detect the 
existence of such contraband trade, it was the main object 
1s0Ew No. 2, p. 60. (20.I.15). 
1s1EW No. 1, pp. 44-52. (10.II.15). 
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of British policy to determine, in view of persistent and 
systematic efforts at concealment, hence it was 
essential that His Majesty's Government should be entitled 
to make, and should make careful enquiry with regard to 
the particular destination of goods shipped, even at the risk 
of some slight delay to the parties interested. If such en-
quiries were not made, either the exercise of British bel-
ligerent rights would have to be abandoned, ... or else it 
would be necessary to indulge in indiscriminate captures of 
neutral goods and their detention throughout all the period 
of the resulting prize court proceedings. 
The results of such inquiry tended to permit the release of 
most vessels without unconscionable delay or loss, when 
the innocent nature or destination of their cargoes was es-
tablished. 
The practice of inquiry, then, may be said to have been 
the principal new departure in British practice, "but if it 
is correctly described as a new departure, it is a departure 
which is wholly to the advantage of neutrals, and which 
has been made for the purpose of relieving them so far as 
possible from loss or inconvenience." 
The contention of the British note may be warranted to 
this extent: that the conditions under which contraband 
is shipped do necessarily entail an inquiry, but the point 
arises at once as to what that place of inquiry shall be. 
Shall it be on the high seas or in port? Shali it be effected 
within or without the territorial jurisdiction of a belliger-
ent? Mr. Bryan had stated on January 20, 1915, that an 
American private vessel entering voluntarily the territorial 
waters of a belligerent became at once subject to the mwni-
cipal law of that belligerent. What was to be said of aves-
sel taken into port by force majeure, or under any other 
form of duress? 
The United States had already made known its opinion 
in this regard in a note addressed by the State Department 
to the British Ambassador on November 7, but which was 
not published by the State Department. In this the United 
States declared that in its opinion the belligerent right of 
visit and search required that the search should be made 
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on the high seas at the time of the visit, and that the con-
clusion of the search should rest upon the evidence found 
on the ship under investigation, and not upo:p. circumstances 
ascertained from external sources.161• 
To this the British Government was unable to accede, 
pointing out that both British and American prize court 
decisions had admitted the necessity for giving the bellig-
erent captor full liberty to establish by all the evidence at 
his disposal the enemy destination of goods. Apart from 
the question of searching vessels in port, it was claimed 
that it was an absolute necessity to bring a vessel into quiet 
water in order that the visiting officer might go aboard, 
which right, if denied, would make the right of visit and 
search a mere nullity. "If the circumstances ar:e such as 
to render it impossible to carry it out at the spot where the 
vessel is met with, the only practicable course is to take the 
ship to some more convenient locality for the purpose. To 
do so is not to be looked upon as a new belligerent right, 
but as an adaptation of the existing right to the modern 
conditions of commerce." 
It was for this reason that neutral ships had been "en-
couraged" to visit British ports in order that the examina-
tion might take place conveniently. "The alternative would 
be to keep a vessel which the naval officers desired to board 
waiting . . . imtil the weather conditions enabled the visit 
to be carried out at sea." To harmonize belligerent action 
and neutral right, therefore, Great Britain had instituted 
means to facilitate alike compensation for costs, and dam-
ages incident to such delays pending investigation. The 
encfeavors of neutrals engaged in surreptitious trade to 
secure diplomatic instead of legal redress could not be ac-
ceded to; 
when an effective mode of redress is open to them in the 
courts of a civilized country by which they can obtain ade-
quate satisfaction for any invasion of their rights which is 
contrary to the law of nations, the only course which is con-
sistent with sound principle is that they should be referred 
i61 aEW No. 1, p . 48. 
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to that mode of redress and that no diplomatic action should 
be taken until their legal remedies have been exhausted, 
and they are in a position to show prima f acie denial of 
justice. 
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This the British Government maintained to have been its 
attitude in previous wars, and during the Spanish-Ameri-
can War. 
Here again it must be particularly insisted upon that 
this attitude taken by the British Government was one of 
the most keenly disputed points at issue between the United 
States and Great Britain, inasmuch as to have countenanced 
the subjection to prize courts of the cases of all American 
citizens would have meant a complete surrender to the 
methods or orders in force in such prize courts as Great 
Britain might establish. These prize courts were bound 
by an Order in Council of August 6, 1914,'~2 to hear and 
determine prize cases according to the course of admiralty 
(which was in effect an injunction to follow the political 
acts of the government) and the law of nations and the 
statutes, rules, and regulations for the time being in force 
in that behalf. The question at once arises as to whether 
a court of this nature is bound by the municipal enactments, 
rules, etc., of the country if they are contrary to the rules 
of international law. In this connection it will be advisable 
to quote the decision laid down by the Privy Council in the 
case of the Zamora in 1916 concerning the relation of Or-
ders in Council to international law: 
The Prize Court Rules derive their force from Orders of 
His Majesty in Council .. . So far, therefore, as the Prize 
Court Rules relate to procedure and practice, they have 
statutory force and are, undoubtedly, binding . ... The 
idea that the King in Council, or indeed any branch of the 
Executive, has power to prescribe or alter the law to be ad-
ministered by courts of law in this country is out of har-
mony with the principles of our constitution .... A Prize 
Court must of course deal judicially with all questions 
which come before it for determination ," and it would be im-
possible for it to act judicially if it were bound to take its 
is2Tiverton, Prize Law, p. 4. 
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orders from one of the parties to the proceedings . . . The 
law which the Prize Court is to administer is not the muni-
cipal law, but the law of nations ... The Prize Court is a 
municipal court and its decrees and orders owe their va-
lidity to J11Unicipal law. The law which it enforces may, 
therefore, in one sense, be considered a branch of municipal 
law. Nevertheless, this distinction between municipal law 
and international law is well defined. A court which admin-
isters municipal law is bound by and gives effect to the law 
as laid down by the sovereign state which calls it into 
being. It need only inquire what that law is, but a court 
which administers international law must ascertain and 
give effect to a law which is not laid down by any particu-
lar state, but originates 'in the practice and usage long ob-
served by civilized nations in their relations towards each 
othe:r or in express international agreement. It is obvious 
that, if and so far as a Court of Prize in this country is 
bound by and gives effect to Orders of the King in Council 
purporting to prescribe or alter the international law, it is 
administering not international law but municipal law; for 
an exercise of the prerogative cannot impose legal obliga-
tions on anyone outside the King's dominions who is not 
the King's subject. If an Order in Council were binding 
on the Prize Court, such court might be compelled to act 
contrary to the express terms of the commission from which 
it derived its jurisdiction .... 
It follows that but for the existence of Courts of Prize 
no one aggrieved by the acts of a belligerent power in times 
of war could obtain redress otherwise than through diplo-
matic channels and at the risk of disturbing international 
amity. An appropriate remedy is, however, provided by 
the fact that, according to international law, ·every bellig-
erent power must appoint and submit to the jurisdiction 
of a Prize Court to which any person aggrieved by its acts 
has access, and which administers international as opposed 
to municipal law-a law which is theoretically the same, 
whether the court which administers it is constituted un-
der the 'municipal law of the belligerent power or of the 
sovereign of the person aggrieved, and is equally binding 
on both parties to the litigation. It has long been well set-
tled by diplomatic usage that in view of the remedy thus 
afforded, a neutral aggrieved by any act of a belligerent 
power cognizable in ·a Court of Prize ought, before res0rt-
ing to diplomatic intervention, to exhaust this re1;1edy in 
the Prize Courts of the belligerent power .. . It is obvi-
ous, that the reason for this rule of diplomacy would en-
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tirely vanish if a Court of Prize, while nominally adminis-
tering a law of international obligation, were in reality 
acting under the directions of the executive of th2 oelliger-
ent power ... 
It cannot, of course, be disputed that a Prize Court, like 
any other court, is bound by the legislative enactments of 
its own sovereign state . ... The fact, however, tbat the 
Prize Courts in this country would be bound by acts of the 
Imperial Legislature afford no ground for arguing that they 
are bound by the executive orders of the King in Coun-
cil. ... If the Court is to decide judicially in accordance 
with what it conceives to be the law of nations, it cannot, 
even in doubtful cases, take its directions from the Crown, 
which is a party to the proceedings. It must itself deter-
mine what the law is, according to the best of its ability, and 
its view, with whatever hesitation it be arrived at, must 
prevail over any executive order. Only in this way can it 
fulfill its functions as a Prize Court an{! justify the con-
fidence which other i{ations have hitherto placed in its de-
cisions. 
It cannot be assumed, until there be a decision of the 
Prize Court to that effect, that any executive order is con-
trary to law, and all such orders, if acquiesced in and not 
declared to be illegal, will, in course of time, be themselves 
evidence by which international law and usage may be es-
tablished.163 
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Having thus explained the British position legally, we 
may return to examine the other circumstances laid down 
in the remainder o1 the British note. In order to avoid 
delays in regard to ships, interdepartmental committees 
had been established to care for detained ships. Concern-
ing conditional contraband shipments, the note pointed out 
that the Order in Council of October 29 drew no distinction 
in the application of the doctrine of continuous voyage be-
tween absolute and conditional contraband, and placed t~pon 
the neutral power of the contraband somewhat drastic con-
ditions as to the burden of proof of the guilt or innocence 
of the shipment. The criticisms of this as first embodied 
in the Order in Council of August 20, 1914, made hy the 
163The Zamora, Law Reports, 1916, 2 A.C. 77 et seq. Cf. also 
Trehern, British and Colonial Prize Cases, II, 13. 
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United States in "prolonged discussion::;" which have never 
been made public1 6 4 had caused the drafting of the Order in 
Council of October 29, 1914, as a partial conce~sion to the 
views of the United States. It scarcely seems necessary to 
remark that the Order in Council really wen-~ far in impos-
ing a very considerable burden on neutrals rather than 
lightening their burdens. In effect it tended to make the 
neutral assume the onus probancli which was properly to 
be shouldered by the belligerent. 
Regarding foodstuffs, the note cited the views of Bis-
marck to show that the German Government had consist-
ently held that the interception of foodstuffs was a per-
fectly legitimate measure. Furthermore, the distinction 
between civilian and military population in the Central 
Empires had ceased, in practice, to exist, due to Govern-
ment control of foodstuffs. On this account there were 
grave fears that it would be impossible to permit the free 
passage of foodstuffs , particularly in view of German meas-
ures for the interception of commerce with Great Britain. 
Evidence of further concessions to American commerce 
was shown in the establishment of a special committee to 
authorize the release of goods without insisting on full evi-
dence of title being produced. Thus claimants were per-
mitted to recover their goods with little delay. The Brit-
ish Government had, furthermore, dealt leniently with neu-
trals in regard to the transfer to a neutral flag of enemy 
ships belonging to companies incorporated in enemy terri-
tory but entirely composed of neutral shareholders. The 
note closed with the hope that it would be apparent to ·the 
United States that Great Britain was making every pos-
sible consideration for neutrals. 
In a note of February 20, 1915, sent both to England and 
Germany, a modus vivendi to avoid the horrors of subma-
rine warfare was proposed.165 Great Britain was to agree 
that food and foodstuffs would not be placed upon the abso-
16•Ew No. 1, p . 50. (10.11.15). 
m ]bid., pp. 59-60. (20.11.15). 
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lute contraband list and that shipments of such commodi-
ties would not be interfered with or detained by British 
authorities if consigned to agencies designated by the 
United States Government in Germany for the receipt and 
distribution of such cargoes to licensed retailers for dis-
tribution solely to the non-combatant population. This was 
proposed much in the same spirit as that which prompted 
the organization of the Commission for Relief in Belgium, 
and, while accepted by the German Government, was abso-
lutely ignored by the Allied Governments.166 
On March 1, 1915, a note from the British Embassy in-
dicated that the Allied Governments were being driven by 
the actions of the German Government to frame retaliatory 
measures to prevent commodities of any kind from reaching 
Germany. These measures would be enforced without risk 
to neutral ships or to neutral or non-combatant lives. They 
held themselves free, therefore, to detain and take into port 
ships carrying goods of presumed enemy destination, own-
ership or origin. Such vessels or cargoes would not be con-
fiscated unless otherwise liable to condemnation.1 67 It is 
to be noted that the question of enemy destination is alone 
a question to be treated under the head of contraband, as 
the question of ownership or origin depends entirely upon 
other considerations than those dealt with under the head 
of contraband. 
On March 5, 1915, the United States addressed identic 
notes to the French and British Governments stating that 
the action of the United States upon the Allied declara-
tions of retaliation was rendered difficult by reason of the 
nature of the measures proposed, which were extremely 
indefinite, in so far as they affected neutrals. While a 
blockade was implied, it was not asserted, rights both inci-
dent to contraband and biockade were enunciated, and the 
United States was left in a quandary as to what should be 
done. In the case of enemy "ownership or origin," the im-
plications attached thereto were that these tests were those 
1G6fbid., pp. 60-61. (28.Jl.15). 
i s 1 Ibid., pp. 61-62. ( 1.III.15). 
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to be applied to goods breaking blockade outwards. If a 
blockade was to be dedared, some limit must be set upon 
the radius of activity, for the United States would be deep-
ly concerned in the application of the principles of block-
ade to a zone far distant from the scene of actual naval 
operations.168 
The French and British Governments replied separately; 
the ·French Government reserving to itself the right of 
bringing into a French or Allied port any ships carrying 
a cargo presumed to be of German origin, destination, or 
ownership, but stating that it would not go to the length 
of seizing any neutral ship except in case of contraband. 
Discharged cargoes would not be confiscated, but neutrals 
proving lawful ownership of goods destined to Germany 
would be entirely fre e to dispose of them subject to certain 
conditions. German-owned goods would be sequestrated. 
Merchandise of enemy origin, when possessed by an enemy, 
would also be sequestrated, but merchandise belonging to 
neutrals would be held at the owner's disposal to be re-
turned to the . port of departure. Prize Courts were to take 
cognizance of these situations and decide cases within eight 
days. Last of all, the announcement was made that the 
Allied French and British fleets had examined "wbat meas-
ures they could adopt to interrupt all maritime communica-
tion with the German Empire and thus keep it blockaded 
by the naval power of the two allies. Assurance was given 
that it was not and had never been the intention of the 
French Government to extend the action of its cruisers 
against enemy merchandise beyond European seas, the 
Mediterranean included.1 69 
The British view was presented in two notes under dates 
of March 13 and 15, 1915, which stated that110 
Inasmuch as the stoppage of all foodstuffs is an admitted 
consequence of blockade, it is obvious that there can be no 
universal rule based on considerations of morality and hu.-
16BEW No. 1, pp. 62-63. (5.III.15). 
169EW No. 1, pp. 63. (14.111.15). 
HO/bid., pp. 64-65. (13.III.15; 15.III.15). 
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manity which is contrary to this practice. The right to 
stop foodstuffs destined for the civil population must there-
fore in any case be admitted if an effective "cordon" con-
trolling intercourse with the enemy is drawn, announced 
and maintained. Moreover, independently of rights aris-
ing from belligerent action in the nature of a blockade, some 
other nations, differing from the opinion of the Governments 
of the United States and Great Britain, have held that to 
stop the food of the civil population is a natural a11d legit-
imate method of bringing pressure to bear upon an enemy 
country ... 
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The Government of Great Britain have frankly declared, 
in concert with the Government of France, their intention 
to meet the German attempt to stop all supplies of every 
kind from leaving or entering British or French ports by 
themselves stopping supplies going to or from Germany for 
this end. The British fleet has instituted a blockade effect-
ively controlling by cruiser "cordon" all passage· to and 
from Germany by sea. 
. . . The degree of severity with which the measures of 
blockade authorized will be put into operation ... will de-
pend on the administrative orders issued by the Government 
and the decisions of the authorities specially charged with 
the duty of dealing with individual ships and cargoes ac- . 
cording to the merits of each case . . . The instructions to 
be issued by His Majesty's Government to the fleet and to 
the customs authorities and executive committees concerned 
will impress upon them the duty of acting with the utmost 
dispatch and consideration for neutrals as may be compati-
ble with the object in view, which is, succinctly stated, to 
establish a blockade to prevent vessels from carrying goods 
for or coming from Germany. 
His Majesty's Government declare their intention to re-
frain altogether from the exercise of the right to confiscate 
ships or cargoes which belligerents have always claimed in 
respect to breaches of blocka_de. They restrict their claim 
to the stopping of cargoes destined for or coming from the 
enemy's territory ... It is not intended to interfere with 
neutral vessels carrying enemy cargo of non-contraband 
nature outside European waters, including the Mediter-
ranian. 
Thus was the long expected blockade announced. With 
its development and extension, its workings upon the enemy 
and upon neutrals we are not here concerned; it will form 
the topic of a later chapter. It is sufficient to remark that 
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from this time on the problem of the restraints on Ameri-
can commerce formed a topic in which these two lines-
those of contraband and blockade-were doubly interwoven. 
In so far as possible, the endeavor will be made to deter-
mine the outcome of each line of policy. independently. 
. In reply to these notes of the British Government, the 
Department of State, on March 30, 1915, made clear its 
position as regards the measures to be taken by the Allied 
Governments, holding that they amounted to a practical 
assertion of unlimited belligerent rights over neutral com-
merce within the whole European area, and an almost un-
qualified denial of the sovereign rights of the nations now 
at peace. The note then went on to point out what these 
rights were : 17 1 
A nation's sovereignty over its own ships and citizens un-
der its own flag on the high seas in time of peace is un-
limited; and that sovereignty suffers .no diminution in time 
of war, except in so far as the practice and consent of civi-
lized nations has limited it by the recognition of certain 
clearly determined rights which it is conceded may be ex-
ercised by nations which are at war. 
A belligerent nation has been conceded the right of visit 
and search, and the right of capture and condemnation, if 
upon examination a neutral vessel is found to be engaged 
in unneutral service or to be carrying contraband of war in-
tended for the enemy government or armed forces. It has 
even been conceded the right to establish and maintain a 
blockade of an enemy's ports and coasts and to capture and 
condemn any vessel taken in trying to break the blockade. 
It is even conceded the right to detain and take to its own 
ports for judicial examination all vessels which it suspects 
for substantial reasons to be engaged in unneutral or con-
traband service and to condemn them if the suspicion is 
sustained. But such rights, long clearly defined both in 
doctrine and in practice, have hitherto been held to be the 
only permissible exceptions to the principle of universal 
equality of sovereignty on the high seas as between bellig-
erents and nations not engaged in war. 
The remainder of the note dealt with blockade. 
At this point it will be well to deal with several cases of 
i11EW No . 1, p. 69. (30.111.15) . 
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detentions, pointing out what purpose they served in clear-
ing up the British viewpoint as to restrictions on contra-
band. The first of such cases is that of the Wilhelrnina, an 
American ship laden with foodstuffs from an American 
port to Hamburg, where the manager of the company own-
ing the cargo, an American representative of an American 
firm, had instructions to sell the cargo solely to the civilian 
population of Hamburg. The vessel was seized by the Brit-
ish authorities and the cargo was sent to the prize court. 
At this point, on February 15, 1915, the State Department 
sent a note submitting that, according to sworn evidence 
· and the ship's manifest, the cargo was destined for the 
civilian population of Hamburg and no one else. The Brit-
ish ground of justification of the cargo, that it was subject 
to the control of the German authorities, having proven 
unfounded according to the terms of a decree of the Ger-
man Bundesrat, and special assurances having been direct-
ly given to the United States by the German Government 
that the cargo would not be used otherwise, the United 
States asked the British Government to release the vessel 
and allow her to proceed to her port of destination unless 
other evidence were found on which to detain her.172 
Sir Edward Grey replied on February 19, 1915, to the 
effect that the exception of imported foodstuffs from Gov-
ernment control in Germany as alleged by the decree of 
the Bundesrat was a matter for prize court determination; 
the treatment by the German Government of cargoes of 
foodstuffs destined for undefended ports as though going 
to an "armed base" of the enemy led the British Govern-
ment to accord a like status to Hamburg, which was forti-
fied; furthermore, the owners of the Wilhelmina would be 
equitably indemnified if the cargo was found to be contra-
band. If, therefore, the British Government should, in 
view of enemy practices, declare foodstuffs absolute con-
traband, it was not to be expected that neutrals would chal-
lenge the validity of such reprisals.173 
112Ew No. 1,, pp. 81-82. (15.11.15). 
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In view of the developments as to blockade while the case 
was pending in the prize court the decision of the prize 
court could not possibly have changed the determination of 
the British Government to hold the cargo as absolute con-
traband. Therefore, after having held the cargo at Fal-
mouth from February 11 till April 7, 1915, it was proposed 
that the British Government, acting by virtue of an Order 
in Council of March 23, 1915, 174 to purchase the cargo of the 
Wilhelmina and compensate the owners for the delay thus 
caused. This Order in Council was proclaimed with the in-
tention of requisitioning ships, and detailed the procedure 
therefor. The owners of the Wilhelmina accepted the ar-
rangement and the case was closed. It had been intended 
to use the case of the Wilhelmina as an instance of the car-
riage of a conditional contraband cargo permitted by earlier 
Orders in Council. The proclamation of the blockade made 
the carrying out of this project impossible. 
The American steamship Wico, carrying a cargo of oil 
to Stockholm, was detained in Great Britain en route to 
Sweden pending assurances from the Swedish Government 
that such a cargo would not be captured by the German 
naval forces. On March 20, 1915, Mr. Bryan instructed 
Mr. Page to verify the attitude of the British Government 
in the matter, and, having done so, to demand the release 
of the vessel, as the United States could not admit the right 
of Great Britain to detain the vessel pending an answer 
made to a demand on a non-belligerent country, with which 
that country would be unable to comply, as no neutral 
could be expected to give assurances that the ship of an-
other neutral would not be held up by the forces of another 
belligerent government. While the British Government 
released the vessel, reserving the right to reconsider its 
action in future cases, the United States notified Great Brit-
ain that such seizures by Germany would be subject of dis-
cussions between the United States and Germany, and 
could afford no basis for the recurrepce of such action on 
t14EW No. 1, pp. 72-75. (23.111.15). 
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the part of the British authorities. In reply, the British 
Government declared that such had not been their inten-
tion, but that they believed that the United States Govern-
ment would not question the holding up of neutral ships 
where there was good reason to believe that the ostensible 
was not the real destination and that fraudulent arrange-
ments had been concerted with enemy cruisers for deliver-
ing ships and cargo into their hands. Thereupon the United 
States dropped the case.1 75 
Due to ·the Detention of the American ship Seguranca, 
bound from New York to Holland with a cargo entirely con-
signed to named consignees in Holland and accompanied 
by a certificate from the British Consul General in New 
York, the Department of State advised the British Govern-
ment through Ambassador Page that the United States 
would support the claims of the owners of the vessel for 
damages for detention, as the United States did not admit 
the right of Great Britain to require reconsignment to the 
Netherlands Oversea Trust. In reply, the British Govern-
ment stated that the ship had been allowed to proceed, as 
all the consignees had agreed to accept their goods through 
the Netherlands Oversea Trust; that while the British Gov-
ernment did not "require" it, consignments to the Nether-
lands Oversea Trust were accepted as evidence of bona 
fide destination, and materially expedited. The United 
States set forth its final position in a note of May 6, 1915, 
stating that while the United States had no objection to 
voluntary shipments to the Netherlands Oversea Trust, it 
maintained that other cargoes still had the same legal 
status; that there was no justification for the detention of 
non-contraband cargoes, and that the onus probandi was 
on the shoulders of the British Government to prove the 
contraband character of such consignments. This ended 
the case. 176 
On March 20, 1915, the American steamer Joseph W. 
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Fordney sailed from New York for Malmo, Sweden, with 
a cargo entirely composed of cattle fodder consigned to one 
E. Klingener. The bill of lading was certified by the Brit-
ish Consul General at New York and by the Swedish Con-
sul, who asserted that the exportation of this kind of cargo 
from Sweden was prohibited. The vessel was loaded un-
der the supervision of British consular officers, who sealed 
her hatches. On April 6, 1915, when about ten miles from 
the Norwegian coast she was sighted by H.M.S. Teutonic, 
which pursued her. The vessel thereupon endeavored to 
escape into Norwegian territorial waters to avoid inter-
ception. Being overtaken, she was brought to Kirkwall, 
April 8, 1915, while inquiry was made as to the identity of. 
Klingener, who was found to be the agent of a Hamburg 
firm. On this account, the vessel was put into the Prize 
Court and compelled· to discharge her cargo before being 
released.177 
On April 14, 1915, Mr. Bryan sent a note to the British 
Government requesting the immediate release of the ves-
sel if evidence had not revealed her to be carrying contra-
band. After considerable correspondence, the views of the 
Procurator General were set forth in a note from Sir Ed-
ward Grey on October 6, 1915, stating that it was originally 
proposed to deal with the cargo under the Order in Coun-
cil of March 11, 1915, as in the case of the Wilhelmina, be-
cause the evidence showed that the cargo was intended .for 
Germany, but as the British Government later had reason 
to believe that they were for the enemy Government or its 
armed forces, proceedings for condemnation were taken 
on that ground. This led to remonstrances from the State 
Department on the ground that it appeared that approxi-
mately one-half a year after the goods were seized the Brit-
ish authorities obtained possession of such evidence as alone 
would have justified the seizure. If due examination of 
the vessel at the time of its seizure did not disclose evidence 
warranting the seizure of the goods, of course the cargo 
mEW No. 3, p. 119. (20.V.15). 
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could not be lawfully seized, and therefore subsequent pro-
ceedings in the Prize Court could not be lawful. To this 
the Foreign Office ~eply was categorically in the negative, 
on November 27, 1915. . 
Another half-year went by and Mr. Lansing addressed 
a note to the British Government stating that the United 
States considered itself entitled to knowledge concerning 
the principles on which the British Government had acted 
in the case of the Fordney and similar American shipping 
cases. Due to the retroactive effect of Orders in Council, 
in the opinion of the United States a plain denial of justice 
was being caused at least in the case of the Fordney. The 
previous stand of the Department in this matter was re-
iterated, but failed to evoke a satisfactory reply from the 
British Government. On May 9, 1916, the Foreign Office 
informed Mr. Page that the British Government must de-
cline to enter into any discussion of points which were 
awaiting decision in a case pending in a Prize Court. Claim-
ants could, however, submit to the Prize Court any evidence 
that they regarded as bearing on the subject, in an endeavor 
to secure redress.118 This closed the case of the Fordney 
as a test case concerning the binding effect of British Prize 
Court regula'tions. Concerning the subsequent develop-
ments in the general controversy between the United States 
and Great Britain, it will be necessary to turn back to the 
approximate time when all these cases started. The devel-
opments in view of the Order in Council of March 11, 1915, 
will be dealt with under blockade; the remainder may be 
taken up in their chronological order. 
The first statement of this kind may be found in a mem-
orandum of the Foreign Office on May 20, 1915, dealing 
with detained ships and cargoes, and particularly with car-
goes of cotton.1 ' 9 
This statement, while dealing principally with the ques-
tion of blockade, held that 
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as regards American cargoes or portions of cargoes which 
have been placed in the Prize Court, His Majesty's Govern-
ment only resort to this measure in cases where either the 
goods concerned are contraband, or there is evidence that, 
although ostensibly consigned to a person in a neutral coun-
try, they are in reality destined for the enemy in contraven-
tion of the rules of blockade. The right to submit such 
cases to the public investigation of a judicial tribunal is 
one which His Majesty's Government cannot forego, and they 
feel convinced that enlightened opinion in the United States 
of America cannot adversely criticize their course of action 
in this respect. 
This was, however, the peculiar point in question, and one 
concerning which the United States was then about to make 
very vigorous protest. 
The resignation of Mr. Lansing as Secretary of State, in 
1920, brought to light from extraneous sources reliable 
testimony as to the policy of the United States as assumed 
by Mr. Lansing on his induction into office as Secretary of' 
State following Mr. Bryan's resignation: 
Mr. Lansing felt that this country should not only be 
neutral in thought, but that it should be just as much in 
earnest in calling England to account for her violations of 
international law during the war as in scoring the Germa11s 
for their sins. For instance, there was a note prepared be-
fore Mr. Bryan resigned, to be sent to Great Britain as soon 
as the first Lusitania note had gone to Germany, taking is-
sue with England for various infractions of the laws o~ war, 
particularly as they affected neutrals. Mr. Cone Johnson, 
then solicitor of the State Department, was responsible for 
the statement that there was not a single canon of interna-
tional law that England had not violated up to that hour; 
and it was beyond doubt true that England at that time had 
not only thrown all possible difficulties in the way of our 
dealing with Germany, but was holding up our ships destineJ 
for neutral ports. For instance, on May 20, 1915, there 
were twenty-four cotton ships all bound for Scandinavian 
and Dutch ports, held up in England in deliberate violation 
of British pledges that all cotton for which contracts of sale 
or freight engagements had been made before March 2, 1915, 
would be allowed free transit provided that the ships sailed 
not later than March 31. Mr. Lansing was one of those 
who thought that just as stiff a note should be sent to Eng-
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land about these matters as had been sent to Germany 
about the Lusitania, and when the President reached New 
York on May 18, 1915, on the Mayflower, to review the fleet, 
such a note was placed in his hands by a special messenger 
from the State Department. With the drafting of that note 
Robert Lansing had a good deal to do. 
113 
Unfortunately for the country, that note was not sent to 
England until nearly five months later, (October 21, 
1915) ,180 during which time its effect was weakened for 
several reasons. In the first place, it came too late to have 
that effect on Germany which it was hoped it would have--
namely, of relieving the German suspicion that America was 
playing the Allies' game. In the second place, it was very 
much toned down in its language and was not nearly so 
sharp an indictment of Great Britain as its projectors had 
intended. In the third place, much water had flowed under 
the bridge in the interim. But at least at that t ime Mr. 
Lansing was for dealing out an even-handed justice, was 
for vigorously upholding the rights of the American flag 
upon the high seas in accordance with American traditions, 
and was determined to stand by the tenets of international 
law which had been so hardly won by decades and centuries 
of slow juristic development.181 
The next communication also came from Great Britain 
on June 22, 1915,182 not as an answer to the arguments of 
the United States, but merely as an explanation of a few 
concrete cases. The note reiterated the previous assurances 
of the British Government, particularly in regard to the 
treatment of cotton cargpes, which were to be allowed free, 
or bought at contract price if stopped, if contract and 
freight arrangements had been made before March 2, pro-
vided the ships sailed by March 31, or if insured on March 
2 and loaded before March 16. All such shipments were 
to be declared before sailing, and documents were to be 
produced to, and certificates obtained from, consular of-
ficers or other authority fixed by the Government. In try-
ing to avoid unnecessary damage to the interests of neutrals 
in regard to the export of goods of German origin, special 
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concessions had been made to American shippers, such as 
the arrangement for presentation of proof of payment at 
the British Embassy by American importers of German 
goods through neutral ports. The British Government fur-
ther agreed to recognize the neutral ownership of goods 
of enemy origin even if not paid for on the date of the in-
stitution of the blockade, provided they were the subject of 
an f.o.b. contract of ~arlier date and had arrived at a neu-
tral port within the time limit set for departures of vessels 
from blockade·d ports. The fact that no time limit had been · 
set in the Orders in Council proclaiming the existence of a 
blockade was no barrier to such limits on commerce being 
set, and special arrangements to settle cases outside the 
Prize Court had been made, as far as investigations were 
concerned, particularly in the case of meat shipments. 
However, in future, with these few exceptions, all cases 
would have to go to the Prize Court, as the British Govern-
ment could not continue to deal through the diplomatic 
channel with individual cases. 
On July 14, 1915, Mr. Lansing sent a note to the British 
Government stating that in so far as the interests of Amer-
ican citizens were concerned, the United States would in-
sist upon their rights under the principles and rules of in-
ternational law as theretofore established governing neu-
tral trade in time of war, without limitation or impairment 
by Orders in Council or other municipal legislation by the 
British Government, and would not recognize the validity 
of Prize Court proceedings taken under restraints imposed 
by British municipal law in derogation of the rights of 
American citizens under international law.1 83 
The seizure of the American steamship Neches, carry-
ing a general cargo from Rotterdam to the United States, ' 
by the British Government provoked a fresh note under 
date of July 15, 1915, from the United States, which re-
garded the seizure of the vessel, with American-owned 
goods passing from the neutral port of Rotterdam to a neu-
t B3EW No. 2, p. 177. (14.VIl.15). 
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tral port of the United States, merely because the goods 
originally came from territory in the possession of an en-
emy of Great Britain, as "internationally invalid" under 
the Orders in Council of March 11, 1915. Although this 
was the first instance of a case where both enemy owner-
ship and blockade were involved, it raised the protest on 
the part of the United States that it violated the rights of 
citizens of one neutral to trade with those of another, as 
well as with those of belligerents except in contraband; 
the rights of American owners of goods to bring them out 
of Holland was firmly insisted on, hence the British Gov-
~rnment was requested to release the goods taken from the 
Neches. The British Embassy, in a note verbale of August 
6, 1915, repfied that the British Government admitted no 
illegality of procedure, inasmuch as the British Govern-
ment could not presume the invalidity of its own legisla-
tion, nor admit the limitation by neutrals of its belligerent 
right of visit and search, capture and condemnation. Con-
traband, no less than blockade, was subject to the doctrine 
of continuous voyage, and the principles upheld by the 
United States could not be recognized. 1 84 
The two notes of March 30, 1915, and July 14, 1915, 
served to call forth from the British Government two notes 
in response, under the dates of July 23, and July 31, 1915, 
respectively. The first dealt almost exclusively with block-
ade, and the other with the contentions of the United States 
as to the validity of Orders in Council. American practice 
had held185 that Prize Courts are subject to the instructions 
of their own sovereign, and in general the principles of 
American and British prize practice were identical. The 
note went on to quote the case of the Fox, in which Lord 
Stowell had declared that a Prize Court would not enter-
tain a priori the question of a conflict between Acts of Par-
liament or Orders in Council and the principles of the law 
of nations ... because it could not without extreme in-
decency presume that any such emergency would happen. 
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Quoting from the opinion of the Zamora, which we have 
already mentioned, and which condemned this judgment of 
Lord Stowell in claiming legislative rights for the King in 
Council over Prize Courts as an erroneous dictum quite ir-
reconcilable with the general doctrines otherwise enunci-
ated by that learned judge, the note had the temerity to 
claim that Sir Samuel Evans had in an obiter dictum in 
the case of the Zamora approved the case of the Fox by 
saying that nations of the world need not be apprehensive 
that Orders in Council would emanate from the British 
Government in such violation of the acknowledged laws of 
nations that the Prize Courts would feel called upon to dis-
regard and refuse ·obedience to the provisions of such or-
ders. So long as the legality of the measures in question 
had not been passed upon by the Prize Courts of Great 
Britain, the note continued, there was no recourse for 
American citizens save to submit to the arbitrament of the 
Prize Court, as the presumption was that the Orders in 
Council were legal until declared otherwise. 
The final stand taken by Great Britain in the matter was 
that if American citizens were denied justice in the Prize 
Courts and such decisions were upheld on appeal to the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and the United 
States still considered that there was serious ground for 
holding that the decisions were incorrect and infringed 
American rights, the matter could be subjected to review 
by an international tribunal. For this there was precedent 
in the seventh article of the Jay Treaty of 1794, the Treaty 
of Washington of 1871, and The Hague Convention of 1907 
proposing the establishment of an International Prize 
Court. Under such circumstances, the British Government 
would be prepared to concert with the United States Gov-
ernment upon the best way of applying the principle of 
arbitration to the questions at issue between the two gov-
ernments.186 
On October 12, 1915, the British Embassy submitted a 
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memorandum concerning the grounds of Prize Court decis-
ions in the cases of four ships, the Kim, the Alfred Nobel, 
tl~e BjOrnsternje Bjornson, and the Fridland, 18 1 laden with 
meat cargoes consigned by Chicago packers to Copenhagen 
and other Scandinavian ports. The cargoes had been 
seized before the blockade was instituted, on the ground 
of being conditional contraband destined for the use of 
enemy armies. The application of the doctrine of continuous 
voyage to these shipments was one which the United States, 
from its own practice, had sanctioned. Moreover, due to 
the fact that neutrals did not try to supply the enemy open-
ly but by means of shipments to neutral ports, the British 
Government was enabled to apply the doctrine of continu-
ous voyage, where~s. if the shipments had been made di-
rectly, it would have been for the British Government to 
establish that the consignees were actually supplying the 
German Government. Evidence of the subterfuges of pur-
veyors to the enemy was seen in the fact that Dutch firms 
who guaranteed against reexportation would not accept 
such consignments. Other evidences of collusion presented 
showed that the British Government was perfectly justified 
in the seizures under the ordinary terms of international 
law.188 
It was on October 21, 1915, however, that the classic note 
of the whole series, long-prepared and held back by supe-
rior orders, was finally sent to Great Britain, covering all 
the contentions i_n previous notes and the replies to them. 
With regrets that the interferences with American ships 
and cargoes had become increasingly vexatious, the United 
States submitted its case under the following specific com-
plaints: 
(1) Detentions of American vessels pursuant to the various Or-
ders in Council had not been uniformly based on proofs obtained at 
the time of seizure, but were incident to a search made for evidence 
of the contraband character of their cargoes, or of their intent to 
evade the blockade. Such evidence was sought to support bare sus-
picion of enemy origin or destination. 
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(2) Search of vessels and their cargoes in port, instead of on the 
high seas, as sanctioned by long practice, was unwarranted by the 
British contention that "modern conditions" made such search dif-
ficult, as naval experts consulted by the United States were of opin-
ion that 
the facilities for boarding and inspection of modern ships 
are in fact greater than in former times, and no difference 
except in time can be seen between the search of a ship of 
a thousand tons and one of twenty thousand tons, for the 
purpose of establishing fully the character of her cargo 
and the nature of her service and destination. 
(3) Under revised British prize procedure, no "first hearing" was 
allowed; extrinsic evidence was at once admitted, enabling the de-
tention of cargoes on suspicion, and causing unconscionable risk, 
loss and delay; the burden of proof of noncontraband character of 
goods was placed upon the claimant; the captor was allowed to es-
tablfsh enemy destination by all the evidence at his disposal, in-
cluding mere presumption of reexportation, thus enabling belliger-
ents to ignore entirely neutral rights on the high seas and prey with 
impunity upon neutral commerce. 
( 4) Increased British exports to neutral countries from which 
similar American products were kept out created a condition of such 
manifest injustice to American trade that the United States could 
not be expected to permit the rights of its citizens to be so seriously 
impaired to the profit and commercial advantage of Great Britain. 
( 5) The detention of goods clearly intended to become incorpo-
rated in the mass of merchandise for sale in neutral countries, on 
the presumption of ultimate enemy destination, was an unwarranted 
and inquisitorial preceeding, an illegal and unjustifiable attempt of 
belligerents to interfere with the rights of neutrals to trade With 
one another. Even if conditional contraband were destined to an 
enemy country through a neutral country, that fact was not in itself 
sufficient to justify seizure. For these reasons, it was anticipated 
that Great Britain would instruct its officers to refrain from such 
vexatious practices. 
(6) American citizens were denied other means of redress than 
through the Prize Courts, subject to ultimate arbitration of the de-
cisions involved. Such Prize Courts, being bound by the faws and 
regulations under which the seizures and detentions were made and 
which were held by the claimants to be in violation of the laws of 
nations, were therefore powerless to pass upon the real ground of 
complaint or to give redress for wrongs of that nature, whereas 
American courts were not and had never been bound by such restric-
tions. Furthermore, Great Britain, alike in the Civil and Boer wars, 
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had obtained or granted redress through diplomatic channels exclu-
sively. 
(7) The general menace of interference with trade, the unwar-
ranted delays imposed, the imminent fear of illegal seizure by Allied 
authorities operated, together with the illegal measures for bring-
ing ships under British territorial jurisdiction, to deter American 
merchants from trading with neutral countries, or to resort to Brit-
ish Prize Courts for redress, as release in these instances could be 
obtained only upon condition that costs and expenses such as pilotage, 
wharfage, demurrage, harbor dues, warehousage, unloading costs 
incurred in the course of such unwarranted procedure be paid by the 
claimants on condition, also, that they sign a waiver of right to bring 
subsequent claims against the British Government for these exactions. 
The United States denied that the charges incident to such deten-
tions could be rightfully imposed upon innocent trade, or that any 
waiver of indemnity exacted from American citizens under such 
conditions of duress could preclude them from obtaining redress 
through diplomatic channels or any other means open to them. 
In conclusion, the United States held that, while reserving the 
question of the discussion of the extension of contraband lists ti}l a 
later day, it submitted as proven that the methods employed by Great 
Britain in obtaining and using evidence of enemy destination of car-
goes bound to neutral ports to impose a contraband character upon 
them were without justification; that the judicial procedure for re-
dress for an international injury was inherently defective, and vio-
lative of international law; that the United States could not with 
complacence suffer further subordination of its rights and interests 
to such oppressive and illegal practices; that our relations towards 
Great Britain must be governed not by expediency but by regularly 
established rules of international conduct, unhampered and unim-
paired by belligerent action, so as to safeguard impartially the in-
terests of neutrals, of whom the United States considered herself the 
champion.189 
In substantiation of the charges laid down in the note, 
an appendix was submitted dealing with the specific cases 
of vessels whose detention for prolonged periods without 
the institution of Prize Court proceedings was unwarranted, 
in view of the fact that their papers were of such charac-
ter as to require but a brief time for examination; of other 
vessels held until they reconsigned their cargoes to con-
signees in neutral countries designated by the British Gov-
ernment; of vessels detained without evidence amounting 
189/bid., p. 38. 
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to probable cause, or because of the manner in which ship-
ments had been consigned. Similar instances were fur-
nished of the seizure by the British Government of goods 
on the ground that the country to which they were con-
signed had not prohibited their export, or in spite of such 
guarantees even though the goods themselves might be 
either conditional contraband or not contraband at all. 
Cases of detention pending assurances that embargoed 
goods would be allowed to pass through a neutral country 
to Allied countries and of seizure on the ground that con-
signees had been known to trade with the enemy or were 
suspected of so doing, were cited; likewise the instances 
where vessels proceeding from European neutral ports were 
detained or seized and brought into port and compelled to 
pay pilotage, harbor, unloading, warehouse, storage or 
other dues, costs and expenses in advance of a judicial de-
termination of the validity of the seizure of the vessel or 
its cargo.190 
This closed what may be regarded the most thorough-
going and masterly effort of the United States to vindicate 
its neutral rights. From the British Government no re-
sponse was received until April 24, 1916, when a reply em-
bodying the views of the French and British Governments 
was received. Meanwhile Great Britain, by two Orders in 
Council of November 10, 1915,191 had rendered liable to re-
quisition for the carriage of foodstuffs and other articles of 
commerce any British ship registered in the United King-
dom upon the serving of such notice upon the owner of the 
ship by authority of the Board of Trade, and had prohib-
ited, after December 1, 1915, the carrying of cargo from 
one forei_gn port to another by any British steamship reg-
istered in the United Kingdom exceeding 500 tons gross 
tonnage unless specifically exempted by licenses to be issued 
by the authority of the Board of Trade. 
On January 19, 1916, the Department of State was of-
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ficially apprised by Mr. Page of the terms of the "Trading 
with the Enemy (Extension of Powers) Act" of December, 
1915, familiarly known as the act establishing the "Black-
list" of American and other neutral firms. In brief, the act 
provided for the extension of the restrictions relating to 
trading with the enemy to persons to whom it was expedi-
ent to extend such restrictions by reason of their enemy 
nationality or associations, whether resident and carrying 
on business in enemy territory or not. By proclamation, 
all persons or bodies of persons, incorporated or unincor-
porated, resident, carrying on business, or being in the 
United Kingdom, might be prohibited from trading with 
any persons or bodies of persons not resident or carrying 
on business in enemy territory or enemy-occupied territory 
(other than persons or bodies of persons incorporated or 
unincorporated, residing or carrying on business solely 
within British dominions) wherever it seemed expedient to 
the crown, by reason of the enemy nationality or associa-
tion of such persons. Any list of such persons with whom 
such trading was prohibited by a proclamation might be 
varied or added to by Orders in Council, and all the provis-
ions of trading-with-the-enemy acts should also apply to 
such persons. Within the scope of the act were embraced 
all persons trading with a person or body of persons to 
whom such royal proclamations might be applied, if they 
entered into any transaction or did any act with, to, on be-
half of, or for the benefit of such a person or body of per-
sons which if entered into or done with, to, on behalf of, 
or for the benefit of an enemy, would be trading with the 
enemy.192 
Such an announcement, as might readily be expected, 
drew fire from the United States, and Mr. Lansing, in a 
note of January 25, 1916, held that the act was pregnant 
with possibilities of undue interference with American 
trade, if such was not already being practiced. The United 
States Government believed that the act was framed with-
out a proper regard for the right of persons domiciled in 
rnzEW No. 3, pp. 54-55. (19.1.16) . 
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the United States, whether Americans or enemy subjects, 
to trade with persons in belligerent countries, and held 
grave apprehensions as to its application, reserving the 
right to protest against its application in so far as it af-
fected American trade, and to contest the legality or right-
fulness of imposing restrictions on the freedom of Ameri-
can trade in such fashion. 193 
To this the British Foreign Office replied under date of 
February 16, 1916, stating that the act was an endeavor to 
bring British practice more in keeping with that of France, 
by applying in some degree the test .of nationality in the 
determination of enemy character in addition to the old test 
of domicile, which experience had shown insufficient to de-
prive the enemy of all direct or indirect assistance from 
national resources. Care had been taken in framing the 
act, it was alleged, to avoid any definition which would im-
pose enemy status upon all persons of enemy nationality 
and associations, but also to take powers of discrimination 
to withhold British resources from such persons. While 
abstaining from a strict interpretation of their belligerent 
rights, the British Government had acted by domestic legis-
lation to restrict the activities of British subjects from a 
standpoint of national necessity. Without denying the 
right of all persons of any nationality resident in the United 
States to engage in trade legitimately, they could not admit 
thereby any limitation of the right of other governments 
to restrict in any appropriate manner the activities of their 
own nationals, which was a sovereign right inherent in na-
tional independence, from the exercise of which, under 
these self-imposed limitations, the United States should 
have little to fear .194 
No reply was made to the British Government in regard 
to the Trading with the Enemy Act until July 26, 1916, by 
which time, it will be remembered, the Allied Governments 
had absolutely discarded their endeavor to pursue, even to 
mEW No. s, p. 55. (25.1.16). 
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a limited extent, the lines of policy laid down in the Decla-
ration of London. On that date Mr. Polk addressed a 
formal note to the British Government, manifesting the 
surprise of the United States at the "blacklisting" of cer-
tain persons, firms, and corporations in the United States 
and the interdiction of all financial or commercial dealings 
between them and British subjects, and expressing the pro-
test of the United States in the most decided terms against 
such a "policy of arbitrary interference with neutral trade." 
The extraordinary effect of the policy, and its wide scope 
operated to deter British steamship companies from ac-
cepting cargoes from such firms for transport to neutral 
ports, and neutral steamship lines were denied coal in Brit-
ish ports if accepting them, besides suffering other penal-
ties; so neutral bankers refused loans to these firms, and 
neutral merchants would not contract from these firms, 
fearing a like proscription; Americans in foreign countries 
had been notified that their dealings with blacklisted 
American firms were to be regarded as subject to the veto 
of the British Government, so that Americans would thus 
be prevented from dealing with purely American firms. 
The limitless dangers to importers thus blacklisted for 
"enemy association" were "inevitably and essentially in-
consistent with the rights of the citizens of all the nations 
not involved in war"; the United States could not 'consent 
to see the remedies and penalties for breaches of blockade, 
carriage of contraband or unneutral service altered or ex-
tended at the will of a single power or powers in deroga-
tion of American rights; the safeguards of prize courts 
against condemnation without fair adjudication were swept 
away by the blacklist which condemned without hearing, 
without notice and in advance. It was rpanifestly out of 
the question that the United States should acquiesce in 
methods or applications of punishment to its citizens. Apart 
from the question of the legality of the blacklist, the United 
States was constrained to regard it as inconsistent with 
true justice and impartiality in friendly international in-
tercourse, and could not consent to see its citiz~ns put on 
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an ex parte blacklist without protesting in the gravest terms 
against the serious consequences involved concerning neu-
tral rights.195 
Congress, apparently not content with the results of _diplomatic 
protests, took occasion to provide, in the sections of the Revenue Act 
of 1916 dealing with "Unfair Competition" due legal authority where-
by measures of a more stringent character might be employed. These 
provisions authorized and empowered the President whenever, dur-
ing the existence of a war in which the United States was not en-
gaged, he should be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to 
believe that under the laws, regulations or practices of any country, 
colony or dependency contrary to the law and practice of nations, the 
importation into their own or any other country, dependency or col-
ony of any article . . . was prevented or restricted, to prohibit or 
restrict, during the period such prohibition or restriction was in 
force, the importation into the United States of similar or other ar-
ticles, products of such country, dependency, or colony, as in his 
opinion the public interest might require, stating by proclamation 
the article or articles which were prohibited from importation into 
the United States. He was also authorized to change, modify, re-
voke, or renew such a proclamation in his discretion. 
By a subsequent section, whenever, during the existence of a war 
in which the United States was not engaged, the President should 
be satisfied that there was reasonable ground to believe that any 
vessel, American or foreign, was, on account of the laws, regulations, 
or practices of a belligerent government, making or giving any un-
due or unreasonable preference or advantage in any respect what-
soever to any particular person, company, firm or corporation, or 
any particular description of traffic in the United States or its pos-
sessions or to any citizens of the United States residing in neutral 
countries abroad, or was subjecting any particular person, company, 
firm, or corporation or any particular description of traffic in the 
United States or its possessions, or any citizens of the United States 
residing in neutral countries abroad to any undue or unreasonable 
prejudice, disadvantage, injury, or discrimination in regard to ac-
cepting, receiving, transporting, or delivering or refusing to accept, 
receive, transfer, or deliver any cargo, freight or passengers, or in 
any other respect ;whatsoever, he was authorized and empowered to 
direct ~he detention of such vessels by withholding clearance or by 
formal notice forbidding departure, and to revoke, modify or renew 
any such direction. 
Similarly it was provided that whenever there was reasonable 
ground to believe that under the laws, regulations or practices of 
195EW No. 4, pp. 85-87. (26.VIl.16). 
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any belligerent country or government, American ships or American 
citizens were not accorded any of the facilities of commerce which 
the vessels or citizens of that belligerent country enjoy in the United 
States or its possessions, or are not accorded by such belligerent 
equal privileges or facilities of trade with vessels or citizens of any 
nationality other than that of such belligerent, the President was 
authorized and empowered to withhold clearance from one or more 
vessels of such belligerent country until such belligerent should re-
store to such American vessels and American citizens reciprocai 
liberty of commerce and equal privileges of trade; or the President 
might direct that similar privileges and facilities, if any, enjoyed 
by · citizens of such belligerents in the United States or its posses-
sions be refused to vessels or citizens or such belligerent; and in such 
case he should make proclamation of his direction, stating the fa-
cilities and privileges which should be refused, and the belligerent 
to whose vessels or citizens they were to be refused, and thereafter 
the furnishing of such prohibited privileges and facilities to any 
vessel or citizen of the belligerent named in the proclamation should 
be unlawfu[ He might change, modify or revoke or renew such 
proclamations at his discretion. 
In case any vessel detained by virtue of this Act should depart 
or attempt to depart from the jurisdiction of the United States with-
out clearance or other lawful authority, the owner or master or per-
son or persons having charge or command of such vessel should be 
severally liable to a fine of not less than $2,000 nor more than $10,000 
or to imprisonment not to exceed two years, or both, and in addition 
such vessel should be forfeited to the United States. 
Lastly, the President of the United States was authorized and em-
powered to employ such part of the land and naval forces of the 
United States as should be necessary to carry out the purposes of 
the Act.196 
The reply of Great Britain to this note concerning the 
"blacklist" was given to Ambassador Page on October 10, 
1916, in a note in which Lord Grey stated that the Trading 
with the Enemy Act was to be regarded as purely munici-
pal legislation, not purporting nor claiming to impose dis-
abilities upon neutral commerce or individuals, but enjoin-
ing British subjects to cease relations with the enemy, di-
rectly or indirectly. The only disability imposed upon such 
neutral firms as had traded with the enemy was the dis-
ability suffered through the prohibition of trade with them 
19G39 Statutes at Large, Part I, 799-800. 
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by British subjects. It was not Great Britain's desire to ham-
per neutral trade, particularly with America, with whom 
she desired the closest commercial relations; such steps 
were not being taken to further British trade by cutting 
off the trade of British subjects-manifestly this was im-
possible. It had, previous to the war, been Anglo-Ameri-
can practice to treat domicil as the test of enemy character, 
in contradistinction with the continental practice which 
regarded nationality as the test . . . In the face of enemy 
activities it was essential for Great Britain to take steps 
to deprive such hostile interests in neutral countries from 
the benefits of trade with British subjects. Such was Great 
Britain's belligerent right, as was also the right to refuse 
bunker coal to those trading with the enemy. While not 
unmindful of the trust which the possession of sea power 
gave her, Great Britain could not refrain from imposing 
certain restrictions on the unlimited use of her coal sup-
ply when the interests of the Empire were at stake. This 
ended the correspondence as to the blacklist.197 
Between the sending of the main note of , October 21, 
1915, and the reply to it in April, 1916, the British Foreign 
Office adhered strictly to its policy of not heeding the diplo-
matic protests of the United States, but of referring all 
claimants to the Procurator General, where the· ships would 
be released on the production of satisfactory proof, or else 
would be held until the sitting of the Prize Court to be 
judged. Small shippers complaining to the Embassy in 
London could thus obtain no redress, so Mr. Page, in a dis-
patch to Mr. Lansing, dated February 19, 1916, suggested 
that in view of the fact that the Consul General in London 
was in the practice of communicating directly with the 
Procurator General's office in regard to all claims of Ameri-
can citizens, he would suggest the State Department to ad-
vise such shippers to communicate with the Consul Gen-
eral directly, unless the Department made diplomatic rep-
resentations. He himself would in future, when denied 
191fbid., pp. 87-92. (10.X.16). 
Controversy over Neutral Rights 127 
action by the Foreign Office, put the claimant in touch with 
the Consul General, advising him of the requisite docu-
ments for pushing his claims, viz. : the originals of bills of 
lading, invoices, previous correspondence with firms in the 
country to which goods were shipped, contracts, insurance 
policies and affidavits setting forth the facts in the case. 
Such, in .Mr. Page's opinion, was the speediest way of set-
tling cases which the British Government would not release 
from the Prize Court on diplomatic representations, or be-
cause such were not in order.198 
On March 16, 1916, Mr. Polk notified Mr. Page that the 
Department had adopted a policy of notifying firms to take 
such action as the Embassy in London had recommended 
as the most expedient way of presenting American claims, 
while explicitly stating that such notice by the Department 
of State, or such action by the Consul General in London 
in attempting to secure the release of American cargoes 
by the British authorities was not to be construed as an 
admission on the part of the United States of the legality 
of the action taken by the British overnment under Orders 
in Council. While the Department could not undertake to 
assist private persons in the conduct of proceedings before 
British Prize Courts, the American Consul General at Lon-
don would be glad to furnish the claimants with the names 
of reputable attorneys, for whose actions, however, the De-
partment and the Consul General were not to be held re-
sponsible.199 
Too much stress cannot be laid on this particular step 
taken by the Department of State, inasmuch as it conceded 
the practical efficacy of the British contentions as to the 
use of Prize Courts as the sole means of redress. How-
ever much the United States might protest diplomatically 
against the theoretical legality of the measures instituted by 
the British Government, it was forced to admit to its own 
tradesmen that the case of the United States as regards 
m EW No. 3, pp. 57-58. (19 .II.16). 
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Great Britain was in effect futile, if not irretrievably lost. 
Whether it was the result of the five months of "watchful 
waiting" during the summer of 1915, when a more direct 
and spirited protest might have achieved some decisive end, 
or not, it is a matter that must seem in the colder reasoning 
of the morrow of the war to have been a surrender to the 
stern law of the sea as administered by Great Britain and 
the French Government. Possibly this intransigent atti-
tude on the part of Great Britain was due to the more 
vigorous policy adopted by a war-time coalition Govern-
ment, against which the United States nit not wish to 
hurl itself in impotence. Suffice it to say, that for all prac-
tical purposes, the middle of March, 1916-the very period 
when the Congressional battle over armed liners was set-
tled against German claims to the dictatorship on the seas 
through her submarines-marks the end of British conces-
sions t<'> the United States, or of effective American resist-
ance to British claims. Thereafter the battle became worthy 
and full of propaganda material, for once that the United 
States had pronounced her attitude towards armed liners, 
and towards submarine warfare as exemplified in the case 
of the Sussex, it was but a question of time until the United 
States should decide to enter the conflict herself. From this 
time on the mention of the "freedom of the seas"200 became 
a topic on which Mr. Wilson might discourse volubly, but 
whatever meaning he might attach to those projects for a 
"radical reconsideration of many of the rules of interna-
tional practice hitherto thought to be established" as re-
gards maritime power, was forestalled by the active pos-
session and tenacious grip of Great Britain upon the lines 
of commerce on the sea. For only one brief instant did the 
hope of effiicient action to guard maritime rights recur, and 
that was on the very eve of America's entrance into the 
Great War, when, under the guise of armed neutrality, pos-
sible means of restriction of the unlimited belligerent rights 
of the Allied Governments at sea might have been thought 
200EW No . 4, pp. 381-386. (22.1.17). Address to the Senat e of the 
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within the bounds of practical attainment. But in the 
twinkling of an eye the opportunity for the assertion of 
American neutral rights in a truly impartial, militant form 
had passed, and a similar moment is hardly likely ever to 
recur. 
The reply of the British Government to the American 
note of October 21, 1915, was delivered by Sir Cecil Spring-
Rice on April 24, 1916, reviewing the statements of the 
United States and making reply to the charges of the 
United States point by point. In the view of the British 
Government, the complaints of the United States with re-
gard to intercepted commercial shipments were made 
against the means chosen for such interception rather than 
due to any belief that the goods so treated had a bona fide 
neutral destination. The British Government, therefore, 
held that new devices for despatching goods to the enemy 
must be met by new methods of applying the fundamental 
and acknowledged principle of the right to intercept trade 
of that sort. 
As regards search at sea instead of in port, the note held 
that the recurring attempts to conceal contraband intended 
for the enemy in innocent packages necessitated the exami-
nation of the ship and cargo in port. The problem of 
searching a ship at sea in troubled weather was demon-
strably impracticable, as proved by the experience of the 
Allied fleets during the war. While hardships might be 
caused to neutral vessels in taking them out of their course 
into port for search, it would be impossible under the ex-
isting conditions to confine the rights of visit and search 
to an examination of vessels where encountered without 
surrendering a fundamental belligerent right. The opinion 
of Admiral J ellicoe that such searches were impossible due 
to the size of the vessels, the danger from submarines and 
the presence of enemy agents using forged American pass-
ports, was submitted as technical evidence, tending to es-
tablish the necessity of search in port. Likewise the French 
naval authorities held that a ship "in order to be searched, 
should be brought to port whenever the state of the sea, 
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the nature, weight, volume, and stowage of the suspect 
cargo as well as obscurity or lack of precision of the ship's 
papers, render search at sea practically impossible or dan-
gerous for the ship searched" though when contrary cir-
cumstances existed the ship should be searched at sea. 
Bringing the ship into port was also necessary and justi-
fied when the recurrence of such searches in hostile wa-
ters201 until the innocence of a vessel were clearly proven 
would subject her to unwarranted dangers. 
The question of locality of search, ·the Allied Govern-
ments held, was of secondary importance. In view of the 
fundamental and incontestable belligerent right to · inter-
cept contraband, restrictions due to insufficient proof to 
condemn the cargo should not be allowed to limit this right. 
The Allied Governments were therefore compelled to take 
the most effectual steps to exercise that right. 
Regarding Prize Court procedure, British jurists had 
prepared the revised prize procedure adopted by Great 
Britain at the beginning of the war, so as to avoid a first 
and second hearing, and permit the concurrent examina-
tion and condemnation of cargoes without awaiting further 
proof. Prize procedure was regulated by municipal and 
not international law. The previous traditions of Great 
Britain were no basis for keeping Great Britain from con-
forming with French or continental prize practice, or in-
troducing such changes as modern Circumstances required. 
Prize Courts were only bound to give a fair hearing to the 
claimants presenting their case. Thus, first and second 
hearings being merely forms of procedure, the Allied Gov-
ernments were not bound to maintain them when they had 
become obsolete, and changes would expedite cases, elimi-
nate technicalities and fully enable the parties to prove 
their cases with all true and material facts before the court. 
Modern means of communication had made subterfuge 
and deception so easy that belligerent governments would 
not readily forego the use of all the means at their disposal 
20 1Literally, "dans la zone ou le voisinage des hostilites." 
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to secure the condemnation of a cargo with ultimate enemy 
destination. Mere evidence that goods were ostensibly de-
signed to become a part of the common stock of neutral 
countries could not be regarded as sufficient to prove their 
innocence, or hinder further inquiry as to their ultimate 
destination. The Allied Governments could not believe 
that the United States countenanced the existence of such 
illicit traffic through neutral ports, as actually . existed. 
In the presence of overwhelming evidence that consign-
ments of goods to neutral ports had been made to people 
who could under no possible circumstances have use for 
the products imported, the British Government submitted 
that no belligerent could in modern times be bound by the 
rule that no goods could be seized unless they were accom-
panied by papers establishing their enemy destination, and 
that all detentions of ships and goods must uniformly be 
based upon proofs obtained at the time of seizure. To press 
such a theory, it was held, was tantamount to asking that 
all trade between neutral ports should be free, and would 
render nugatory the exercise of sea-power and destroy the 
pressure which the command of the sea enabled the Allies 
to impose upon Germany. The United States could not be 
expected to "urge the technical theory that there should be 
no interference at all with goods passing between neutral 
ports," thus frustrating the Allied measures for the inter-
ception of commerce, because of its previous stand taken 
during the Civil War .... It was essential to the Allied 
Powers to see that the measures so taken were not rendered 
illusory by the use of adjacent neutral ports. Every effort 
was being made to distinguish bona. fide from suspicious 
commercial transactions, even though neutrals should be 
dissatisfied with the action of the Allies in determining to 
allow no more than the normal inflow of goods to neutral 
countries, as shown by previous experience to be actually 
needed. The mere fact of adjacency to neutral countries 
constituted in itself an element of proof of ulterior destina-
tion which no Prize Court could afford to ignore. 
As to the means of redress open to American citizens for 
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any injury or loss suffered as a consequence of belligerent 
action, and the claim of the United States that neutrals 
could not appeal to Prize Courts bound and fettered by 
municipal enactments which could not be questioned by the 
courts themselves, Sir Edward Grey held that the Prize 
Courts had jurisdiction to pronounce a decision as to 
whether an order or instruction to the naval forces issued 
by the British Admiralty was inconsistent with the prin-
ciples of international law, and could decline to enforce such 
orders, thus affording every facility for redress and com-
pensation to American citizens. While municipal law gov-
erned the establishment and procedure of Prize Courts, the 
substantive law applied therein between captor and claim-
ant consisted of the rules and principles of international 
law, and not the municipal legislation of the country, and 
the British Government laid particular stress on the fact 
that its competence and jurisdiction, vital to the perform-
ance of its duties, should not be encroached on. 
It only need be pointed out that the above reasoning in 
regard to the scope of the authority of the Prize Court is 
valid so long as the Prize Court exercises such rights 
in annulling obnoxious Orders in Council. Due, however, 
to the traditional practice in Anglo-American jurisprudence 
not to question the decision of the political authorities in 
the Government, it is extremely unlikely that any Court of 
Prize in Great Britain would have questioned the action of 
the British Government in establishing a blockade of Ger-
man ports. As a consequence, it is altogether likely that, 
as actually proved the case, all such Orders in Council 
would be held valid-just as German Prize Courts did not 
for a moment question the propriety of the measures of the 
Imperial Government-and no redress against the noxious 
effect of such Orders in Council could possibly have been 
obtained. 
Concerning losses to neutrals from the exercise of rights 
jure belli Prize Courts had ample jurisdiction to deal with 
them, and they were at the disposal of all aggrieved neu-
trals. Where such means of redress existed, recourse must 
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be had to such courts before there was any scope for diplo-
matic action. The very cases submitted by the United 
States, concerning the Magicienne, Labuan, Don Jose and 
Saxon, bore out the British contention that where the Prize 
Court was empowered to grant relief, no recourse through 
diplomatic channels could be permitted. 
As to the claim of exactions of wharfage, pilotage, port 
dues, etc., had been charged to detained American vessels 
under duress, it was stated that where detained vessels had 
J1.0t discharged cargo, no dues had been exacted; where car-
goes were discharged, the terms of the discharge were ar-
ranged by the Prize Court. The British Government held 
that the statement that waivers of the right to put forward 
claims of compensation had been exacted as a condition of 
release was not accurate, and that such waivers would be 
a hardship to the owners of released goods. Under the cir-
cumstances, no further exactions would be made, no.r those 
made be enforced. This is particularly important as being 
a veiled admission that the charges of the United States 
were substantially correct, even if "scarcely accurate." 
Provided that measures against enemy commerce were 
not impaired thereby, the British Government was willing 
to concert with the shippers of neutral countries as to 
means for reducing the probabilities of delay and risks of 
seizure; it was to such mitigation of the rigors of belliger-
ent measures rather than to abrupt changes either in the 
theory or the application of policies based on admitted prin-
ciples of international law carefully adjusted to modern 
war-time conditions that neutrals could best look for re-
lief. Otherwise the principles contended for by the United 
States would tend to deprive the Allied Governments of 
their belligerent rights. 
In closing, the Allied Governments stated that they had 
nothing to fear from any combination of neutral nations 
under the lead of the United States which would exert an 
effective influence to prevent the violation of neutral rights, 
if impartially undertaken in the true spirit of the rules of 
international law and humanity. This was, as may readily 
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be seen, tbe most vigorous instance of the use of propa-
ganda in purely legal controversy that had as yet come up 
in America's correspondence with the Allied Governments. 
Moreover, it bears out the view that once the crisis 
of the MacLemore resolution had been passed, the great 
aim of Anglo-French diplomacy became the enlisting of 
the aid of the United States in the Great War. While 
numerous "concessions" were made, and actes . de grace 
allowed, substantially no concession of the belligerent 
rights of the Allies was admitted, no acknowledgement of 
the rights of neutrals avowed, nor was any endeavor for the 
promotion of a concert of neutral powers really favored 
by Great Britain. At the very moment that she and France 
made these broadminded suggestions, the Paris Economic 
Conference, with its deep-laid schemes of an economic 
revanche were being laid out, regardless of the wishes of 
neutrals or its possible effect on them. The championship 
of neutral rights had become but a phantom idea to be 
raised at will by the Allied Governments as an enticement 
to neutrals to concert in measures directed against the 
economic structure of the Central Empires, no less cogently 
or forcefully than the Central Empires with their dreams 
of world dominion and Weltzollvereins were plotting. From 
now on, the conquest of neutral opinion was to become in-
creasingly easy, and the subjection of neutrals to the mari-
time rights of the Franco-English naval alliance swift and 
sure. The Uniti:id States had made its last move for the 
maintenance of its rights and had failed. 
This, in substance, had been the controversy between the 
Allied Governments arid the United States. It remains for 
us to sum up briefly the criticisms made by others on the 
particular topics covered under the caption of contraband. 
As regards the questions of visit and search, in port or 
on the high seas, Professor Hyde holds that 
in resorting to a procedure regardless of precedent, Great 
Britain assumed the burden of showing that changed condi-
tions freed it from restrictions previously acknowledged, 
and that its conduct was in any event but a reasonable if 
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fresh application of a fundamental belligerent right. The 
attempts of warships to visit and search neutral merchant-
men of great tonnage and in rough waters have not been 
c'onfined to wars of even the present century. The British 
task was rendered difficult and dangerous by the submarine 
operations of the enemy rather than by any absence of calm 
seas. Such operations often made it impracticable to con-
duct an extensive yet reasonably necessary search at the 
place where a suspected merchantman was encountered. 
In view of such circumstances, unlike those prevailing in 
any previous war, it may be admitted that searches in port 
were oftentimes the only effective searches by means of 
which the exercise of that right could become effective. 
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The right of search is not to be deemed an unrestricted 
means of interfering with the carriage of contraband to the 
enemy. It has never been more than a concession to a bel-
ligerent itself capable of exercising it on the high seas .... 
Doubtless latitude should be accorded a belligerent in at-
tempting to check traffic in contraband, and to ascertain its 
existence on the high seas. The procedure, however, where-
by innocent ships are forced to deviate from their courses, 
put into belligerent ports, and there submit to protracted 
searches as a means of indicating whether they or other 
vessels are participating in the war or are about to do so, 
appears to be at variance with the demands of justice. The 
British argument and the facts which supported it indicate 
why the right of search a s exercised in previous wars is in-
applicable to modern conditions. There is solid reason for 
the attempt to place within the reach of a belligerent' by 
some other process less injurious to innocent shipping, infor-
mation concerning the nature of neutral cargoes and the 
voyages of neutral vessels. It is believed that neutral gov-
ernmental certification of ships' papers would offer as relia-
ble assurance as to facts ascertainable by search as could 
be furnished by a neutral convoy. Moreover, the burden of 
making such certification might be fully compensated by 
benefits derived from the freedom from annoyances under 
the system now prevailing. General approval of a pro-
cedure establishing reasonable neutral guarantees effected 
through increasing governmental control over neutral com-
merce may cause the exercise of the belligerent right of 
visit and search to sink into a much desired desuetude.2''~ 
Similar arrangements, in his opinion, would tend to estab-
lish, by some form of neutral governmental certification, 
"""Hyde. Mm·itime JT"a,- , l'P · 49-51. Cf. his lrit. Law, II, 443-444. 
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the inviolability of postal correspondence at sea, whereas 
the United States, by its stand, had essentially admitted the 
right of censorship in numerous cases,203 though the essence 
of American complaints had been that by virtue of the sheer 
naval force they possessed, the Allied Governments com-
pelled neutral steamship lines to put into allied ports and 
thus subject themselves to the municipal laws of the 
country. 
As regards contraband in general, "it may be fairly con-
tended that existing conditions of war place the burden 
squarely upon those who claim to be unmolested (i.e. upon 
neutrals). Neutral as well as belligerent governmental as-
surance ought to be given the state called upon to forego 
the right of capture and confiscation. . . . It is in the na-
ture and scope of assurance of innocent use that lies the 
hope of retaining for ' neutral st.ates the enjoyment of a 
trade which, as war is now waged, must otherwise be re-
garded as a traffic in contraband."204 
It is interesting to point out the vast possibilities inher-
ent in a concert of neutrals for the safeguarding of their 
rights, not only by means of convoy or armed merchant-
men-the externals of a system or league of modern armed 
neutrality-but by "the conclusion of a general arrange-
ment contemplating a system of regulated trade under neu-
tral governmental auspices and embracing a mode of giving 
requisite assurance that such articles would be employed 
for hostile purpose. Possibly the readiness of some states to 
acquiesce in such an arrangement might be accelerated in 
case simultaneously general agreement were made that 
neutral maritime powers should undertake, either to for-
bid the exportation from their territories of munitions of 
war and ingredients in their manufacture, or to facilitate 
the task of a belligerent in ascertaining both the character 
and destination of cargoes comprising such articles."20 "• 
203Ibid., p. 56 and note. 
204Hyde, Int. Law, II, 597. 
~00Hyde, op. cit., pp. 165-169, passim. Cf. also his Int. Law, II, 601. 
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While such may seem rather radical steps to take in view 
of the policy finally adopted by the United States on her 
entry into the war in acknowledging no distinctions be-
tween conditional and absolute contraband, and extending 
her contraband lists so as to preclude the possibility of her 
ever making "a further communication" to the Allied Gov-
ernments in regard to the question of contraband, the pos-
sibilities of such a course may be said to be fruitful in pro-
tecting in future the rights of neutrals by making their 
Governments responsible for the good faith of the shippers. 
Once that belligerents may find a definite locus for respon-
sibility in the neutral government, the right of search is 
superfiuous.20c 
2os For other critical reviews of the whole subject of contraband, 
right of search and continuous voyage, cf. Garner, op. cit., II, 285-
316, passim, and Baty, T ., "Continuous Voyage: The Present Posi-
tion." 9 Transactions of the Gro tius Society, 101-117. 
CHAPTER VII 
TRANSFER OF REGISTRY AND ENEMY· 
CHARACTER 
With the outbreak of the Great War there at once arose 
a very acute shortage of shipping in the ports of the 
United States. The ships of the British mercantile marine 
at once were taken over by the British Admiralty by vir-
tue of its previous agreements with the various steamship 
lines, as noted in our discussion of armed merchant ships. 
As concerns the German liners, after the abortive effort of 
the Kronprinzessin Cecilie to steal her way across the At-
lantic with a cargo of gold, and her final entry into the port 
of Bar Harbor, Maine, no effort was made by them to sail 
out of the various American ports into what was almost 
certain capture by British cruisers. As a consequence, the 
existence of a l¥ge unusable belligerent mercantile marine 
in our ports and the withdrawal from the trade routes of 
American commerce of the Brith:\h bottoms in which Amer-
ican goods were wont to be carried led to earnest inquiries 
by American merchants as to the possibility of the pur-
chase, in all good faith, of these various liners, for perma-
nent American use. 
This at once raised a serious question: Would the bellig-
erent governments, particularly those of Great Britain and 
France, raise any objection to the transfer to American 
registry of such ships, or question the validity or good faith 
of such transactions? This was a peculiarly pressing prob-
lem, and the State Department, alive to the necessities of 
the hour, at once issued a memorandum on the transfer of 
merchant ships of a belligerent to a neutral after the out--
break of war, holding the American position to be that mer-
chant ships of a belligerent might so be transferred if the 
transfer was absolute, made in good faith, without colorable 
or collusive action, under the municipal regulations of the 
country of the neutral purchaser. Such transfer could not, 
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of course, be made while the ship was in transitu, or in a 
blockaded port. As far as the provisions of the Declara-
tion of London were concerned, there was no binding force 
to them, since the Declaration had remained unratified and 
the American ratification had not been deposited at The 
Hague.201 
In pursuance of this policy, the Administration intro-
duced into Congress, and succeeded in passing at an early 
date, a bill designed to facilitate the transfer to American 
registry of foreign-built and owned vessels, whether of 
belligerent or neutral powers.'08 Under the stress of the 
emergency, it was provided that not all the watch officers 
need be Americans-an arrangement which, as we have 
already seen in the case of the M etapan, enabled an almost 
entirely British crew to be kept on board an American ves-
sel and to be officered almost without exception by British 
officers. Furthermore, survey, inspection and measurement 
by American officers was dispensed with. Once that this 
measure had been adopted, the transfer of ships from 
Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and Dutch lines was greatly 
facilitated, and the available ships were readily registered 
under the American flag. There remained, however, the 
German ships, and bids for these were now readily offered. 
As a result, a very few of such vessels were sold, notably 
the Hamburg American liner Dacia, whose case is of pecu-
liar interest in view of the fact that it tested the Allied 
standpoint towards the validity of such transfers. Ac-
cording to the evidence of purchase, the purchaser, Mr. 
E. N. Breitung, was not engaged in a collusive bargain with 
the Hamburg American line, but actually wanted the ship 
for his own permanent possession in the conduct of com-
mercial operations/00 
The Dacia was sold to Mr. Breitung in December, 1914, 
2o•See statement of State Department in Appendix, infra, pp. 169-
177, (7.VIII.14) . 
20s 38 Statutes at Large, 698-699; Chap. 256, 63rd Congress, 3rd Ses-
sion. 
209Senate Document 979, 63rd Congress, 3rd Session. 
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received her certificate of American registry at Port 
Arthur, Texas, on January 4, 1915, and was chartered to 
take a cargo of cotton to Bremen from Galveston, Texas. 
The ship loaded 11,000 bales of cotton and sailed from Gal-
veston to coal at Norfolk and receive final instructions be-
fore leaving for Rotterdam, in lieu of going to Bremen. On 
February 27, 1915, the French auxiliary cruiser Europe 
met the Dacia on the high seas near the entrance to the 
English channel, and, on examination of the ship's papers, 
which showed her to have been of Hamburg-American own-
ership at the beginning of the war, captured the vessel, 
"because it could not in time of war avail itself of the right 
of transfer to a neutral flag." 
The case was brought before the French Prize Council 
on August 3-4, 1915, the government asking the council to 
declare right and lawful the capture of the Dacia and all 
its accessories, including the supplies and provisions of 
every kind without exception found on board, even those 
claimed as personal property by the captain, an American, 
except the ship's papers, and the owner asking that the 
vessel be immediately released on bail, and her rightful 
transfer 'to American registry under American law and 
Article 56 of the Declaration of London as put in force by 
the French Government by a decree of November 6, 1914, 
be acknowledged; that her capture be declared void, as 
being neutral property; that she be released and her pro-
visions, etc., restored; and that compensation of 300,000 
francs be given, under the provisions of Article 64 of the 
Declaration of London, for the injury caused by the un-
justifiable c~pture of the ship, plus freight and demurrage 
charges. 
The council, being concerned solely with the validity of 
the capture of the ship, and not concerning the cargo, held 
that Article 56 of the Declaration of London, which pro-
vided that the transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag, 
effected after the outbreak of hostilities, was void unless it 
were proved that such transfer was not made in order to 
evade the consequences to which an enemy vessel, as such, 
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was exposed, was the only law applicable to the particular 
case, with only the force of a national act and not of an 
international one. 
On this point the report of the Drafting Committee had 
settled the question of bona :fide transfer by declaring that 
a belligerent cruiser encountering a merchant vessel laying 
claim to neutral nationality must inquire whether such na-
tionality had been acquired legitimately or merely to shield 
the vessel from the risks to which she would have been ex-
posed had she retained her former nationaliLy. 210 Accord-
ing to the report, from the determination of the neutral or 
enemy character of merchant vessels followed the question 
of the validity of their capture and the fate of the goods 
they had on board. So would be determined the neutral 
or enemy character of the goods. It is of the utmost im-
portance to bear this in mind, as the Prize Court in France 
held that it was not empowered to decide the fate of the 
goods according to the decree that embodied the provisions 
of the Declaration of London. As the German Prize Or-
dinance of 1909 had embodied these principles,"" it was 
held that the viewpoint of the French Government in thus 
interpreting the Declaration of London could not be con-
sidered extreme. 
Furthermore, as had been decided by the Supreme Court 
in the case of the Benito Estenger/ 12 the continuance of a 
vessel in the same trade as before transfer led to a pre-
sumption that the transfer had been effected in order to 
avoid the consequences of enemy character. Hence the 
council held that such a transfer to a neutral flag with the 
object of carrying on enemy trade and of protecting the 
ship from capture could not be valid against belligerents, 
hence the capture of the Dacia together with its rigging, 
apparatus, equipment, and supplies of every kind was de-
clared good and valid as a prize to be assigned to the claim:.. 
ants according to the laws and regulations in force. Ar-
ticles and effects, the personal property of the captain and 
2 1 0Cohen, op cit., pp. 133-134. 
2nHuberich and King, Prize Code of the German Empire, p. 11. 
212176 U. S. Reports, 568. 
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the crew, if not contraband, were to be restored to the 
claimants. 213 This decision seemed to settle, in the minds 
of the Allied governments, that the capture of vessels of 
former German registry, even if bound from neutral port 
to neutral port with a cargo of non-contraband, was quite 
legal, and that American registry, no matter whether legal-
ly made or not, could not be considered binding. 
It subsequently developed that the Dacia had been cap-
tured by a French cruiser purely because the British Ad-
miralty did not wish to reverse its own . policy, 214 hence the 
British Government was not fully committed to this policy. 
Later, however, in reply to a written question in the House 
of Commons on January 21, 1916, Lord Robert Cecil, speak-
ing for Sir Edward Grey, stated that the British Govern-
ment adhered in full to the provisions of the Declaration 
of London and the report on these matters. This in sub-
stance would mean the acquiescence of the British Govern-
ment in the views held by the French Prize Council.2 1 5 As 
no instance of this kind occurred after the abandonment 
by the Allied governments of the Declaration of London or 
under the Maritime Rights Order in Council of 1916,21 6 it 
may be presumed that the attitude of the Allied governments 
remained the same throughout the war.211 
In the cases of the American Transatlantic Company's 
steamers, Genesee and Hocking, seized by the British au-
thorities while plying between neutral ports, and giving 
rise to several exchanges of correspondence between the 
British Government and the United States, there was raised 
2139 AJI L, 1015-1027 ( 1915) . 
2 14The idea of letting a French cruiser make the capture appears 
to have been suggested to Sir Edward Grey by Ambassador Page, 
in order to relieve the British Government of the responsibility in 
the case of the Dacia. Cf. Hendrick, Burton, J. The Life and Letters 
of Walter Hines Page, I, 392-397. 
215Parliamentary Debates, 1916, Vol. LXVIII, Col. 859 (21.1.16). 
21aEW No. 4, pp. 69-72. (7.VIl.16). 
2 17For comment on the cas eof the Dacia, Cf. Garner, op. cit., I, 184-
• 198, passim. 
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the rather important question of so-called "beneficial own-
ership," under which category Great Britain held it pos-
sible to seize the vessels in question. The British Govern-
ment had from the first protested against the transfer of 
neutral vessels from their registry to American registry 
under-the American Transatlantic Company, and had taken 
occasion to seize the Genesee and the Hocking, even though 
under thoroughly authenticated neutral registry and flag, 
and while plying between two neutral ports and not carry-
ing, therefore, contraband cargo if anything could be con-
sidered contraband in coastal traffic from one American 
port to another, or to a South American port. The history 
of these cases was not published by the Department of 
State, inasmuch as the effort of the United States, in this 
instance at least, was not overwhelmingly successful, and 
only the final note in the series, on May 10, 1916,218 was 
made public. Elsewhere the story may be found-hidden 
in the pages of the Congressional Record and told with all 
the pro-German bias of the facile pen of the late William 
Bayard Hale, who may be regarded with suspicion for his 
motives, although in the main accurate as to the facts. 2 19 
This much, however, is revealed from the fragmentary 
correspondence available: that in December, 191~, the De-
partment of State had obtained from the British Govern-
ment assurances that they would not detain any vessels be-
longing to the American Transatlantic Company unless 
they should carry contraband, pending the decision of the 
British Prize Court in the cases of the Genesee and Hock-
ing. Meanwhile the State Department had made an ex-
haustive investigation into the organization of the Ameri-
can Transatlantic Company to determine the character of 
its stockholders. On April 22, 1916, however, the British 
Embassy informed the Department of State t_hat such ves-
sels could no longer enjoy the immunities accorded them 
21sEW No. 3, pp. 84-96. (10.V.16). 
219Congressional R ecord, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. LUI: 14. 
pp. 139-141. 
144 University of Texas Bulletin 
unless the company could give further assurances that its 
vessels would not trade with Scandinavia or Holland. 
To this Mr. Lansing replied that the American Trans-
atlantic Company, being an American corporation, was re-
garded as a citizen of the United States and must be so 
treated in accordance with the custom of nations. Accord-
ing to British Prize Court decisions, British corporations 
were British in character, regardless of what the political 
nationality of its shareholders might be, yet in recent cases 
they had condemned a vessel flying the German flag and 
refused neutral claimants an opportunity to establish that 
they were the beneficial owners of 'the vessel, owning the 
capital stock of the nominal owners, a subsidiary German 
concern, ruling that such facts would not benefit the claim-
ants. Similarly, the British Government had requisitioned 
British registered vessels in which the entire beneficial in-
terest was owned by Americans, holding that ownership 
by British corporations made them British, not American 
vessels. Thus British courts did not in any way recognize 
beneficial ownership in their own cases, yet the British 
Government sought to condemn the ships of an American 
corporation on the ground that they were entirely or largely 
enemy ow;ned, stressing beneficial, rather than actual, own-
ership as the criterion of national character. 
The American Transatlantic Company's stock was, to the 
best of the Government's information, entirely American 
owned, hence the United States could only regard these 
seizures as entirely arbitrary and unwarranted. This had 
been the original attitude of the United States, but the Gov-
ernment had "decided to let the matter rest" after receiv-
ing assurances that the remaining vessels would not be 
captured, pending prize court proceedings, unless these 
were unduly .protracted, or the remaining vessels carried 
contraband. The company had agreed to refrain from so 
doing. In view of this, the United States could not allow 
matters to stand if the British Government were to re-
pudiate the promise it had given. The argument of the 
United States was continued in the notes discussing the 
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so-called "blacklist," in dealing with ships denied ,privi-
leges at British ports. Evidence to substantiate these 
claims was furnished by the company itself,220 yet, as has 
already been noted, the net result of the standpoint taken 
by the United States was nugatory, and utterly preclusive 
of future claim upon the British Government, because of 
the adoption of similar lists of "trading-with-the-enemy" 
firms during the war. 
The Declaration of London on this point had held that as 
regards ships, the neutral or enemy character of a vessel 
was determined by the flag she was entitled to fly, 221 not 
by the flag she might choose to fly. This is one of t,he rea-
sons that gave little opportunity for the United States to 
make more than a formal protest at the beginning of the 
submarine warfare in 1915 against the illegal use of the 
American flag. At that time 22 2 the United States "reserved 
for future consideration the legality and propriety of the 
deceptive use of the flag of a neutral power in any case for 
the purpose of avoiding capture," but pointed out the seri-
ous consequences apt to result from such general use, as it 
"jeopardized the vessels of the neutral in a peculiar degree 
by raising the presumption that they were of belligerent 
nationality, regardless of the flag they carried." Such 
action the United States viewed with "anxious solicitude" 
and "grave concern," as it would seem to "impose upon the 
government of Great Britain a measure of responsibility 
for the loss of American lives and vessels in case of an at-
tack by a German naval force." To this the British Gov-
ernment replied that by the British Merchant Shipping Act, 
the use of the British flag by foreign merchant vessels was 
permitted for the purpose of escaping capture, and that in 
their opinion it would be unreasonable to expect Great 
Britain to pass legislation forbidding the use of neutral 
flags as a ruse de guerre. Such use was justifiable to escape 
22ocongressional Record, 64th Congress, 1st Session, Liil: 9525. 
(12.Vl.16). 
221Cohen, op. cit., p. 140. 
222EW No. 1, p. 55. (10.II.15). 
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captul'e, but a general use of neutral flags was not contem-
plated. It was, however, incumbent upon a belligerent war-
ship to ascertain the identity of a suspected vessel before 
attacking it.223 
The Declaration of London being in force at this par-
ticular time, it was legitimate to expect the British Gov-
ernment to conform to its wonted policy of test of na-
tionality rather than beneficial ownership as the real cri-
terion of enemy or neutral character. This was actually 
recognized in the case of the Proton. 224 But when, on Oc-
tober 20, 1915, an Order in Council repealed and made 
inoperative Article 57 of the Declaration of London, the 
British Courts, though enjoined to apply the rules formerly 
in force in such courts, were entirely free to do as they 
chose in the matter with the result that in 1917 it was held 
in the case of the Hamborn225 that a vessel registered in Hol-
land and flying the Dutch flag was in reality a German 
ship because the vessel belonged to German owners, though 
it did not appear that registration in Holland had been il-
legal. Still more close to the cases of the Genesee and the 
Hocking was the case of the Polzeath,226 where a vessel 
owned by a British corporation whose chief office was in 
Hamburg and which was controlled in Germany was con-
demned and forfeited to the Crown. While this was the 
case of recognition of beneficial ownership, it does not ap-
pear that a similar test could have been applied with suc-
cess to the Genesee or Hocking. Nevertheless the British 
Prize Court, on March 5, 1917, condemned the Genesee and 
the Hocking as good prize on account of their being bene-, 
ficially owned by enemy subjects. 2 27 
223/bid., p. 59. ( 19.II.15). 
22434 Times' Law R eports, 309; also Trehern, op. cit., III, 125. 
22s/bid., 145, also Trehern, op. cit., III, 80. 
22632 Times' Law R eports, 399, 647; also Law Reports, P. D., 117 
(1916). 
227Cf. London Times, March 6, 1917, for the decision of the Prize 
Court. For critical commentary on the cases of the Genesee and the 
Hocking, cf. Garner, op. cit., I, 198-199. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE CONTROVERSY OVER BLOCKADE 
It will be remembered that the controversy between the 
United States and the Allied Governments over restraints 
on commerce was traced in Chapter VI from the beginning 
of the war until the issuance of the famous Order in Coun-
cil of March 11, 1915, which proclaimed the beginning of a 
blockade of Germany by the joint Anglo-French naval 
forces. The blockade, as it was proclaimed, was declared 
to be an act of retaiiation, according to which no merchant 
vessel which sailed from her port of departure after the 
first of March, 1915, was to be allowed to proceed on her 
voyage to any German port. Unless the vessel received a 
pass entitling her to proceed to some neutral or allied port 
named therein, her goods must be discharged in a British 
port and placed in custody of the marshal of the Prize Court. 
Goods so discharged, if not contraband, and not requisi-
tioned for the use of the British Government, would be re-
stored to persons entitled to them upon such terms as the 
court might deem just. Vessels sailing from German ports 
after the same date were not to be allowed to proceed with 
any goods laden in a German port; such goods must be dis-
charged in British or Allied ports, and put under similar 
custody, where they might be detained, requisitioned or 
sold, the proceeds in the latter instance being paid into the 
court as the court might deem fit to direct. No proceeds 
from the sale of such goods were to be paid out until the 
conclusion of peace, except upon application of the proper 
officer of the Crown, unless it were shown that the goods 
had become neutral property before March 11. Nothing 
in the Order in Council was to prevent the release of neu-
tral property laden in a German port on application of the 
proper officer of the Crown, so as to comply with the pro-
visions of the Declaration of Paris. 
Merchant vessels sailing from their port of departure 
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after March 1, 1915, en route to non-German ports, carry-
ing goods with an enemy destination, or which were enemy 
property, might be required to discharge the goods in a 
British or Allied port, on the same conditions as goods 
bound directly for German ports. Likewise, with merchant 
vessels from non-German ports, carrying on board goods 
of enemy origin or which were enemy property, the British 
or French naval forces might compel the discharge of such 
goods in British ports subject to the conditions laid down 
for vessels breaking blockade outward from enemy ports. 
Interested parties claiming such discharged goods might 
issue a writ in the Prize Court against the proper officer of 
the crown and apply for an order that the goods be restored 
to him, or their proceeds paid to him, subject to the forms 
of Prize Court procedure. 
The most important provision laid down in the Order in 
Council was that merchant vessels clearing for neutral 
ports from British or Allied ports and proceeding to an 
enemy port would, if captured on any subsequent voyage, 
be liable to condemnation. This is peculiarly important, 
inasmuch as it was distinctly violative of the provisions laid 
down in the Declaration of London, even as accepted by the 
Allied Governments. The terms on which the Allied Gov-
ernments had accepted the Declaration, it will be remem-
bered, were that such vessels proceeding to enemy ports 
under false papers were liable to capture on the return voy-
age only, and not on any subsequent voyage. The terms of 
the Declaration itself were that a vessel breaking blockade 
outwards, or attempting to break blockade inwards, was 
liable to capture as long as pursued by ships of the blockad-
ing force, so that if pursuit were abandoned she could not 
be captured, the report holding that indefinite or unlimited 
liability to capture would be too extreme a position to 
take. 228 It introduced a considerable modification of Eng-
lish law and practice, according to Bentwich, since the rule 
of English Prize Law had been that a vessel was subje.ct 
22scohen, op. cit., p. 90, Article 20. 
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to capture for breach of blockade at any time after leaving 
port during a continuous voyage to the blockaded place-
the very rule that the Allied Governments had reestablished 
as a condition of their "acceptance" of the Declaration of 
London. It will be argued in this respect that no blockade 
had at that time been declared, which is technically but not 
actually true. All except the notification to neutrals and 
the delimitation of the blockaded area had been laid down 
in the Order in Council of August 20, 1914, 229 and when 
the sham of this action was made clear by the retaliatory, 
though plainly illegal, measures taken by the German Gov-
ernment in instituting a submarine "blockade," there was 
no longer any modus vivendi of keeping up a half effective 
and totally undeclared blockade by mere restrictions on the 
carriage of contraband and by the mining of the North 
Sea230 in retaliation for the mining operations of the Ger-
man Government. The blockade was now openly acknowl-
edged, although its limits were not clearly defined.2 " 
The Order in Council in question concluded by stating 
that none of its provisions should be deemed to affect the 
liability of a vessel or goods to capture or condemnation 
independently of· the order, nor to prevent the relaxation 
of its provisions in respect of the merchant vessels of any 
country which declared that no commerce intended for or 
coming from Germany or belonging to German subjects 
should enjoy the protection of its flag. This, of course, was 
a plain bid to all neutrals to depart from their neutrality 
in favor of Great Britain, and cannot be considered as a 
legally justifiable practice, as it would mean, in essence, the 
guaranteeing of neutral rights when they were surrendered 
to belligerents, or relaxed in their behalf. 
A decree of the French Republic, dated March 13, 1915, 
laid down in the main the same provisions as the British 
Order in Council, but as the correspondence and contro-
versy over the blockade are almost entirely with Great 
229EW No. 1, p. 7. 
230EW No. 4, p. 231. 
231EW No. 1, p . 66. (11.Ill.15). 
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Britain, it is scarcely necessary to detail the provisions of 
the French decree, save to say that Article 5 stated that in 
exceptional cases, at the suggestion of the foreign, war, 
and navy ministers, authorization for the passage through 
the blockade lines of specified cargoes or certain categories 
of merchandise destined to or coming from a specified neu-
tral country might be granted, but that goods coming from 
Germany should only be allowed to pass when they were 
loaded in neutral ports after having paid the custom duties 
of the neutral country. 23 ~ 
At this point it may be well, before entering the corres-
pondence in regard to the blockade, to point out that, ac-
cording to the rules on blockade laid down in the Declara-
tion of London, which should, in this instance, be regarded 
as the criterion of Allied action, a blockade must not extend 
beyond the ports or coasts belonging to or occupied by the 
enemy ;233 it must be effectively maintained by a force suf-
ficient really to prevent access to the enemy coastline; it 
must be applied impartially to the ships of all nations; it 
must be declared, specifying the date of its inception, the 
geographical limits of the coastline under blockade and the 
period within which neutral vessels might come out, and 
notified to neutral powers by the blockading power by 
means of a communication addressed to the governments 
direct, or to their representatives accredited to it, and to 
the local authorities by the officer commanding the blockad-
ing force, else the declaration would be regarded as void. 
These rules were to apply to cases where the limits of the 
blockade were extended or where a blockade was reestab-
lished after having been raised. Raising of a blockade must 
also be notified. Neutral vessels were liable to capture 
for breach of blockade contingent upon their knowledge, 
actual or presumptive, of the blockade. Such presumption 
was dependent upon the ship's having left a neutral port 
subsequent to a notification of blockade; otherwise it was 
2 32EW No. 1, pp. 67-68. (13.III.15). 
233Cohen, _op. cit., pp. 70-91. 
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incumbent upon the officer of the blockading force to per-
sonally notify the existence of such a blockade to the vessel 
concerned by writing the fact on her log-book. Failing such 
notification, a neutral vessel must pass free. Neutral ves-
sels might not be captured for breach of blockade except 
within the area of operations of the warship detailed to ren-
der the blockade effective. 
Concerning the meaning of such a rayon d'action or area 
of operations, considerable conflict had arisen in the Naval 
Conference, but the consensus of opinion of the reporting 
committee held that all the zones of action along a blockaded 
· coast, taken together, and so organized as to make the 
blockade effective, would be regarded as forming the area 
of operations of the blockading naval force. It did not seem 
possible to fix the limits of the area of operations in definite 
figures, which must be determined according to the circum-
stances in each particular case of blockade, as the coast 
might not be defended by fortifications. Though the area 
might be rather wide, the whole idea of blockade was in-
separable from the effectiveness of operations, and must 
never reach distant seas and there affect merchant ships,' 
which could not be proven to be making for a blockaded 
coast. The specific assurance given by both France and 
Great Britain that the blockade would not extend further 
than the European area did not, as will be seen, cover the 
question of hovering, which has not inaptly been compared 
to a blockade. 
According to Article 18 of the Declaration, the blockad-
ing forces must not bar access to neutral ports or coasts. 
This rule, in the opinion of the drafting committee, was 
necessary to better protect the interests of neutral coun-
tries. Concerning this, Bentwich points out that234 
a blockade, being exclusively a warlike act, cannot be made 
t o extend to any part of the coast which belongs to a neu-
tral power, even though there may be ready means of ac-
cess from that neutral country to the enemy country ... 
It was laid down by Lord Stowell in the case of the Stertn° 
that ships carrying goods from a blockaded port by means 
of a canal, or interior means of navigation, to a neutral 
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port which was open could not be seized for breach of block-
ade. Thus if England were blockading the German coast, 
our cruisers could not seize neutral vessels bringing innocent 
merchandise to or from German ports through the Scheidt. 
Article 19 further established the provision that what-
ever might be the ultimate destination of a vessel or her 
cargo, she could not be captured for breach of blockade if, 
at the moment, she was on her way to a non-blockaded 
port. It was the true destination of the vessel, the Draft-
ing Committee held, that was in question, and not the ul-
terior destination of the cargo. This, of course, bears out 
the distinctions so neatly drawn by Lord Loreburn between 
the objects of contraband interception and the aims of a 
blockade.m 
Lord Loreburn, looking at the evils of a purely commer-
cial blockade, sees, in any attempt to legalize it, the killing 
of its efficiency by the permission granted in Article 19 for 
neutrals to trade with other neutrals adjacent to the enemy, 
under the supposition that there would be no questioning, 
in the case of blockade, as to the ultimate destination of the 
· cargo. Similarly, the noble lord holds that a blockade of 
the Baltic Sea by the British navy would be legitimate only 
if Great Britain were at war with all the povy"ers on its 
littoral, hence in any maritime war in which one country 
bordering on the Baltic were engaged, the British fleet 
could not "blockade" the Baltic legally.237 
Far different is the view of Sir Francis Piggott in hold-
ing that 
234Bentwich, op. cit., pp. 44-45. 
23s4 Rob. Adm., 65. 
236Sir Francis Piggott, in one of his vehement philippics against 
the protests of the United States, has brought out the fact that if a 
neutral must sacrifice his rights Jn the carrying of cargoes to bel-
ligerent rights, in so far as those cargoes are contraband, the bel-
ligerent has one last resort and may take the last right of a neutral 
to trade with the enemy away from him by the declaration of a 
blockade, which not only stops all shipping, but puts even non-con-
traband under the ban. The Neutral Merchant and Contraband of 
War and Blockade, p. 77. 
231Capture at Sea, pp. 71-102, passim. 
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"contraband" and "blockade" are identical in principle; that 
they are merely convenient names given to varying exhi-
bitions of sea-power against the enemy, and the conse-
quences, to enemy and neutral merchant alike, do in fact 
depend on and vary with the force exhibited, that is, with 
the number and position of the ships employed upon the 
service, which, if effectively performed, results in both cases 
in seizure and condemnation. Blockade in principle is, 
threfore, nothing more than an indefinite extension of the 
list of contraband of war, subject only to the requirement 
that a sufficient number of ships should be placed in such 
a position as to make this extended threat of seizure effect-
ive. This, then, is practically what the Order in Council 
does. 2307 • 
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The writer of this passage then goes on to proclaim that 
the disappearance of a definite limit to the blockading line, 
the granting of the broad rayon d' action to a blockading 
fleet by the Declaration of London is in itself full warrant 
for the denial of any such strictures upon belligerent right 
as the waiver of the doctrine of continuous voyage relative 
to blockade in the Declaration of London would seem to 
imply. It is the bold assertion in the realm of maritime 
law that "might is right." 
Having thus found the legal situation in the allied coun-
tries by virtue of the existence of their decrees of Orders 
in Council-fashioned admittedly on· the Orders in Coun-
cil of 1807-to be in direct contrast with the Allied pro-
fessions in regard to the Declaration of London, having 
shown that the unveiling of the sham of an undeclared 
blockade by the action of the German naval authorities 
forced the Allied Governments to conform to the form, as 
well as the substance, of a blockade which had all but been 
declared before, it remains to be seen how the United 
States, confronted with such an aggressive exercise of bel-
ligerent power, accommodated herself to the situation thus 
created. 
This found its first expression in the American note to 
Great Britain on March 30, 1915,m wherein the United 
2a1, piggott, op. cit ., p. 79. 
23•EW No. 1, pp. 69-72. (30.IIl.15). 
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States contended that innocent shipments might be freely 
transported to and from the United States through neutral 
countries to belligerent territory without being subject to 
the penalties of contraband traffic or blockade. It was also 
assumed that the British Government would not dispute 
the provisions laid down as to blockade and the covering 
of enemy goods by the neutral flag as laid down in the 
Declaration of Paris. Calling attention to the case of the 
Peterhof, under which decision it was held that the mere 
fact of ulterior enemy destination was not cause for breach 
of blockade proceedings, the United States held that no 
claim on the part of Great Britain of justification for in-
terfering with these clear rights of the United States to 
trade with the enemies of Great Britain through neutral 
ports in goods that were not contraband, could be admitted. 
To admit it would be to assume an attitude of unneutral-
ity towards the enemies of Great Britain which would be 
obviously inconsistent with the solemn obligations of the 
United States. For Great Britain to make such claims was 
to abandon and set at naught her traditional principles. 
The blockade thus notified, the note continued, would. if 
defined by the terms of the Order in Council, include all 
the coasts and ports of Germany and every port of possible 
access to enemy territory. The novel feature of the block-
ade was that it embraced many neutral ports and coasts, 
barred access to them, and sub.iected all neutral ships seek-
ing to approach them to the same suspicion that would at-
tach to them if they were bound for the ports of the ene-
mies of Great Britain, and to unusual risks and penalties. 
These constituted distinct invasions of the sovereign rights 
of the United States. 
Though the United States recognized that a "close" block-
ade might not be possible under modern conditions, the 
spirit and principles of the established rules of war must 
be conformed to, whatever form of effective blockade was 
employed. 
If the necessities of the case should seem to render it im-
perative that the cordon of blockading vessels be extended 
across the approaches to any neighboring neutral port or 
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country, it would seem clear that it would still be easily prac-
ticable to comply with the well recognized and reasonable 
prohibition of international law against the blockading of 
neutral ports by according free admission and exit to all 
lawful traffic with neutral ports through the blockading cor-
don. This traffic would of course include all outward-bound 
traffic from the neutral country and all inward-bound traf-
fic to the neutral country except contraband in transit to the 
enemy. Such procedure need not conflict in any respect with 
the rights of the belligerent maintaining the blockade since 
the right would remain with the blockading vessels to visit 
and search all ships either entering or leaving the neutral 
territory which they were in fact, but not of right, investing. 
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The United States could not admit that the mere fact 
of establishing the blockade as an act of retaliation could 
become an excuse for, or a prelude to, any unlawful action 
on the part of the British naval forces. It was thus confi-
dently expected that the orders actually given would modify 
in practical application those provisions of the Order in 
Council which, if strictly enforced, .would violate neutral 
rights and intercept legitimate trade. The United States 
took it for granted that the approach of American mer-
chantmen to neutral ports situated upon the long line of 
coast affected by the Order in Council would not be inter-
fered with so long as they were not carrying contraband or 
proceeding to enemy ports. Wit'h such a wide area of 
operations to cover, it was assumed by the United States 
. that neutral vessels would have the right to pass through 
the blockading line in order to reach important neutral 
ports such as those of Holland and Denmark and Scandi-
navia, which were, of course, open for American trade. As 
Great Britain had no legal right to blockade these ports, 
it was presumed that she would not do so. From the terms 
of the Order in Council, the United States also inferred 
that Scandinavian countries would be !lllowed to trade with 
German Baltic ports, although it was essential in any block-
ade that it bear with equal severity upon all neutrals. 
The British Government, in its note of July 23, 1915, re-
plied to the American contentions, noting that the United 
· States admitted the right of a belligerent to establish a 
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blockade of enemy ports, but holding this to be obviously 
of no value if the belligerent were not permitted to cut off 
all the sea-borne trade of his adversary. The British Gov-
ernment, therefore, found itself unable to accept the con-
tention of the United States ·that if a belligerent was so 
circumstanced that his commerce could pass through ad-
jacent neutral ports, his opponent had no right to interfere 
and must restrict his measures of blockade in such a man-
ner as to leave such avenues of commerce still open. This 
was held unsustainable from either a standpoint of law or 
the principles of international equity. The British Gov-
ernment was unable to admit that a belligerent violated 
any fundamental principle of international law by apply-
ing a blockade in such a way as to cut off the enemy's com-
merce with foreign countries through neutral ports if the 
circumstances rendered such an application of the prin-
ciples of blockade the only means of making it effective. It 
will readily be seen that this plea, reduced to its lowest 
terms, is none other than that which the German Chancel-
lor advanced as his reason for his "chiffon de papier"-
that necessity knows no law. 
Testing the means sought to be employed by the British 
Government as to whether they conformed to the spirit 
and principles of the essence of the rules of war, the doc-
trine which the United States had been most zealous to ad-
vance during the Civil War-the doctrine of continuous 
voyage-was seen to have applied in American experience 
equally well to blockade and to contraband. Applying this 
to the situation confronting Great Britain, it was held that 
if the blockade could only become effective by extending it 
to enemy commerce passing through neutral ports; such an 
extension was defensible and in accordance with principles 
which had met with general acceptance-the very princi-
ples on which the United States had decided to rely when 
the various belligerents could not come to an agreement 
as to the unqualified adoption of the Declaration of Lon-
don. Citing the case of the Springbok, the British Govern-
ment held that what was really important was that adapta-
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tions of old rules should not be made unless they were con-
sistent with the general principles upon which admitted 
belligerent rights were based. That was the spirit of the 
measures taken to intercept commerce with Germany, and 
the penalty hitherto imposed, that of condemnation and 
confiscation of the vessel and goods, had been changed so 
as to avoid confiscation of either for breach of blockade. 
As regards the charge of the United States that the 
blockade was embracing neutral ports and coasts and 
barring access to them, the note held that the measures 
"could not be properly so described." This circumlocution 
was an endeavor to avoid admitting what, throughout the 
entire discussion of blockade, loomed up as the most obvi-
ous fact in the whole controversy. In the successful opera-
tion of the British blockade, little difficulty would be en-
countered by neutrals not trading in contraband except in 
so far as bordering countries constituted ports of access to 
and exit from enemy territory. As this was the entire matter 
in question, it is evident that the note here made a most 
fundamental acknowledgment. There were many ports, the 
note alleged, that could not be regarded as offering facili-
ties for neutral commerce only, and the only endeavor of 
the British Government was to interfere with trade with 
an ultimate enemy destination through such ports. 
In closing, the note pointed out that many questions re-
gardilJ.g the exact method of carrying out a blockade were 
unsettled. The one fundamental principle obtaining uni-
versal recognition was that entitling a belligerent to cut 
off, by effective means, the sea-borne commerce of his 
enemy. This was true of blockade; it was the same with 
contraband. This was the most bald and unequivocal state-
ment of the view of Sir Francis Piggott and his correligion-
ists of the school of worshipers of sea power. 239 
The classic reply of the United States to the position 
taken by Sir Edward Grey is to be found in the note of 
October 21, 1915,uo in which the United States held that 
m EW No. 2 , pp. 179-181. (23.Vll.15). 
2•0EW No. s, pp. 30-34. (21.X.15). 
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Great Britain's main defense of the successful working of 
her blockade of Germany had not borne fruit in the ability 
of the Allied naval forces to distinguish between enemy 
and neutral trade. The arrangements made in neutral 
countries to create special consignees or consignment corpo-
rations (like the Netherlands Oversea Trust )with power to 
refuse shipments and to determine the amount of imports 
actually needed had only hampered neutral trade by the 
intricacy of s11ch arrangements, thereby much reducing 
American trade with neutral countries. The shifting of 
the burden of proof by the belligerents to the neutral 
shippers to prove neutral destination was an endeavor to 
make the neutral exercise responsibility that rightfully 
belonged to belligerents. 
As regards the blockade itself, the United States was 
compelled to admit that it had misconceived the intentions 
of the British Government. The United States had, there-
fore, reserved for this occasion the discussion of the validity 
of the blockade, whose legality is now challenged. The 
charges made by the United States may be enumerated: 
(1) That the blockade was ineffective, as instanced by the 
freedom with which German naval forces cruised in cer-
tain portions of the North Sea and in the Baltic, seizing 
and bringing into German ports goods intended for neu-
tral countries. The placing of cotton on the list of absolute 
contraband by the British Government was adduced as 
proof of the ineffectiveness of the blockade and· of its 
doubtful legality. (2) That the blockade was not impartial 
in its application to the ships of all nations. German ports 
were open to Scandinavian trade, and Great Britain herself 
shipped great quantities of goods to Scandinavian ports 
while denying to American vessels access to the Scan-
dinavian coast. It had been held in British Prize Courts 
that if belligerents themselves traded with blockaded ports 
they could not be regarded as blockaded. (3) That it block-
aded neutral ports, in violation of the Declaration of Lon-
don, which the British Government had adopted without 
modification in that respect, as well as in violation of Sir 
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Edward Grey's instructions to the delegates to the Naval 
Conference. It was also noted that no limitation on the 
blockade area nor any penalty for breach of blockade had 
been prescribed. On all of these grounds the United States 
was bound to consider the blockade illegal. The British 
view in the case of the Springbok, as expressed by Sir Ed-
ward Grey himself, had been that it was exceedingly doubt-
ful if the doctrine of continuous voyage could be applied 
to a vessel carrying non-contraband material, which was 
the only instance where condemnation for breach of block-
ade alone was warranted. 
It was not until April 24, 1916, that the British Govern-
ment made reply, in concert with the French Government, 
pointing out, as regards the blockade, that the Allied Gov-
ernments had loyally complied with the spirit of the rules 
as laid down in the Declaration of London, having given 
due notice of the blockade and having treated liberally all 
neutral ships finding themselves in German ports at the 
time. The effectiveness of the blockade, it was pointed out, 
could be seen in the small number of vessels that escaped 
the Allied patrols. The most astonishing portion of the 
note is the one which states that 
the measures taken by the Allies are aimed at preventing 
commodities of any kind from reaching or leaving Germany, 
and not merely at preventing ships from reaching or leaving 
erman ports. His Majesty's Government do not feel, there-
fore, that the rules set out in the United States' note need 
be discussed in detail ... It need only be added that the 
rules applicable to a blockade of enemy ports are strictly 
followed by the allies in cases where they apply-as, for in-
stance, in the blockades which have been declared of the 
Turkish coast of Asia Minor or of the coast line of German 
East Africa. 
'This attempts to ignore the position laid down by the 
United States. In a subsequent section of the note, how-
ever, the question of the blockade of neutral ports is thus 
·dealt with: 
It is no doubt true that commerce from Sweden and Nor-
way reaches German ports in the Baltic in the same way 
that commerce still passes to and from Germany across the 
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land frontiers of adjacent states, but this fact does not ren-
der the measures which France and Great Britain are taking 
against German commerce the less justifiable. Even if these 
measures were judged with strict reference to the rules ap-
plicable to blockades, a standard by which, in their view, the 
measures of the Allies ought not to be judged, it must be 
remembered that the passage of commerce to a blockadecl 
area across a land frontier or across an inland sea has never 
been held to interfere with the effectiveness of a blockade. 
If the right to intercept commerce on its way to or from a 
belligerent country, even though it may entu that country 
through a neutral port, be granted, it is difficult to see why 
the interposition of a few miles of sea as well should make 
any difference. If the doctrine of continuous voyage may 
rightly be applied to goods going to Germany through Rot-
terdam, on what ground can it be contended that it is not 
equally applicable to goods with similar destination passing 
through some Swedish port and across the Baltic or even 
through neutral waters only? In any case, it must be re-
membered that the number of ships reaching a blockaded 
area is not the only test as to whether it is maintained ef-
fectively. The best proof of the thoroughness of a blockade 
is to be found in its results. (Italics are writers). 
To argue thus in the face of premises that were them-
selves the subject of dispute was but a bold endeavor to 
hide the fact that the blockade was notoriously ineffective 
in the Baltic because of the failure of Allied naval forces 
to control those waters. 
In regard to the placing of cotton on the list of contra-
band, it was alleged in the note that the necessity for such 
action was the very effort of the Order in Council to spare 
blockade-breaking goods from condemnation. The im-
mense demands in Germany for cotton for military as well 
as other purposes had, in the opinion of the Allied Gov-
ernments entirely justified the placing of cotton on the list 
of absolute contraband by an Order in Council of August 
20, 1915. 
As regards the retaliatory character of the Allied meas-
ures, it was held that the principle of retaliation was one 
firmly established in international law; that the meas-
ures taken by the Allies were not in conflict with any gen-
eral principle of international law, of humanity or civili-
Controversy over N eutra! R ights 161 
zation; that they were enforced with consideration against 
neutral countries and were, therefore, juridically sound 
and valid. Concerning the more abstract question of the 
legitimacy of measures of retaliation, the Allied Govern-
ments thought that the subject was one the consideration 
of which might well be def erred. 2 • 1 By this curt refusal , the 
Allied Governments put an end to a discussion futile from 
its inception and extremely embarrassing to the United 
States, whose view that any concurrence in such measures 
of retaliation by her would make her own conduct unneutral 
was thus reduced, from an abstract, though not perhaps 
from a sentimental standpoint, to reality. This extreme 
view of the Allied Governments was one based on the in-
exorable force of superior sea-power, and the United States 
had no choice but to submit to it. 
Before giving a final consideration to the means taken by 
the Allied Governments to enforce their blockade still fur-
ther, once that even the sham of the Declaration of Lon-
don had been thrown overboard by the Maritime Rights 
Order in Council of July 7, 1916,2• 2 , we may advert for a 
moment to the discussion of the question of hovering by 
Allied warships off American ports. This action in particu-
lar cases had led the United States to protest to the Brit-
ish Government and the Japanese Government in 1914 in 
regard to the acts of their war vessels off New York and 
Honolulu, respectively. 2• 3 In both cases, the warships were 
withdrawn. Mr. Bryan, early in 1915, called attention to 
the fact that the United States had regarded such conduct 
throughout the course of the Franco-Prussian war as "un-
friendly and offensive" (see Appendix, infra ) , but it was 
not until the Danish steamer Vinland was chased down the 
Atlantic seaboard of the United States and forced to seek 
shelter from British war vessels in American territorial 
waters, whither, it was alleged, the cruiser followed, that 
further representations were made. In these, reference 
241 EW No . 3, p. 77 . (24.I V. lG). (Italics are wr iter 's). 
z<2EW No. 4, pp. 69-71. 
rnEW No. 2 , p. 29, (24.IX.14) and p. 61. (20.I.15) . 
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was made to the unpublished correspondence, which com-
prised three notes of October 5, 1914, December 22, 1914, 
and April 16, 1915, and a request made that the British Ad-
miralty instruct its ships to desist from a practice which had 
been maintained for long periods at a time, and which was 
peculiarly disagreeable alike to the Government and to 
American tradesmen.244 
In reply, the BritTsh Government maintained that this 
was a purely extra-legal question, and one in which the 
United States could claim no right or precedent, as the 
action of American vessels during the Civil War amply 
warranted the actions now being pursued by the British 
cruisers. To this the United States rejoined by saying 
that much earlier practice, during the Napoleonic wars, 
had justified the United States in protesting against hover-
ing, and that Great Britain herself had protested during the 
Civil War, not as to the illegality of such action on the part 
of cruisers, but on account of the irritation that they caused 
to tradesmen. Fear that German raiders would escape 
from American ports showed a distinct mistrust of the 
ability of the United States to maintain her neutrality. 
Just as the mobilization of an army on a frontier in time 
of peace might be the cause of peculiar affront, upon the 
same. principle the constant and menacing presence of 
cruisers on the high seas near the ports of a neutral coun-
try might be regarded as a just cause for offense, although 
it might be strictly legal. To this the British Government 
did not even deign to reply. 
In the chapter dealing with the Declaration of London, 
brief mention was made of the final withdrawal of accept-
ance of the declaration by an Order in Council of July 7, 
1916, on the grounds that the successive Orders in Coun-
cil had given rise to doubts as to whether the Allied Gov-
ernments were acting within the strict bounds of interna-
tional law. In the place of the Declaration certain prin-
ciples were enunciated and rules laid down for the guid-
ance of the Allied fleets. The provisions as to hostile desti-
244 EW No. 3, pp. 131-141. (20.Xl.lf;). 
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nation were kept with the addition of the case where goods 
were shipped to or for a person who during hostilities had 
forwarded contraband goods to an enemy authority . . . or 
if the ship's papers did not show who was the real consignee 
of the goods. The principle of continuous voyage was to 
be applicable both in cases of contraband and blockade. 
This, of course, obviated any further controversy with the 
United States unless the latter should seek to push 
the legal determination of these controversies to actual 
arbitration. The United States took occasion to back down 
gracefully from its position by declaring, in a note of Sep-
tember 18, 1916, 245 that it deemed the rules established by 
the Order in Council of July 7, 1916, at variance with the 
law and practice of nations, and that the United States re-
served all of its rights in the premises, including the right 
not only to question the validity of the rules, but to pre-
sent demands and claims in relation to any American in-
terests which might be unlawfully affected thereby. Sir 
Maurice de Bunsen having replied that the United States 
could challenge their validity in British Prize Courts, m 
Mr. Lansing replied that without admitting that even in-
dividual rights, when clearly violated by Orders in Coun-
cil, must be maintained by resort to Prize Courts, the United 
States must announce that it, of course, had no intention 
to resort to British courts for the maintenance of such of 
its national rights as might be infringed by Great Brit-
ain's Orders in Council. 
On January 10, 1917, the British Government issued 
another Order in Coun~il defining the status of goods of 
"enemy origin" or "enemy destination" as applying to 
goods destined for or originating in any enemy country, 
"enemy property" being deemed to be goods belonging to 
any person domiciled in an enemy country. This was to 
have a retroactive effect on all goods which, having been 
discharged at a British port or an Allied port, were goods 
24 :>EW No. 4, pp. 75-6. 
2<6/bid., pp. 76-7. (10.X.16) and reply (24.XI.16). 
164 University of Texas Bulletin 
of enemy, though not German, destination, origin, or own-
ership. Similarly, by an Order in Council of February 22, 
1917, also modifying the Blockade Order in Council of March 
11, 1915, it was held that vessels encountered at sea on their 
way to or from ports in neutral countries affording access 
to the enemy without calling at a port in British or Allied 
territory would, until the contrary was established, be 
deemed to be carrying goods with an enemy destination or 
of enemy origin and should be brought into port for exami-
nation, and, if necessary, for adjudication by a Prize Court. 
Any vessel carrying goods with an enemy destination or of 
enemy origin should be liable to capture and condemnation 
in respect of the carriage of such goods, provided that ves-
sels complying with the foregoing requirements would be 
condemned only for actual carriage of enemy goods, the 
presumption being that her touching at an Allied port made 
her actions just. Such goods, if of enemy origin, when 
found aboard such vessels, would be liable to condemna-
tion. 241 
This supplied the missing link in the "effective block-
ade" argument that Mr. Lansing had adduced and closed 
the iron ring of maritime right and supremacy still fur-
ther. The United States, in these two instances, gave its 
tacit consent to the steps already undertaken. 
There remains the necessity of pointing out the particu-
lar conclusions to be reached from our study of the contro-
versy over the belligerent exercise of the right of blockade. 
Concerning this, Professor Hyde points out quite signifi-
cantly248 that the British argument appeared to re-st pri-
marily on the theory that the right to institute a blockade 
embraced the right also to render it effective. As has al-
ready been pointed out, the practice of the United States 
in the Civil War offers no justification for the British prac-
tice, because the particular cases involved, such as the case 
of the Springbok or the Peterhof, all involved additionally 
mEw No. 4, pp. 92-4. (22.11.17). 
24sc. C. Hyde, Blockade (State Department Documents) pp. 14-24. 
Cf. also his International Law, II, 668. 
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the carriage of contraband. No evidence was offered to in-
validate the position taken by the United States that the 
blockading of neutral coasts was not to be permitted, 
however seriously that might impair the value of the 
blockade of the enemy's coast. Such a contention that 
the right to make the blockade involved the right to 
bar access to neutral coasts has had no general sanc-
tion; the tendency has been hitherto distinctly the op-
posite. Instead of resembling the old-style blockade, or 
conforming in any way to it, the effort of the British and 
French Governments was rather towards an expansion of 
the right to capture, the only restriction being placed on 
the action of the belligerents being the ultimate destina-
tion or point of departure, or ownership of the goods in 
question, regardless of whether they were contraband or 
not. If carried to its logical conclusion, this extended right 
of capture means the destruction of the principle that free 
ships make free goods, a point which the British Govern-
ment was not anxious to discuss. 
Professor Hyde draws a very clear distinction in this 
connection between the right to intercept contraband and 
that to institute a blockade of hostile territory:""' 
The former is due to the fact that articles deemed to pos-
sess military or other special value to the belligerent into 
whose territory they come are objects which for that reason 
the enemy may reasonably endeavor to intercept when so 
destined. The application of the doctrine of continuous voy-
age to contraband merely signifies that the ultimate hostile 
use was inferred from an ultimate hostile destination and 
justifies seizure when the article is in transit to a neutral 
port while actually en route for belligerent territory. The 
right to establish a blockade is based on the claim that as a 
consequence of the power which a belligerent is able to exert 
against a particular place controlled by the enemy, all ac-
cess by sea thereto may be lawfully barred. The act of 
maintenance constitutes a hostile operation undertaken by 
a naval force and directed against the place blockaded as 
2•9Hyde, Blockade, loc. cit. Cf. also his International Law, II, 657-
669, passim, especially 668-9. 
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truly as if it were subjected to bombardment. Such a meas-
ure should not be directly or indirectly undertaken with re-
spect to territory possessed by states not engaging in the 
war.2so 
The placing of a screen or barrier before all commerce 
bound for neutral territory in proximity to that under block-
ade, and the interference with non-contraband and innocent 
traffic destined to the former justify such opposition as ema-
nated from the United States in 1915. It also suffices to 
account for the lack of general approval on th epart of mari-
time states ... In order to protect legitimate neutral trade 
in non-contraband articles with neutral territory contiguous 
or in close proximity to that controlled by a belligerent and 
under blockade, there is needed a definite prohibition of 
measures either capable of operating as a blockade of neu-
tral territory, or serving to enlarge the right of capture. 
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°For a defense of the blockade and an attempted refutation of 
the American contentions, Cf. Garner, op. cit., II, 326-334. It is only 
fair to add that Professor Garner cites copiously from the writings 
of proponents and opponents of the Anglo-French blockade. 
CHAPTER IX. CONCLUSION 
A summary of the controversy between the United States 
and the Allied Governments respecting neutral rights and 
commerce reveals the very wide extension of the rules of 
maritime war as existing on the outbreak of the World 
War. The evolution of those rules, as disclosed in the course 
of the controversy, has been such as to enlarge to a remark-
able degree the rights of belligerents at the expense of the 
rights of neutrals. This may be seen in the matter of cen-
sorship, and of mail seizures; in the wide extension of the 
categories of unneutral service; in the wholesale arming 
of the merchant fleets of belligerents to pursue limited but 
discriminate warfare against armed public vessels of the 
enemy. It is further instanced in the extension of the meas-
ures taken against ships and goods of enemy ownership, 
.actual or beneficial, as well as those of enemy origin or des-
tination. Lastly, it is evidenced in the wide extension of 
the belligerent rights of visit, search, capture, condemna-
tion and requisition as well as in the greater extension of 
contraband lists so as to destroy not only the hypothetical 
difference between absolute and conditional contraband, 
but virtually to subject all non-contraband goods to the 
same fate. In the contest between the def enders of neutral 
rights and the possessors of sea-power, the victory has in 
no wise been for the neutral. 
Undoubtedly, the conditions of modern warfare have 
either caused, or resulted in, changes in the rules previ-
ously obtaining. Under the pressure of naval necessity, 
contraband and blockade have in reality become dual as-
pects of a single process-the interception of enemy com-
merce. The power of belligerents to police the ·3eas has 
resulted in the exaction of compliance by neutrals in bei-
ligerent action against neutral nationals and property in 
ways hardly known before the World War. It is .seriously 
to be questioned whether in the future the rights of neu-
trals, if such there be, will receive any greater acknowledg-
ment at the hands of belligerents. It would appear that 
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the cumulative tendency of the measures taken by the Al-
lied Governments during the World War was to outlaw com-
pletely the group of states which, having broken their cove-
nanted word in one instance, did not scruple to trample un-
der foot other portions of the law of nations. Viewed in 
this light, the tendency of Allied measures closely ap-
proaches what is legally possible under the provisions of 
the League of Nations Covenant-the boycotting and 
banning of a covenant-breaker. In a reorganized society 
seeking to curb the violence of outlaws, the rights and in-
terests of the bystander are altogether likely to be swept 
away. No position of impartiality, of disinterestedness, 
of aloofness on the part of the neutral will guarantee him 
security; rather will his abstention from the enforcement 
of the common law of nations against branded madefactors 
mark him out as a tacit accomplice of the lawless and the 
passive abettor of criminal acts of war against the society 
of which he forms, albeit unwillingly, a part. Under the 
Covenant of the League, there can scarcely be immunity 
for neutrals any more than there will be impunity for out-
laws. 
Thus it is not inappropriate to question whether .the 
consistent diminution of neutral rights evidenced in the 
controversies of the United States with the Allied gov-
ernments is not an evidence of a tendency in consonance 
with the political integration of the world into a closer in-
ternational society. Under such circumstances, the free-
dom of the seas, involving of old a balance of power be-
tween neutrals and belligerents, will simply cease to exist, 
and legal authority of an unchallengable character will be 
vested in such naval powers as command and police the 
seas, to keep open the channels of commerce for law-
abiding nations, while utterly closing the world's highway 
to the commerce of lawbreakers. It is along such lines that 
the problems which vexed non-participants in the World 
War are most likely to be solved. 
APPENDICES 
THE TRANSFER OF MERCHANT SHIPS OF A BELLIGERENT 
TO A NEUTRAL AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF WAR 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE MEMORANDUM ATTACHED 
1. Merchant ships of a belligerent may be transferred to a neu-
tral after the outbreak of hostilities. 
2. If the sale of the ship is made in good faith, without defeas-
ance or reservation of title or interest in the vendor, without any 
understanding, expressed or tacit, that the vessel is to be retrans-
ferred after hostilities, and without the indicia or badges of a col-
lusive or colorable transaction. 
3. But the transfer cannot be made of such vessels in a blockaded 
port or while in transitu. 
4. The transfer must be allowable under and in conformity to 
the municipal regulations of the country of the neutral purchaser. 
5. The declaration of the London convention that transfers of 
an enemy vessel to a neutral during war will not be valid unless it 
be shown that the same was not made to evade the consequences to 
which an enemy vessel, as such, is exposed, if it were controlling of 
the question, relates only to the good faith of the transfer and not 
to the ulterior motives of the parties to reap the natural advantages 
to :flow from the operation of the vessel under the :flag of a country 
not at war, while it inverts the burden of proof of the good faith 
of the transaction. 
THE RIGHT OF NEUTRALS TO PURCHASE MERCHANT 
SHIPS FROM BELLIGERENTS IN TIME OF WAR 
INTRODUCTORY 
The right of neutrals to purchase merchant ships from belligerents 
in time of war is based upon, and is indeed part of, the right of neu-
trals to continue in time of war to trade with belligerents, which 
right is undoubted, subject to certain exceptions, relating princi-
pally to contraband and blockade. This right to trade with bellig-
erents is of universal recognition, although on occasions it has been 
denied in practice. During the Napoleonic wars the French and 
British Governments assumed to dictate the trade in which neutrals 
should be permitted to engage with the belligerents and to prohibit 
them from trading with belligerents altogether. But these decrees 
met with the firmest resistance on the part of the American Govern-
ment at the time, and after the occasions which produced them had 
passed, the English Government was compelled to reprobate and 
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abandon them. The commerce of neutrals should not be interrupted 
by the exigencies of war. The right of the citizens of a neutral 
country to trade in merchant vessels belonging to the citizens of a 
belligerent, with certain well-defined exceptions, may be said to be 
of well-nigh universal admission. 
The position of the United States on this question is historical, 
and, so far as my investigation has extended, has been uniform. 
This position may be stated as follows: 
A neutral has a perfect right to purchase the merchant vessels of 
a belligerent during a state of war, when such purchase is bona fide, 
without defeasance, reservation of title or interest, and intended to 
convey perfect and permanent title to the purchaser. This rule is 
subject to certain exceptions· herein noted. 
PRECEDENTS 
I shall now recite some of the precedents illustrating the position 
uniformly maintained by the United States. 
1. February 19, 1856, Secretary of State Marcy to Mr. Mason: 
"The principle, therefore, that a neutral has a perfect right to 
purchase the merchant vessels of a belligerent has been maintained 
by England, by Russia, and by the United States; and it is incon-
sistent with these historical facts to say that the contrary doctrine 
avowed by France has had the sanction of the chief maritime nations 
or that it forms part of the whole doctrine of maritime law." (Msc. 
Inst. France, Vol. XV, 321; see 11th Waits State Papers, 203.) 
(The position thus stated by Secretary Marcy is undoubtedly in 
harmony with the general English rule, but has been contested by 
France, where, under governmental regulations, enemy-built vessels 
cannot be made neutral by a sale to a neutral after hostilities begin. 
It is also claimed that the position of Russia is in line with the 
French contention. But it appears that the position of Russia is 
correctly stated by Secretary Marcy, supra.) 
Secretary of State Cass to United States Consuls, Circular No. 10, 
June 1, 1859: 
"Inquiries having been addressed to the Department as to the right 
of a citizen of the United States to purchase the vessel of a bel-
ligerent during the present war in Europe, I have to inform you that 
a similar question arose during the late Crimean War and was de-
liberately and carefully investigated by the administration for the 
time being and resulted in the conviction that a vessel so purchased 
in good faith becomes the property of the purchaser and is entitled 
to the protection of the flag of the United States, though a special 
act of Congress would be necessary to enable her to obtain a regis-
ter from the proper department. These views are entirely concurred 
in by the existing executive Government of the United States, and 
will be maintained whenever there may be occasion therefor." 
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To the same effect, Secretary Cass to Mr. Mason, June 20, 1859, 
(30 MS Dom. Let., 414), and Secretary Cass to Mr. Gittings, Junt. 
24, 1859, (30 MS Dom. Let., 429). 
The regulations referred to, supra, pointed out that the purchase, 
in order to be valid, must be in good faith and not a simulated pur-
chase of vessels to be employed in hostile operations against coun-
tries with which the United States are at peace. In this connection 
it is safe to say that where there has been merely an outward trans-
fer of title, as when the original owner is left in command and direc-
tion of the vessel, and the same is continued in identically the same 
service of trade, especially where the original owner retains, though 
secretly, an interest in the vessel or its operation, the sale would be 
treated as a mere subterfuge to screen the vessel from capture by 
one of the belligerents, and in such case the ostensible owner would 
not be entitled to the protection accorded to a vessel flying the flag 
of the neutral country. (Under this, see Mr. Fish, Secretary of 
State, to Mr. Marsh, January 29, 1877, MS Inst., to Chile, Vol. 2, 
p. 11). 
Boutwell, Secretary of the Treasury, to Mr. Washburne, Minister 
to France, May 23, 1871, and sent to the Secretary of State at the 
same time (see MS. Misc. Let.): 
2. "Can a foreign vessel be purchased by a citizen of the United 
States?" 
"In reply, I have. to observe that the natural right to acquire prop-
erty by purchase has been held by high authority to be unaffected, 
so far as neutrals are concerned, by the mere fact that a state of 
war exists between two or more powers, from the citizens or sub-
jects of one of which the purchase is made. Such right is subject, 
however, to the restrictions imposed by international law, by treaty, 
or by belligerent powers, respectively, as to the property of their own 
citizens or subjects puring the existence of such war. This principle 
is stated by one of the former Attorneys General of the United 
States, as follows: 'A state of war interrupts no contract of pur-
chase and sale, or of transportation, as between neutral and bel-
ligerent, except in articles contraband of war.'" 
3. The opinion of the Attorney General referred to was that of 
Mr. Cushing in 1854 (6 Op. Atty. Gen., p. 638) and 1855 (7 Op. Atty. 
Gen., p. 538), wherein the Attorney General said: 
"A citizen of the United States may purchase a ship of a bel-
ligerent power, at home or abroad, in a belligerent port, or on the 
high seas, provided the purchase be made bona fide and the property 
passed absolutely and without reserve, and the ship so purchased be-
comes entitled to bear the flag and receive the protection of the 
United States.'' 
4. On June 20, 1879 (Foreign Relations, 1879, p. 884), Secretary 
of State Evarts to Mr. Christiancy, minister to Peru, affirmed the 
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general doctrine as above stated, but pointed out the temptations to 
the abuse of the right and the great danger from inconsiderate ac-
tion on the part of United States consuls in facilitating such trans-
fers , but stated that "although the validity of the transfer may in 
the end be judicially inquired into, much harm might result from a 
simulated sale before a final decision on the subject could be reached; 
still the possible abuse of power by a sale is not a sufficient reason 
for abrogating the power, especially if Congress should abstain from 
forbidding the purchase and use abroad of foreign-built ships by 
American citizens." 
In a letter to Minister Christiancy, December 26, 1879 (Foreign 
Relations, 1879, p. 894), and in a similar instruction to the minister 
to Chile, Secretary Evarts again stated, among other things, that: 
"The right of Americans to buy foreign-built vessels and to carry 
·on commerce with them is clear and undoubted .... As a conse-
quence; an adjunct of this right, that of flying the American flag, 
cannot be prohibited. If circumstances justify on the part of the 
consular officers, an opinion that the sale is honest and that the ves-
sel has really become the property of a citizen of the United States, 
she may properly fly the flag of the owner's country as an indication 
of such ownership and as an emblem of the owner's nationality." 
(In this connection he said that a ship so transferred but not reg-
istered as an American vessel was not entitled to the immunities 
and thorough protection accorded to registered American vessels 
plying between ports of the United States and those of foreign coun-
tries; that American owners domiciled abroad and engaged in busi-
ness of that sort take upon themselves the risks to such traffic, and 
that, if seized by one of the belligerents, they have no right of diplo-
matic protection other than that they should be accorded fair treat-
ment in prize courts.) 
5. In reply to request for sanction of a proposed transfer of an 
enemy vessel to a neutral in a blockaded Cuban port in 1898, the De-
partment said, through Assistant Secretary Moore, that it would 
not give such desired permission or any privilege to the transfer 
from a belligerent to a neutral of a vessel in a blockaded port. (Mr. 
Moore to Messrs. Butler et al., May 10, 1898, 226 Dom. Let., 378.) 
(The refusal of this request was evidently based upon the fact that 
the vessel intended to be transferred was at the time in a blockaded 
port of the Cuban Government. It will be seen that this forms an 
exception to the general rule as hereinbefore stated.) 
6. In this same connection, the case of the B enito Estenger (176 
U. S., 568) is valuable as illustrating the general principle stated. 
In that case Chief Justice Fuller said: 
"Transfer of vessels fiagrante bello were originally held invalid, • 
but the rule has been modified and is thus given by Mr. Hall, who, 
stating that in France their sale is forbidden and are declared to be 
Controversy over Neutral Rights 173 
prize in/all cases in which they have been transferred to neutrals 
after the buyers could have knowledge of the outbreak of the war, 
says: 'In England and the United States the right to purchase ves-
sels is in principle admitted, they being in themselves legitimate ob-
jects of trade as fully as any other kind of merchandise, but the 
practice of fraud being great, the circumstances attending a sale are 
severely scrutinized and the transfer is not held to be good if it is 
subjected to any condition or tacit understanding by which the ven-
dor keeps an interest in the vessel or its profits, control over it, and 
power of revocation, or a right to its restoration at the conclusion 
of war.'" 
He cites Justice Story on Principles and Practice of Prize Courts, 
who states: "In respect to the transfer of enemy's ships during 
war, it is certain that purchases of them by neutrals are not in gen-
eral illegal, but are liable to great suspicions, and if good proof be 
not given of their validity by bill of sale and payment of a reason-
able consideration, it will materially impair the validity of a neutral 
claim; and if after such transfer the ship be employed habitually in 
the enemy's trade or under the management of a hostile proprietor, 
the sale will be deemed merely colorable and collusive.'' 
(The Chief Justice cites several English cases, which are valuable 
on the question of fraudulent and colorable transfers.) 
7. The Russian Prize Regulations of March 27,1895, section 7 
(Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 736), prescribe that merchant vessels ac-
quired from the hostile power, or its subjects, by persons of neutral 
nationality are acknowledged to be hostile vessels, unless it be proven 
that the acquisition must be considered according to the laws of the 
nation to whom the purchaser belongs as having actually taken place 
before the purchaser received news of the declaration of war, or that 
the vessels acquired in the manner mentioned, although after the re-
ceipt of such news, were acquired conscientiously and not for the 
purpose of covering hostile property. 
8; I find no citation of any American precedent or authority which 
denounces the general doctrine of the right of a neutral to purchase 
the vessel of a belligerent in time of war, where such purchase is 
made in good faith and is not subject to the charge that it was color-
able or collusive only. 
AUTHORITIES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 
1. Oppenheim's International Law (p. 206), discussing this ques-
tion, says: 
"Since many vessels are liable to capture, the question must be 
taken into consideration whether the fact that an enemy vessel has 
been sold during war to a subject of a neutral or to a subject of the 
belligerent state whose forces seized her has the effect of excluding 
her appropriation. It is obvious that if the question is answered 
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in the affirmative, the owners of enemy vessels can evade the danger 
of having their property captured by selling their vessels. There 
is no general rule of international law which answered this question. 
The rule ought to be that, since commerce between belligerent sub-
jects and neutral subjects is not at all prohibited through the out-
break of war, a bona fide sale of enemy property should have the 
effect of freeing such vessels from appropriation, as they are in fact 
no longer enemy property. But the practice among the states varies. 
Thus France does not recognize any such sale after the outbreak 
of war. On the other hand, the practice of Great Britain and the 
United States of America recognizes such sales, provided they are 
made bona fide and the new owner has actually taken possession of 
the sold vessel. If the sale was contracted in transitu, the vessel 
having started her voyage as an enemy vessel, the sale is not recog-
nized when the vessel is detained on her voyage before the new owner 
has taken actual possession of her." 
(The attempted sale of a vessel in transitu seems to form another 
exception to the rule permitting the sale of enemy vessels to neutrals. 
This and the other exception of an attempted sale of an enemy ves-
sel in a blockaded port appear to constitute the two principal ex-
ceptions.) 
2. Halleck's International .Law (Vol. 2, p. 93), discussing the sub-
ject, says: 
"The transfer, in time of war, of the vessel of an enemy to a neu-
tral is a transaction, from its very nature, liable to strong suspicion 
and consequently is examined with a jealous vigilance and subjected 
to rules of peculiar strictness in the prize court of an opposite bel-
ligerent. Nevertheless, neutrals have a right to make such p1,1r-
chases of merchant vessels, when they act with good faith, and the 
belligerent powers are not justified, by the law of nations, in attempt-
ing to prohibit such transfer by a sweeping interdiction, as was done 
in former years by the French and English governments. Ordi-
nances of this character form no part of the law of nations, and con-
sequently are not binding upon the prize court, even of the country 
by which they are issued. Nevertheless, when the sale is claimed to 
have been made by an enemy to a neutral in time of war, it is not 
unreasonable that these motives and terms should be an object of 
searching inquiry. Hence courts of admiralty have established se-
vere rules respecting these transfers." 
(He states these rules to be in substance: the sale must be abso-
lute and unconditional; the title and interest of the vendor must be 
completely and absolutely divested; if lhere is a covenant, 'lgreement 
or tacit understanding by which he retain& any proof of his interest, 
the contract is vitiated and in international law is regarded as void. 
He points out various instances in which a sale would be considered 
as colorable only.) 
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3. Phillimore's International Law, Volume 3, page 735, says: 
"In respect to the transfers of enemy ships during war, it is cer-
tain that purchases of them by neutrals are not in general illegal; 
but such purchases are liable to great suspicion; and if good proof 
be not given of their validity by bill of sale and payment of a rea-
sonable consideration, it will materially impair the validity of the 
neutral claim; and if the purchase be made by an agent, his letters 
of procuration must be produced and proved; and if, after such 
transfer, the ship be employed habitually in the enemy's trade or 
under the management of a hostile proprietor, the sale will be deemed 
merely colorable." 
He quotes the Privy Council in 1857 as follows: 
"The general rule is open to no doubt. A neutral, while a war is 
imminent, or after it has commenced, is at liberty to purchase either 
goods or ships (not being ships of war) from each belligerent, and 
the purchase is valid whether the subject of it be lying in a neutral 
port or in an enemy's port. During a time of peace, without prospect 
of war, any transfer sufficient to transfer the property between the 
vendor and vendee is good; a~o against a captor if war afterwards 
unexpectedly breaks out. But in case of war, either actual or immi-
nent, this rule is subject to qualifications and it is stated that in such 
case a mere transfer by documents, which would be sufficient to bind 
the parties, is not sufficient to change the property as against captors 
as long as the ship or goods remain in transitu." 
LONDON CONVENTION OF 1909 
The London convention (which was not ratified by the signatory 
powers and becomes valuable only as indicative of the disposition of 
the several governments) confirms rather than denies the position 
herein maintained. 
Article 56 of the convention is as follows: 
"The transfer of an enemy vessel to a neutral flag affected after 
the outbreak of hostilities is void unless it is proved that such trans-
fer was not made in order to evade the consequences to which an 
enemy _vessel, as such, is exposed. 
"Provided that there is an absolute presumption that a transfer is 
void-
" (1) If the transfer has been made during a voyage or in a block-
aded port. 
"(2) If a right to repurchase or recover the vessel is reserved to 
the vendor. 
"(3) If the requirements of the municipal law governing the right 
to fly the flag under which the vessel is sailing have not been ful-
filled." 
The effect of this article would be merely to change the burden 
of proof by reversing the presumption of the bona fidrs of the sale 
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and specifying certain conditions under which the sale would be con-
clusively presumed to be void. But this article does not change the 
general rule which I have asserted, to-wit, that the sale of a bel-
ligerent vessel to a neutral in time of war is valid where such sale 
is made in good faith and divests all title and interest of the vendor. 
In this connection the report of the drafting committee of the con-
vention is instructive. Of this article it is said: 
"The rule respecting transfer made after the outbreak of hostilities 
is more simple. Such a transfer is only valid if it is proved that its 
object was not to evade the consequences to which the enemy vessel 
is exposed. The rule accepted in respect to transfers made before 
the outbreak of hostilities is inverted. In that case there is a pre-
sumption that the transfer is valid; in the present that it is void, 
provided always that proof to the contrary may be given. For in-
stance, it might be proved that the transfer had taken place by 
inheritance." 
In this same connection, attention is directed to the report to their 
government by the British delegates to the convention respecting the 
work of the convention . . Referring to this article, they said: "The 
provisions respecting transfers made during war are less compli-
cated. The general rule is that such transfers are considered void 
unless it be proved that they were not made with a view to evade 
the consequences which the retention of enemy nationality would 
entail. This is only another way of stating the principle already ex-
plained that transfers effected after the outbreak of hostilities are 
good if made bona fide, but that it is for the owners of the vessels 
transferred to prove rnch bona fides. The provisions under this head 
are practically in accord with the rules hitherto enforced by British 
prize courts.'' 
From all of which it will appear that the declaration of the Lon-
don convention on the question of the transfer of merchant vessels 
from a belligerent to a neutral flag, but restates the position long 
maintained by the United States, Great Britain, and most of the 
other maritime nations, except as to the burden of proof of the bona 
fides of such a t~nsfer made during the existence of war. It is the 
bona fides of the sale which is the essence of a good transfer, and it 
is not perceived that the ulterior motive actuating the parties to the 
transfer is to govern, though such motive may have been the natural 
advantages in having the ship to fly the flag of a neutral rather than 
that of a country at war. If the transfer was bona fide, without de-
feasance or reservation of title or interest, without any understand-
ing that the vessel should be rjltransferred at the end of hostilities, 
and without other indicia of a simulated or fictitious transfer, and 
not of a ship in a blockaded port or in transitu, the transfer is valid 
under international law, as it would be under the London conven-
tion, though the ulterior motive of the vendor and vendee may have 
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been the natural advantage~ of flying the flag of a country at peace. 
This memorandum . . . it is believed, correctly presents the status 
of the question involved. 
Solicitor's Office, State Department, 
August 7, 1914. 
CONE JOHNSON. 
Congressional Record, LI: 13572. Cf. also Sen. Doc. 563, 63d Con-
gress, 2d Session, pp. 83-89. 
ON BOARD UNITED FRUIT COMPANY'S STEAMSHIP ":\!ETAPAN" 
October 8, 1914. 
SENATORS THOMAS AND SHAFROTB, 
Washington, D. C.: 
This is an American vessel, flying the American flag. On Sunday, 
the 4th instant, between Cartagena and Puerto Colombia, at 10 :30 
a. m., this ship was boarded by two French officers and two armed 
soldiers from the French war vessel, the Conde, who, through the 
captain, after having examined the ship's papers, ordered all the 
passengers into the dining-room. After some ten minutes all were per-
mitted to leave the dining-room except five young Germans, who were 
held imprisoned and compelled to each sign a parole in order to gain 
their liberty, binding them not to engage with Germany in this war 
against France, etc. 
After these young Germans had each signed in triplicate this pa-
role, the French officers and armed soldiers departed from the 
Metapan to the Conde, which had stood by during the search and 
seizure. The Meta pan was held for two and a half hours or more. 
This vessel had been recently transferred from a British ship to 
an American ship with other vessels of the United Fruit Company. 
This is her first voyage as. an American ship. The captain and all 
the officers, save the physician and the third officer, are British sub-
jects. The captain did not protest, so far as I oculd see or hear. He 
admitted to the American consul at Barranquilla, Mr. Isaac Manning, 
that he did not protest. I witnessed the entire proceedings as here-
in recited. 
I called the captain to account afterwards, and he claimed he did 
not know whether the Conde had the right to imprison and take off 
his ship these five Germans, said he could not find out until he ar-
rived in New York. He said he would know his rights and _ duties 
if this were a British ship .... 
This American ship was sailing between two Colombian ports, neu-
tral ports. Its entire voyage is between . neutral ports, unless it 
should halt at Jamaica. Four of these Germans were sailing from 
New York to Puerto Colombia, Colombia, and one went on board at 
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Cartagena, for Puerto Colombia. They were all going into the in-
terior of Colombia, away from Germany. Two were born in Ger-
many. One other was physically incapacitated to serve in the Ger-
man army and exhibited papers from the German. Government to 
that effect. 
Here was an outrage committed on American soil, under the 
American flag, by the Conde-the passengers were all practically 
imprisoned on an American ship by French officers of war. I urged 
Mr. Manning to protest and to report upon this act of the Conde. 
He has made a report of this affair to the United States Government. 
I have this report in a sealed envelope in my possession, with in-
structions to mail it when I reach the United States. These are the 
facts as I know them. Yours, 
ROBERT W. PATTERSON. 
Congressional R ecord, LI: 16765-6. (17.X .14). 
NEUTRALITY AND TRADE IN CONTRABAND 
The Department of State has received numerous inquiries from 
American merchants and other persons as to whether they could 
sell to governments or nations at war contraband articles without. 
violating the neutrality of the United States, and the Department 
has also received complaints that sales of contraband were being 
made on the apparent supposition that they were unneutral acts 
which this Government should prevent. 
In view of the number of communications of this sort which have 
been received, it is evident that there is a widespread misapprehen-
sion among the people of this country as to the obligations of the 
United States as a neutral nation in relation to trade in contraband 
and as to the powers of the executive branch of the Government over 
persons who engage in it. For this reason, it seems advisable to 
make an expfanatory statement on the subject for the information 
of the public. 
In the first place, it should be understood that, generally speak-
ing, a citizen of the United States can sell to a belligerent govern-
ment or its agent any article of commerce which he pleases. He is 
not prohibited from doing this by any rule of international law or 
by any treaty provisions, or by any statute of the United States. It 
makes no difference whether the articles sold are exclusively for war 
purposes, such as firearms, explosives, etc., or are foodstuffs, cloth-
ing, horses, etc., for the use of the army or navy of the belligerent. 
Furthermore, a neutral government is not compelled by interna-
tional law, by treaty, or by statute to !)revent these sales to a bel-
ligerent. Such sales, therefore, by American citizens do not in the 
least affect the neutrality of the United States. 
It is true that such articles as those mentioned are considE:red ron-
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traband and are, outside the territorial jurisdiction of a neutral na-
tion, subject to seizure by an enemy of the purchasing government, 
but it is the enemy's duty to prevent the articles reaching their des-
tination, not the duty of the nation whose citizens have sold them. 
If the enemy of the purchasing nation happens for the time to be 
unable to do this, that is for him one of the misfortunes of war; the 
inability, however, imposes on the neutral government no obHgation 
to prevent the sale. 
Neither the President nor any executive department of the Gov-
ernment possesses the legal authority to interfere in any way with 
trade between the people of this country and the territory of a bel-
ligerent. There is no act of Congress conferring such authority or 
prohibiting traffic of this sort with European nations, although in 
the case of neighboring American republics, Congress has given the 
President power to proclaim an embargo on arms and ammunition 
when in his judgment it would tend to prevent civil strife. 
For the Government of the United States itself to sell to a bel-
ligerent nation would be an unneutral act, but for a private indi-
vidual to sell to a belligerent any product of the United States is 
neither unlawful nor unneutral nor within the power of the execu-
tive to prevent or control. 
The foregoing remarks, however, do not apply to the outfitting or 
furnishing of vessels in American ports or of military expeditions 
on American soil in aid of a belligerent. These acts are prohibited 
by the neutrality laws of the United States. 
Department of State, 
October 15, 1914. 
Congressional Record, LI: 16814. Cf. also Sen. Doc. 604, 63d Con-
gress, 2d Session, pp. 3-4. 
ATTITUDE OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
TOW ARDS HOVERING 
Secretary of State Hamilton Fish to E. B. Washburne, Minis~er 
to France: 
Department of State, 
WASHINGTON, October 4, 1870. 
This Government desires and intends to maintain a perfect and 
strict neutrality between the two powers which are now unfortu-
nately engaged in war. It desires also to extend to both the mani-
festation of its friendly feeling in every possible way and will allow 
to the vessels of war of each power equally the hospitality of its 
ports and harbors for all proper and friendly purposes. 
But this hospitality is liable to abuse, and circumstances have 
arisen to give rise in the minds of some persons to the apprehension 
that attempts at such abuse have taken place. 
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I am not in possession of facts to justify me in saying that such 
has been the case, but I have deemed myself justified in calling the 
attention of M. Berthemy, the French representative at this Capi-
tal, to the current rumors, sustained, as they are, by the presence of 
a number of French vessels upon the coast of the United States. These 
vessels have appeared at or near the entrance of the harbor of New 
York, off Sandy Hook; at the entrance of the Long Island Sound; 
at or near the entrance of the Chesapeake Bay. One or more is rep-
resented to have been anchored not far from Sandy Hook, the main 
entrance to New York harbor, and there is a difference of statement 
as to the precise distance at which she lay from the shore, some 
claiming that she was within a marine league. But of this there is 
no positive evidence. She has entered the port of New York-as 
claimed by som~for the purpose of watching a German steamer 
about to sail thence. Three of them have put into the harbor of New 
London (which looks out upon Long Island Sound, the eastern en-
trance to the New York Harbor), avowedly for some small repairs; 
one recently asked permission, which was granted, to make some re-
pairs at the Norfolk Navy Yard, near the entrance of Chesapeake 
Bay. 
All this may be consistent with the intention of perfect observance 
of the neutral character of our waters and jurisdiction, and with an 
entire absence of undertaking any hostile movement against the ves-
sels of North Germany from those waters or that jurisdiction. 
A large trade has been carried on from the ports of the United 
States approached by the waters in which these vessels have thus 
appeared by vessels belonging to North Germany. 
The appearance of French vessels in these immediate neighbor-
hoods in such numbers and force does not fail to excite the alarm 
of these vessels and must have the effect to a greater or less degree 
to diminish that trade. 
The United States are not prepared at present to say that any 
actual violation of international law has been committed or that the 
hospitality of these waters has been positively abused. But the 
hovering of the v essels of war of a belligerent on the coasts n ear the 
entrance of the principal ports of a friendly power does interfere 
with the trade of the friendly power. 
The interruption of the regular communication with you, by rea-
son of the investment of Paris, has led me to r epresent to M. Berthemy 
our views on this subject and to say that, although the vessels of 
either belligerent may not actually shelter within the jurisdiction of 
the United Sta tes and proceed thence against the vessels of its enemy, 
this Government w ould r egard as an_ unfriendly act the hovering of 
such v essels upon the coast of the Unit ed States, near to its shores, 
in the neighborhood of its ports, and in the track of the ordinary com-
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merce of these ports with intent to intercept the vessels of trade of 
its enemy. 
I have requested M. Berthemy to make known these views to the 
French Government and to express the confident hope of the Presi-
dent that there may be no cause of complaint on the part of this 
Government by reason of any such hovering by the vessels of the 
French Government. 
You will be pleased to take an early opportunity to present the 
same view to the minister for foreign affairs, which you may do by 
reading to him this dispatch. 
HAMILTON FISH. 
Congressional Record, LII:1782 (18.I.15). (Italics are writer's.) 
STATEMENT AS TO USE OF CABLES AND WIRELESS 
Department of State, 
WASHINGTON, D. C., 
January 20, 1915. 
Communication by wireless cannot be interrupted by a belliger-
ent. With a submarine cable it is otherwise. The possibility of 
cutting the cable exists, and if a belligerent possesses naval superior-
ity the cable is cut, as was the German cable near Azores by one of 
Germany's enemies, and as was the British cable near Fanning Island 
by a German naval force. Since a cable is subject to hostile attack, 
the responsibility falls upon the belligerent and not upon the neutral 
to prevent cable communication. 
A more important reason, however, at least from the point of view 
of a neutral' government, is that messages sent out from a wireless 
station in neutral territory may be received by belligerent warships 
on the high seas. If these messages, whether plain or in cipher, di-
rect the movements of warships or convey to them information as 
to the location of an enemy's public or private vessels, the neutral 
territory becomes a base of naval operations, to permit which would 
be essentially unneutral.' 
As a wireless message can be received by all stations and vessels 
within a given radius, every message in cipher, whatever its in-
tended destination, must be censored; otherwise military information 
may be setlt to warships off the coast of a neutral. It is manifest 
that a submarine cable is incapable of becoming a means of direct 
communication with a warship on the high seas. Hence its use can-
not, as a rule, make neutral territory a base for the direction of naval 
operations. 
WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN. 
EW No 2, p. 58. 
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HON. OSCAR W. UNDERWOOD, 
House of Representatives. 
My Dear Mr. Underwood: 
Department of State, 
WASHINGTON, 
March 3, 1915. 
The Secretary has ... requested me to address you on a subject 
of vital importance to the Government in the present war situation. 
I refer to the necessity for additional legislation to enable the Gov-
ernment to enforce its neutral duties during the present war. It is 
known in some quarters that the Government has been hindered by 
l~ck of sufficient legislation to prevent vessels from leaving American 
ports with coal and supplies for warships at sea in contravention of 
the neutrality of the United States. The United States is bound by 
treaties in force to prevent the use of its ports as bases of naval 
operations, but there is no legislation by Congress to enable the Gov-
ernment to carry out these obligations. 
The Department of Justice, therefore, has drafted a proposed reso-
lution which, in its opinion, will give the President such power as 
will be necessary to carry out the neutral obligations of the Govern-
ment in these respects. The Department of State heartily supports 
the proposed resolution, and I desire to emphasize the great urgency 
and need of the immediate passage of a resolution in some such form 
as the one enclosed, in order that, in the present critical situation 
brought about by the stupendous conflict in Europe, the Government 
may not be bound internationally and yet have its hands tied so as 
to be unable to act in the discharge of its internationfl duties. 
Very sincerely yours, 
ROBERT LANSING. 
Congressional Record, Lil: 5454 ( 3.111.15). 
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